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The harsh radiation environment of space, the propensity for SEUs to per-
turb the operations of a silicon based electronics, the rapid development of mi-
croprocessor capabilities and hence software applications, and the high cost 
(dollars and time) to develop and prove a system, require flexible, reliable, low- 
cost, rapidly-developed system solutions.  Consequently, a reconfigurable Triple 
Modular Redundant (TMR) System-on-a-Chip (SOC) utilizing Field Programma-
ble Gate Arrays (FPGAs) provides a viable solution for space based systems.  
The Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor (CFTP) is such a system, designed 
specifically for the purpose of testing and evaluating, on orbit, the reliability of in-
stantiated TMR soft-core microprocessors, as well as the ability to reconfigure 
the system to support any onboard processor function.    
The CFTP maximizes the use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) tech-
nology to investigate a low-cost, flexible alternative to processor hardware archi-
tecture, with a Total Ionizing Dose (TID) tolerant FPGA as the basis for a SOC.  
The flexibility of a configurable processor, based on FPGA technology, will en-
able on-orbit upgrades, reconfigurations, and modifications to the architecture in 
order to support dynamic mission requirements. 
The CFTP payload consists of a Printed Circuit Board (PCB) of 5.3 inches 
x 7.3 inches utilizing a slightly modified PC/104 bus interface.  The initial FPGA 
configuration will be an instantiation of a TMR processor, with included Error De-
tection and Correction (EDAC) and memory controller circuitry.  The PCB is de-
signed with requisite supporting circuitry including a configuration controller 
FPGA, SDRAM, and Flash memory in order to allow the greatest variety of pos-
sible configurations.   
The CFTP is currently manifested as a Space Test Program (STP) ex-
perimental payload on the Naval Postgraduate School’s NPSAT1 and the United 
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The space environment presents numerous hazards to electronic sys-
tems.  Particularly, the effects of radiation can cause catastrophic problems.  To-
tal Ionizing Dose (TID) effects contribute to the deterioration of a device over 
time, and Single Event Effects (SEEs) are those radiation effects that occur un-
predictably with a wide range of consequences.  Many manufacturing techniques 
and mitigation schemes exist to alleviate or reduce the effects of radiation, both 
TID and SEE.  Although some devices are specifically manufactured to perform 
in the radiation environment, they tend to sacrifice performance, at a higher cost, 
compared to state-of-the-art Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices.   
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are available as both Radiation 
Hardened (RADHARD) and COTS devices.  They are comprised of thousands to 
millions of tiny programmable logic elements, each capable of performing a logic 
function, in a sea of interconnects.  Combining the TID tolerance of the RAD-
HARD FPGAs with various mitigation schemes, FPGAs have the potential to per-
form adequately in space.  Considering that an FPGA can be configured to per-
form the functions of COTS processors, it now becomes possible to provide 
COTS functionality in a RADHARD device. 
Applying the reconfigurability of RADHARD FPGAs to the space industry 
provides a tool for engineers to overcome some of the constraints that are im-
posed on systems designers.  First, systems can now be designed using FPGAs 
using the most current configuration of a processor.  As processor technology 
advances the FPGA’s configuration can be upgraded, not only prior to launch, 
but conceivably throughout the orbital life of the system.  Also, families of sys-
tems that are replenished over the long periods of time, for example the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) constellation, can be designed with FPGAs allowing 
for design changes eliminating the need to set processor technology years or 
even decades earlier than the last planned launch.  On-board systems would no 
 xviii
longer be required to be backward compatible, as the existing systems would 
simply be updated to match the latest technology. 
The Configurable Fault-Tolerant Processor (CFTP) is a system that has 
been designed from the beginning with many of these goals in mind.  It is cen-
tered on the concept of instantiating a Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) micro-
processor as a System-On-A-Chip (SOC), to provide COTS-like performance, at 
low-power and cost, for on-orbit applications.  The CFTP’s objectives, centered 
on the concept of reliable, reconfigurable, computing in space, were the starting 
point for this research.  The result has been the design and development of the 
CFTP’s architecture, culminating in the delivery of a Printed Circuit Board (PCB).  
The CFTP, through the Space Test Program (STP), has been manifested on the 
Naval Postgraduate School Satellite 1 (NPSAT1) and the United States Naval 
Academy’s (USNA’s) Midshipmen Science and Technology Application Research 
Mission 1 (MidSTAR-1), both to be launched in 2006. 
The development of the CFTP from a conceptual plan of a reconfigurable 
SOC to a full system followed three concurrent and mutually dependant proc-
esses.  Component parts were assessed and selected while the architecture was 
being developed and the functionality of the system was being determined.  
Changes in one of the processes required changes in the other two.  The final 
selection of parts, however, determined the end state architecture and functional-
ity.  
Designed around FPGAs, the CFTP utilizes Xilinx RADHARD Static Ran-
dom Access Memory (SRAM) FPGAs to provide TID-tolerant reconfigurable ar-
chitecture.  Supporting the FPGAs are Synchronous Dynamic Random Access 
Memory (SDRAM), Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM), and Electrically 
Erasable PROM (EEPROM), as well as discrete devices including resistors, ca-
pacitors and voltage regulators, and an oscillator.  The SDRAM provides system 
memory for the normal functioning of the system as a processor.  The EEPROM 
and PROM provide configuration storage for the two FPGAs.  Using an elaborate 
interconnection architecture between the CFTP’s devices provides maximum 
 xix
flexibility in both how the devices are configured and how the devices communi-
cate between each other.  Because the FPGAs can be configured for infinite 
functions, providing a robust interconnection architecture allows the greatest op-
tions for future configurations.  
Through this research, the required flexible architecture has been de-
signed using reliable components, in order to provide COTS-like reconfigurable 
performance.  Using this architecture and carefully selected components, the 
CFTP PCB has gone from concept to hardware, ready now for the next step in 
preparation for satellite integration and eventual launch. 
Further research is required to design suitable configurations for the vari-
ous controllers required by the two FPGAs, as well as configuration for state-of-
the-art follow-on processors, which will provide the aforementioned COTS-like 
performance.  The next step, however, is to validate the architecture and meth-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Utilizing microelectronic devices in space requires that engineers use 
highly specialized and very expensive parts in order to survive the harsh envi-
ronment.  Modern applications, including Digital Signal Processing (DSP) and 
image compression, demand significant processing power and speed, as well as 
increased complexity of the host system architecture for those satellites being 
launched today.  Unfortunately, since the end of the cold war the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the commercial electronics industry have been steadily re-
ducing research and development investment into the radiation hardening and 
reliability of microelectronics, deferring to the more lucrative consumer electron-
ics markets.  Consequently, the radiation hardened parts available lag state-of-
the-art technology by one or more generations.  Further exacerbating the prob-
lem is that the space industry has become more commercialized and accessible 
to companies outside of the DOD, tending to scale down satellite sizes and 
budgets, while satellite-building competition has increased.  The results of the 
above factors are simply that the space industry can no longer afford to exclu-
sively use radiation-hardened parts designed specifically for space applications.   
In addition to the problems associated with designing for the space envi-
ronment, spacecraft are deployed without an inherent ability to correct design 
mistakes, modify, or upgrade on-board systems, or repair damaged components.  
Presently there is no way to upgrade “multibillion-dollar satellite constellations 
with new faster computers except to launch new satellites” [1].  The long design-
to-launch time and subsequent orbital lifetime of a satellite result in systems that 
become outdated or non-productive due to rapid technology advancements after 
design has been finalized.  In fact, the development cycle cannot keep pace with 
Moore’s Law [2], forcing engineers, even under optimal circumstances, to deliver 
hardware that is already outdated. 
Spacecraft engineers must seek alternatives in their designs in order to 
satisfy customer demands for improved performance while ensuring that their 
2 
systems are not vulnerable to the ravishment of the space environment.  It is be-
cause the space environment tends to induce errors and failures in electronic de-
vices, that engineers are willing to trade performance for reliability and use radia-
tion-hardened parts.  In order to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices in 
lieu of radiation-hardened devices, and thereby provide state-of-the-art perform-
ance, designers increase the risk of system failure or malfunction even with the 
use of various fault avoidance schemes.  While using COTS devices may meet 
performance, cost, and design-to-launch time needs, it does not necessarily sat-
isfy the critical reliability or technology upgrade issues.  As suggested, however, 
there exists several hardware and software methods to improve (but not elimi-
nate) the reliability of COTS devices, with an associated performance penalty. 
Programmable logic represents a technology that has the potential to 
bridge the radiation-hardened - performance gap because the hardware can be 
designed as a radiation-hardened device while it is programmed with a state-of-
the-art functionality.  Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Field Programma-
ble Gate Arrays (FPGA), reconfigurable logic devices introduced in the early 
1990’s, offer a possible solution to this issue.  However, not all of these devices 
are radiation hardened and they slightly lag the commercial Application Specific 
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) performance.  They nonetheless offer numerous op-
tions to the system designer when considering the performance vs. reliability 
trade-offs. 
The focus of this thesis is on the design, development, and delivery of the 
Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor (CFTP) flight hardware.  The CFTP is a 
single Printed Circuit Board (PCB) multifunction system, maximizing the use of 
COTS technology including FPGAs, in order to demonstrate a reliable, recon-
figurable system capable of fully withstanding the deleterious effects of the space 
environment. 
A. CFTP BACKGROUND  
In order to give this research context, a brief discussion of the CFTP as an 
orbital experiment is required.  Eager students, focused faculty, patient and gen-
3 
erous sponsors, as well as valuable industry advisers have contributed to the de-
velopment of this project.  The CFTP represents much more than the result of 
several theses, but also the source for research and discovery for years to come.    
1. CFTP Objective 
The explicit objectives of the CFTP flight experiment are two-fold.  First, 
the CFTP will evaluate in various orbits, a Triple Modular Redundant (TMR), 
fault-tolerant, reconfigurable System-On-a-Chip (SOC) design in order to mitigate 
bit errors in computation by detecting and correcting errors using voting logic.  
Multiple orbits are an important aspect of the experiment, providing the opportu-
nity to evaluate the CFTP a variety of radiation fluxes.  Second, the CFTP will 
demonstrate the use of reprogrammable FPGA technology in spacecraft archi-
tecture as a viable means of decreasing development time, decreasing costs, 
and increasing reliability as well as flexibility in hardware development and im-
plementation [3].  
2. Concept 
The CFTP design is centered on the investigation of a low-cost, flexible al-
ternative for processor-hardware architecture, using FPGAs as a basis for a 
SOC.  The increased flexibility of the processor architecture, characteristic of the 
FPGA, will serve as a means of decreasing development time while allowing 
software development and component integration to commence at the earliest 
stages of development, with the expectation that the processor can be configured 
to support any design constraints.  TMR provides an essential aspect of the reli-
ability of the CFTP by mitigating single event transients in various radiation envi-
ronments.  This will enable the system to continue its normal functional routine 
without requiring a system reset and commensurate loss of data, normally asso-
ciated with a return to a trusted state.  Finally, the flexibility of a configurable 
processor, based on COTS FPGA technology, will enable on-orbit upgrades, re-
configurations, and modifications to the onboard architecture in order to support 
dynamic mission requirements.  This processor reconfiguration capability has 
been previously unavailable to space systems engineers [3].  The basic concept 
of the CFTP is depicted in Figure 1, with the FPGA-based TMR processor as the 
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large block on the left, the FPGA’s configuration storage located at the top, the 
processor’s memory on the right, the host system interface located at the bottom 


















































Figure 1.   CFTP Conceptual Diagram 
 
3. History 
The CFTP has evolved considerably from  its inception as an investigation 
into fault-tolerant computing techniques [4].  Research into the applicability, de-
sign and testing of component level TMR computers continued for several years 
and is detailed in References [5 – 8].  Concurrently, the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) Space Systems Academic Group (SSAG) incorporated a Config-
urable Processor Experiment (CPE) into the design of the Naval Postgraduate 
School Satellite 1 (NPSAT1) satellite’s Command and Data Handler (C&DH).  
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This experiment, based on findings from the research referred to above, captures 
the essence of the present incarnation of the CFTP.  The CPE formally became 
the CFTP in May 2002 after briefing the CPE during the NPSAT1 Critical Design 
Review (CDR).  It was at this point when the CFTP became a unique experiment, 
as opposed to a sub-component of NPSAT1 C&DH, with the goal of pursuing 
DOD Space Test Program (STP) support in order to integrate with additional sat-
ellites planned for multiple orbital regimes.  Through the Space Experiment Re-
view Board (SERB) process, the STP has manifested the CFTP on two satellites, 
NPSAT1 and the United States Naval Academy’s (USNA) Midshipmen Science 
and Technology Application Research Mission 1 (MidSTAR-1) satellite.  Re-
search, design, and development of the CFTP hardware have been on-going 
throughout the SERB/STP process.  Additionally Lieutenant Steven Johnson de-
veloped a TMR soft-core microprocessor for instantiation in the CFTP’s SOC [9], 
based on the research of Dr. Kenneth Clark [10].  The STP and SERB process 
are detailed in Section C of this Chapter, and documentation from the SERB/STP 
process can be found in Appendix A.   
4. Methodology 
The methodology throughout the development of the CFTP has been gov-
erned by six rules.  First, the CFTP must be reconfigurable.  This is to say that 
the CFTP must be able to communicate with ground stations, transfer data, 
status, and instructions, and reconfigure as commanded.  Second, the CFTP 
must utilize COTS technology whenever possible in order to minimize costs and 
maximize performance.  Third, flexibility must be designed into the hardware.  
Potential applications for the CFTP include spacecraft control and data handling, 
image processing and compression, information and network routing, Digital Sig-
nal Processing (DSP), and general purpose computing; as such, the CFTP 
hardware must be designed to support a myriad of applications, some of which 
have yet to be identified.  Fourth, the CFTP must be reliable.  The components 
selected and the system design must include necessary provisions, either hard-
ware, software or a combination, to ensure that the system will reliably perform 
its assigned task in its prescribed orbital environment.  Of course there exists a 
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practical bound—the budget.  The budget, as in any space-based application, 
includes size, weight, and power, in addition to the obvious cost.  If any aspect of 
the budget is exceeded, then CFTP becomes in serious jeopardy of losing flight 
opportunities.  Sixth, access to multiple orbits is essential to the evaluation of the 
CFTP.  Because higher orbits provide a much greater exposure to radiation 
fluxes and therefore an increased probability of single event transients, these or-
bits would also supply a larger collection of data with which to evaluate the suit-
ability of the design.  Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO), Molniya, or Medium 
Earth Orbit (MEO) orbits are preferred due to high radiation environments en-
countered; however, many of the CFTP design requirements can be met with 
high and low inclination Low Earth Orbit (LEO) orbits.  
B. GETTING TO SPACE 
The Space Test Program (STP) is a Department of Defense (DoD) activity 
under Air Force management that provides space access for DoD research and 
development experiments [11].  The STP’s objective is to obtain space flight for 
experiments on the DoD SERB priority list.  Through the SERB, the STP makes it 
possible for DoD academic institutions like NPS, United States Air Force Acad-
emy (USAFA), and USNA, to gain access to space.  
1. STP 
The STP was created in 1966 by a memorandum from the Director of De-
fense Research and Engineering to provide space flight opportunities for all DoD 
research and development activities in an economic and efficient manner [12].  
With the primary objective of flying the maximum number of payloads consistent 
with payload priority, launch opportunities, and funding, the STP relies on the 
service level and DoD level SERBs heavily.  In order for a payload to be flown by 
the STP, it must first be sponsored by a DoD organization and be screened by a 
series of review boards.  The process begins with submission of forms 1721 and 
1721-1, which detail the nature of the experiment’s needs.  If the experiment is 
considered valuable, then it will be invited to the appropriate service’s SERB for 
presentation.  Form the service SERB, the experiment is forwarded to the DoD 
SERB where it competes for ranking against experiments from all of the services.  
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The outcome of the DoD SERB determines what the experiment’s priority rank is.  
Rank, opportunity, and funding are the entering arguments from which the STP 
will create launch packages.  This process is shown in Figure 2, and FY2002 
summary is shown in Figure 3. 
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As mentioned above, the SERB has two phases, consisting of a service 
specific board and a DoD board.  Both boards rank experiments based on the 
same criteria: military relevance, quality of experiment, and Service SERB rank. 
a. Military Relevance 
Military relevance is 60% of the overall grade for an experiment.  It 
is intended to ensure that the experiment does pertain directly to the military.  
While science experiments are allowed, the goal is to apply the experiment re-
sults to the war fighter in particular [9]. 
b. Quality of Experiment  
The quality of the experiment is 20% of the overall grade, and it is 
intended to ensure that experiments early in their development, or even still in a 
conceptual phase, do not get too great an advantage over experiments that are 
near completion. 
c. Service Priority 
Service Priority, also 20%, takes into account the previous two cri-
teria and is a numerical ranking of the experiment against the entire group of ex-
periments being presented that year.  The CFTP, for example, was ranked 13th 
of 24 experiments at the Navy SERB in 2002. 
Service priority serves two purposes.  First, if the experiment has 
been presented in the past, it is an indication to the current service and DoD 
Board Members of the experiment's status the previous year. Second, it is used 
to prioritize experiments at the DoD Board for the service experiments.  Using the 
CFTP as an example, its ranking of 13 of 24 placed it in the middle of the Navy's 
experiments.  This gave the DoD Board an indication of the Navy's priority for the 































To STP  
Figure 4.   SERB Process (After Ref. [13].) 
 
3. Launch Vehicle Integration 
When the STP receives the rank order list of experiments form the SERB, 
it will endeavor to marry experiments to a satellite and launch vehicle.  For some 
experiments, a dedicated platform is required, and for others, such as the CFTP, 
several satellites can fit into a single launch vehicle.  The CFTP, as a single 
printed circuit board, simply needs a card slot in a satellite, and thus it was very 
easy for the STP to find suitable vehicles to carry this experiment to orbit. 
a. NPSAT1 
NPSAT1 is an NPS experiment that was the initial host of the CPE.  
When the CFTP became a separate STP experiment, it required that the integra-
tion process between the two in-house projects be formalized.  Fortunately, from 
a paperwork aspect, the NPSAT1 design was mature enough to forgo much of 
the tedious early technical integration documentation.  The result is that the 
CFTP is an integrated component of NPSAT1, supported by the STP, and will be 
launched in March 2006. 
b. MidSTAR-1 
The USNA’s MidSTAR-1 satellite provides a satellite “bus” to carry 
the CFTP and other small experiments to orbit.  This satellite is a SERB priori-
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tized and STP integrated satellite to be launched in March 2006, and underwent 
the same SERB briefing schedule as CFTP.  While many experiments were 
ranked higher than both CFTP and MidSTAR-1, the opportunity, availability, and 
scale of the projects were ideally suited for a vacancy on the same launch vehi-
cle as NPSAT1.  Thus, CFTP and MidSTAR-1 commenced an aggressive inte-
gration schedule requiring a considerable amount of documentation, to satisfy 
contractor and STP requirements.  Appendix A includes SERB and STP dcumen-
tation that has been required to integrate the CFTP in these two satellites. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to design, develop, and deliver reliable 
CFTP developmental and space flight systems utilizing COTS hardware, maxi-
mizing flexibility in design, and guaranteeing reconfigurability.  This research 
specifically concentrates on the component parts selection and the PCB layout 
for the CFTP.  The end result of this research will be the CFTP ready for system 
test and evaluation leading to program CDR. 
This work will not address the TMR microprocessor soft-core developed in 
Reference [9], nor will it specifically address the Error Detection and Correction 
(EDAC) coding which will become an integral part of the data structure.  These 
topics, as well as additional FPGA configurations and system wide pre-launch 
test and evaluation are left for future research.  
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will detail the design and development of the first CFTP PCB 
and is organized much like the design process itself.  Chapter II is a discussion of 
the operating environment, the effects it has on electronics, and methods to miti-
gate those effects.  Chapter III provides background material on the technologies 
that served as the foundation for this design.  Chapter IV is a discussion of the 
hardware-design trade space, processes that contributed to design decisions and 
a discussion of the development process.  Chapter V discusses the parts se-
lected for the CFTP.  Chapter VI presents the CFTP as a completed system.  Fi-
nally, Chapter VII will offer concluding remarks and topics for follow-on research. 
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E. ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION 
Appendix A contains SERB and STP required documentation, as an es-
sential aspect of the entire CFTP process.  This documentation has served to de-
fine the scope of this project throughout the development of the CFTP. 
The detailed schematic diagrams of the CFTP and CFTP PCB layer dia-
grams are presented in Appendixes B and C, respectively.  Finally, Appendix D 
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II. THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT AND ITS EFFECTS 
The harsh environment of space exacerbates common electrical circuit er-
ror occurrences seen on earth, as well as introducing a new set of problems.  
Close to earth’s surface, within the atmosphere, circuits are shielded from many 
of the effects of space, most notably radiation.  Leaving the earth’s atmosphere, 
a semiconductor device is exposed to an environment heavily populated by free 
electrons, protons, and high-energy ions.  These particles, as well as other as-
pects of the space environment can introduce a variety of errors into logic cir-
cuits. 
Semiconductor devices have a well-documented history of susceptibility to 
the effects of ionized particles [14 – 16].  This radiation induces two principle 
types of failures; Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effects and Single Event Effects 
(SEE).  Semiconductor devices experience SEEs in the form of Single Event 
Latchup (SEL), Single Event Transients (SET), and Single Event Upsets (SEU).  
Potential solutions and methods to mitigate the effects of the TID and SEE prob-
lems exist at all levels of the system design process, and become a critical trade 
space for the systems engineer throughout the design process. 
A. THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
The Earth’s magnetosheath, ionosphere and atmosphere all serve to pro-
tect the surface environment from the effects of the space environment.  Beyond 
the safety of our atmosphere, there exists an extremely severe environment 
characterized by all manner of destructive forces.  The effects of the conditions of 
this environment have a deleterious effect on everything that enters it.  The con-
ditions that will be discussed are the effects of the atmosphere and gravitation, 
the effects of vacuum and debris, and radiation effects. 
1. Atmospheric and Gravitational Effects 
The Earth’s atmosphere is far denser than the space environment and 
therefore requires vehicles or devices operating within the boundaries of our at-
mosphere to be designed to withstand the physical rigors caused by air, water, 
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trace elements and gravity.  Air, water, and trace elements conspire to induce 
drag, as well as to cause oxidation and erosion of materials.  These lead to struc-
tural weakness and must be accounted for in the design of any system operating 
within the limits of our atmosphere.  The density and pressure of the earth’s at-
mosphere decrease exponentially with altitude; nonetheless, these effects can 
still be felt in LEO (below approximately 600 km) [16].  The most significant ef-
fects on a system, however, are induced by the enormous forces associated with 
overcoming drag and earth’s gravity in order to put a satellite or vehicle in orbit.  
The required thrust imposes enough stress on the physical structure of a system 
that considerable design weight must be allocated to the systems’ structural in-
tegrity.    
2. Vacuum 
Extending beyond Earth’s atmosphere effects (beyond approximately 960 
km [16]) is the cold vacuum of space.  As density and pressure decrease, the ef-
fects of vacuum become more and more pronounced.  The most significant ef-
fects are outgassing and cold welding.  Outgassing is the release of trapped mo-
lecular gas from any material in a vacuum.  In some cases, if the material was 
incorrectly fabricated or not designed for use in a vacuum, the escaping gasses 
can be have destructive effects, either directly due to the loss of mass or indi-
rectly due to the deposit of the gas on other surfaces, called sputtering [15, 16].  
Cold welding occurs when the thin layer of molecular gas covering the surface of 
a metal, which serves as insulation between the metal and the surface next to it, 
is pulled away by the vacuum.  The metals will molecularly bond together as they 
are now in direct contact, essentially welding the surfaces together.  
3. Debris 
While celestial bodies may be few and far between, there is a significant 
amount of debris in space.  Particles, dust, meteors, asteroids, comets, and 
pieces of each of the aforementioned contribute to the debris of space.  In addi-
tion to this natural debris, the most common by-product of human space explora-
tion is… junk.  The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
“tracks more then 7000 objects, baseball sized and larger, in earth’s orbit [16].”  
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This debris, no matter how small, can have catastrophic effects on anything it 
may impact due to the high speed it is traveling; in excess of 7000 m/s [16]. 
4. Radiation 
“Radiation is the movement of energy through space by propagation of 
waves or particles” [7].  Our Solar System’s radiation environment is dominated 
by the Sun; however, the interaction of the Earth’s magnetic fields and energy of 
various forms from various sources impacting it also have a significant impact on 
the near earth radiation environment. 
The Sun truly dominates the near earth radiation environment due to its 
proximity and extremely high energy.  It is a source of protons, heavy ions and 
trapped particles in the Earth’s magnetosphere as well as a modulator of Galactic 
Cosmic Rays (GCR), atmospheric neutrons, and trapped particles [17].  The so-
lar cycle, an eleven-year period consisting of a seven-year period of solar maxi-
mum and a four-year period of solar minimum, drives the type and abundance of 
protons, electrons, heavier ions, and GCR’s that are present in space near earth.   
Solar particle events, including sunspots and solar flares, increase in both 
number and intensity during the solar maximum.  This can have a significant im-
pact on communications and weather on Earth, even with the natural shielding 
the Earth’s magnetic field provides [17, 18].  Protons with energies up to hun-
dreds of MeV and heavier ions with even higher energies bombard the Earth. 
Due to its partially ionized nature, this matter has a greater ability to penetrate 
the magnetosphere than GCRs [17]. 
 
 Solar Min Solar Max 
Trapped Electron Intensities Lower Higher 
Trapped Proton Intensities Higher Lower 
Atmospheric Neutron Levels Higher Lower 
Cosmic Ray Population Peak Level Low Level 
Table 1.   Electron, Proton, GCR Relative Intensities (After Ref. [17].) 
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Gradual solar events, such as coronal mass ejections, are the largest pro-
ton events.  These particles are accelerated by the shock wave created when the 
surface of the sun is breached and the plume of nuclear material is ejected [17]. 
Solar wind, from the corona, streams off of the Sun in all directions (not 
uniformly) at speeds of about 400 km/s (about 1 million miles per hour).  The so-
lar wind speed is high over coronal holes and low over streamers.  These high 
and low speed streams interact with each other and alternately pass by the Earth 
as the Sun rotates [19].  These wind-speed variations buffet the Earth's magnetic 
field and can produce magnetic storms, ions, and an increase in particle events.  
While the Sun’s effects on the near-earth radiation environment are the 
most significant, there are other contributors to the amount and type of radiation 
present.  A GCR ion or a charged particle such as Hydrogen, Helium, Iron, etc., 
are typically found in free space and consequently are called free space parti-
cles, and have energy levels ranging from the MeV to GeV levels [17].   
The net effect of solar particle and GCR bombardment on the Earth’s 
magnetosphere is the collection of protons, electrons, and heavier ions.  This col-
lection of energized particles has been previously referred to as “trapped parti-
cles.”  These particles penetrate the Earth’s magnetosphere and collect in bands 







Figure 5.   Van Allen Belts (After Ref. [20].) 
17 
The trapped particles in the Van Allen Belts include electrons trapped in 
the outer belt with energies up to 10 MeV, and protons trapped in the inner belt 
with energies from 40 keV up to 500 MeV [20].  The inner Van Allen Belt proton 
energies vary approximately inversely with altitude.  Figure 6 shows trapped par-
ticle intensities in number per cm2/s. 
Galactic Cosmic Rays Solar Flares
1 2 3 4 5 10
105106102 104 106 105106 3x106 102104 103
Protons > 10 MeV Electrons > 1 MeV
6 7 8 94 3 2 1
 
Figure 6.   Proton and Electron Intensities (From Ref. [17].) 
 
The Earth’s axis of rotation is not perpendicular to the sun, and a dip in the 
Earth’s dipole moment causes an asymmetry in the distribution of ions trapped in 
the Earth’s magnetosphere.  The sum of these effects is the South Atlantic 
Anomaly (SAA), an area where the belts dip closer to the earth’s surface.  This 
region of concentrated, unusually high-energy protons, was documented by the 
Multi-angle Imaging SpectroRadiometer (MISR) instrument aboard NASA's Terra 
spacecraft, and is shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.   The South Atlantic Anomaly, a Region of Extremely High Proton 
Density (From Ref. [7].) 
 
The above map was created with MISR camera data geographically pro-
jected over a map of Earth.  Individual orbit tracks are visible; some are missing 
due to data gaps, missing spacecraft navigation information, or other early-
mission processing problems [21].  The illuminated area shows a high concentra-
tion of proton hits, depicting the higher radiation activity in the SAA . 
The effects of charged particles from GCRs, solar particle events (solar 
wind, flares, coronal mass ejections, etc.), and trapped particles (the Van Allen 
Belts) have a significant effect on a satellites and orbital vehicles.  Effects include 
circuit damage, sputtering, surface damage due to impact, surface damage due 
to the charge-discharge cycle, leakage, erosion, etc.  These effects (shown as 
Hazards), the energy level, and the nature of the source (shown as Environment) 




Figure 8.   Radiation Environment Summary (From Ref. [22].) 
 
B. EFFECTS OF RADIATION 
In the radiation environment of space, semiconductor based circuitry is 
vulnerable to all of the conditions described above.  This section will focus on the 
effects of long-term exposure to radiation as well as transient (single particle 
event) effects, as related to semiconductor devices.  
1. Total Ionizing Dose 
TID is the cumulative long-term ionizing damage due to protons and elec-
trons being deposited in a device and is measured in Radiation Absorbed Dose 
(rads).  A device that collects charged particles over a long period will eventually 
fail due to the sum of the radiation absorbed.  This failure point is determined by 
the material, physical design, and device operating characteristics.  Although 
some annealing may occur during periods of inactivity or reduced exposure, 
generally as TID increases, material degradation will increase until the point of 
failure.  Long-term exposure can cause device threshold shifts, increased device 
leakage and power consumption, timing changes, and decreased functionality.  
TID effects may be mitigated using radiation-hardened devices and shielding.  
Electrons and low energy protons can also be partially mitigated with shielding. 
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Closely related to TID is dose rate, the rate at which radiation accumulates 
in a device.  The dose rate classification of a device specifies to what level the 
device was tested with respect to rate of accumulation of radiation.  In order to 
clarify the relationship between TID and dose rate the following brief example is 
provided.  A device rated with total dose tolerance of 100 krad at a dose rate of 
10 rad/s would indicate that it can accumulate up to 100 krad of radiation before 
failure at an exposure rate of 10 rad/s.  Suppose then that this device were 
planned for use in an orbit that averaging 5 krad accumulation per year.  Should 
an hour-long solar event occur producing 10 rad/s, then 36 krad would have ac-
cumulated in that single hour.  As a result, the lifetime of that device would be 
reduced approximately one-third, or from 20 years to less then 13 years.    
The most significant radiation-dose sources for satellites are from solar 
energetic particle events (e.g. solar flares), trapped particles, and passage 
through the SAA [23].  In LEO, the principle dose source is from the inner Van 
Allen Belt, and in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) the outer Van Allen Belt is the 
primary source of radiation.  Figure 9 shows the ionizing radiation environment in 
space.  
 
Figure 9.   Ionizing Environment (From Ref. [23].) 
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2. Displacement Damage 
Displacement Damage (DD) is the result of nuclear interactions, typically 
scattering, which cause lattice defects.  DD is due to the cumulative long-term 
non-ionizing damage (as opposed to the ionizing effects with TID) from protons, 
electrons and neutrons.  The collision between an incoming particle and a lattice 
atom subsequently displaces the atom from its original lattice position [23].  Fig-
ure 10 shows this effect. 
 
Figure 10.   Scattering Effect of DD (From Ref. [23].) 
 
The particles that cause displacement damage include protons of all ener-
gies, electrons with energies above 150 keV, and neutrons.  Shielding has some 
effect to mitigate the occurrence of DD.  DD degrades minority carrier lifetime; a 
typical effect would be degradation of gain and leakage current in bipolar transis-
tors.  A cascade of collisions, shown in Figure 11, occurs to a portion of the 
semiconductor lattice atoms.  These collisions are produced by both incident 
“heavy” particles (p+, n-, ions) and secondary particles.  Defects are produced 




Figure 11.   Cascade and Clustering Effects of DD (From Ref. [23].) 
 
3. Single Event Effects 
Simply stated, an SEE is any measurable effect to a circuit due to an ion 
strike [17].  Unlike the effects of total radiation dose, SEEs are instantaneous 
events, and are related to the level of radiation in a particular environment.  An 
SEE is caused by a single charged particle as it enters or passes through a 
semiconductor material [17].  Heavy ions and protons, due to their size and 
mass, are significantly more likely to cause an SEE then an electron.  Linear En-
ergy Transfer (LET) is a “measure of the energy deposited per unit length as an 
energetic particle travels through a material.  The common LET unit is 
MeV*cm2/mg of material (e.g. Si for MOS devices)” [17].  In silicon, for example, 
if the LET of the particle is greater than the amount of energy or critical charge 
threshold, an effect may be seen [17].  These effects are categorized as hard or 
soft.  Hard errors include, but are not limited to, SELs and Single Event Burnout 
(SEB).  Soft errors include SETs and SEUs.  
4. Single Event Latchup 
SEL is a condition that may result in the potentially permanent loss of de-
vice functionality due to a single-event-induced high-current state.  Transistors 
are made by layering silicon doped with impurities, forming p-type and n-type re-
gions.  The arrangement of these p-type and n-type regions creates channels for 
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current flow and is the basis for transistor logic.  The paths other than those cho-
sen to form the desired transistor can sometimes result in so called parasitic 
transistors, which under normal conditions would not be activated.  The parasitic 
circuit elements form what are called Silicon Controlled Rectifiers (SCR).  
Latchup occurs when a spurious current spike, such as that produced by an ion 
passing through the device, activates an SCR, combining to make a new circuit 
with large positive feedback.  The result is that the circuit turns on and causes a 
short circuit across the device until the device either burns up, completely drains 
the power supply, or the power to it is cycled and the parasitic transistor is reset 
[2, 17, 24].  Figure 12 shows a normal Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconduc-
tor (CMOS) inverter and its equivalent circuit in the top of the image, and in the 
bottom shows the parasitic transistor that is formed (and its equivalent circuit) by 
a charged particle entering the device. 
 
Figure 12.   Single Event Latchup (From Ref. [24].) 
 
5. Single Event Transient 
An SET is any short-duration, unexpected change at the output of a com-
binatorial circuit caused by a charged particle passing through a device.  In the 
case of an SET the event does not damage the device and only causes a mo-
mentary “hiccup” or short lived spike in an output.  The significance of this type of 
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event is that the spike generated, although only momentary, may be substantial 
enough to impact the circuit’s timing.  Figure 13 shows a drawing of a notional 
clock pulse affected by an SET. 
 
Figure 13.   Single Event Transient.  Double Clocking as a Result of Ion         
Induced Pulse (After Ref. [25].) 
 
6. Single Event Upset 
An SEU is any unwanted change of value in a memory cell, which is 
caused by a charge absorbed into the device body in a radioactive environment.  
More thoroughly, an SEU is a change of state or transient induced by an ionizing 
particle in a device.  The resulting bit errors can easily be corrected by resetting 
or rewriting the device, thereby returning it to normal operation [17].  SEU errors 
are classified as program flow errors, which occur when any register (e.g., pro-
gram counter) is affected by radiation, and data errors, which occur when any 
data storage (e.g., cache) is affected by radiation.  A full SEU analysis considers 
the system effects of an upset; for example, a single bit flip while not damaging to 
the circuitry involved, may damage the subsystem or system.  
Figure 14 shows how an energetic particle can produce a spurious electri-
cal signal.  Electron-hole pairs are created along the ion track through the device.  
The electrons and holes are collected at the source and drain of the transistor, 
inducing a current pulse [26].  This can be large enough to produce an effect like 
that of a normal signal applied to the transistor. 
  Heavy ion induced negative pulse 
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Figure 14.   Electron-Hole Generation Along Ion Path (From Ref. [26].) 
 
The circuit in Figure 15, a simple one-bit storage device, is designed to 
have two stable states, one representing a stored '0' and one representing a 
stored '1.'  In each state, two transistors are activated (on) and two are deacti-
vated (off) [26].  A bit-flip (SEU) may occur as a result of the current spike in-
duced as described above, causing the state of the transistors in the circuit to re-
verse.  This phenomenon occurs in many circuits, including memory chips and 
microprocessors, both on earth and in space.  In a computer, a bit flip could have 
any number of unpredictable effects, from trivial to catastrophic. 
 
Figure 15.   A Simple One-Bit Storage Device (From Ref. [26].) 
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C. MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF RADIATION 
Numerous methods, techniques, and work-arounds exist to mitigate the 
effects of radiation on a system.  These will be briefly discussed here. 
1. Fault Avoidance 
Fault avoidance refers to a system or device that is designed to prevent 
the occurrences of faults.  Each of the below techniques, while reducing the like-
lihood of a radiation-induced failure by “building-in” fault avoidance, increases the 
complexity of a device, as well as the cost. 
a. Shielding 
Shielding is the protecting of electronic circuits using materials im-
penetrable or only partially penetrable by radiation.  It is used at both the device 
level in the form of metal foils and chip packaging, as well as at the system level 
in the form of more substantial metal coverings or structures. 
(1) Metal Foils and device packaging.  Thin, light-weight 
metal foils and the shielding incorporated into a device’s packaging add a limited 
amount of protection against radiation.  Most effective in shielding alpha-particles 
and low energy protons, thin metal tends not to be effective for shielding GCRs, 
heavy ions, gamma rays, x-rays, and high-energy trapped protons [27]. 
(2) System Shielding.  Substantial shielding, including the 
use of dense materials such as lead can be very effective at protecting the cir-
cuitry of a space system.  Unfortunately, the weight of any shielding adds a sig-
nificant burden to the budget, considering that it costs “about $5,000 to $10,000 
per pound to put anything in space” [28].  In some cases the aluminum walls of 
the satellite may be sufficient [28]; in others the use of additional shielding must 
considered, even though it is essentially dead weight.  Consequently, the amount 
and type of shielding to be used must be balanced against the mission profile, 
expected lifetime, risk acceptance, and budget.   
b. Radiation Hardening 
Radiation hardening refers to improving the tolerance of microelec-
tronic circuits to various types of radiation [29].  The process, design and layout 
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all contribute to the level of “hardness” realized in a circuit or device.  Radiation-
hardened components, while not standardized, generally refer to parts that can 
tolerate 300 krad or more and are SEL immune, as opposed to radiation-tolerant 
devices which are rated up to 100 krad and do not guarantee SEL immunity. 
(1) Process.  The fabrication process is composed of 
many manufacturing steps which can affect the “hardness” of the design.  Silicon 
on Insulator (SOI) provides for transistors to be formed on top of insulating lay-
ers, such as sapphire, which is less likely to become charged by embedded ions.  
Similar to the SOI is the use of an epitaxial (epi) layer.  This is a lightly doped 
layer on a heavily doped substrate, which assists in preventing SCR formation 
and the subsequent SEL phenomenon.  Finally, thin gate-oxide designs tend to 
provide more radiation tolerance.  The thinner gate oxide reduces the buildup of 
charged particles and thus requires more charge before becoming biased leading 
to an SEL [30].  
(2) Design.  Designing radiation tolerant circuits requires 
that the organization and interconnection of electrical elements, such as resis-
tors, capacitors, and transistors, be carefully considered.  Generally, larger ca-
pacitors will be used for protection, thicker interconnects will be used in order to 
dissipate more energy, and in SRAMs additional resistors will be used [27, 30]. 
(3) Layout.  During the layout process, guardrings, or 
channel stops [31] are used around individual transistors or around areas, such 
as high voltage circuitry on the device.  Guardrings are the addition of p+ and n- 
diffusion regions in the p-substrate or n-well, respectively, and serve to collect 
minority carriers injected into the transistor.  By improving the reverse breakdown 
characteristics of the device, guardrings reduce the likelihood of SELs [8].  Figure 
16 shows a simplified guardring concept. 
 
Figure 16.   Guardring (From Ref. [32].) 
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2. Fault Tolerance 
The inability to guarantee fault avoidance in device and system design re-
quires that methods be devised to reduce the impact of non-fatal faults. 
a. System Processing Tolerance 
Numerous schemes exist for a system to reliably compute in an er-
ror-prone environment.  The use of timers, voters, and component or module re-
dundancy are the most common methods, and are found in both hardware and 
software.  Table 2 summarizes common protection methods. 
 
Table 2.   Summary of Protection Measures (From Ref. [29].) 
 
TMR is a combination of redundancy and voting as described in 
Table 2, and can be utilized in either hardware or software.  With TMR, critical 
components are replicated.  Each component delivers their outputs to voting 
logic responsible for passing on the corrected output in a best two-out-of-three 
manner.  Utilizing a scheme such as TMR provides the additional capability of 
capturing data concerning the erroneous bits such as which of the three devices 
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it occurred in and the time of the error.  The basic TMR concept is shown in Fig-
ure 17. 
 
Figure 17.   TMR Concept (From Ref. [8].) 
 
b. Error Detection and Correcting 
It is often impractical to use one of the above methods to mitigate 
the effects of SEEs.  In fact, many systems both on Earth and in space reduce or 
eliminate the impact of errors through the use of Error Detection and Correction 
(EDAC) schemes.  In addition to being a necessity for certain systems such as 
large solid state recorders [29], these schemes allow engineers to utilize emerg-
ing technologies while reducing much of the associated risk.  Table 3 summa-
rizes the more common EDAC methods. 
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Table 3.   EDAC Methods (From Ref. [29].) 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The severe environment found in space wreaks havoc on electronic de-
vices.  Most notably, the effects of radiation can cause a number of device and 
system level failures.  SEE and TID effects can, however, be mitigated or elimi-
nated through various hardware and software technologies.   
This Chapter has defined the environment that the CFTP must operate in 
and is thus one of the underlying reasons for design and development decisions 
made during the design and develop process.  Chapter III will provide additional 
background information concerning the specific technologies researched as they 
apply to the CFTP. 
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III. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND 
The space environment, as described in Chapter II, is a particularly inhos-
pitable place for electronic devices.  The radiation of space plays the most sig-
nificant role in the failure of electronic equipment in orbit.  There exists a wide 
range of these circuit-crippling events, including total failure, SEUs, SELs, and 
SETs.  Fortunately, as discussed, there are a number of techniques to protect 
circuits from the space environment.  Chapter II concluded with a brief discussion 
of the type of special methods and procedures that must be utilized in order to 
mitigate the effects of radiation.  Unfortunately, radiation hardened devices which 
are specifically designed to avoid faults or mitigate their effects have a price.  
This price is in the form of performance, cost, and availability. 
This Chapter will present a discussion of the trade-offs between COTS 
technology and RADHARD technology as background information relevant to the 
purpose of the CFTP.  Additionally, this Chapter will introduce the key technology 
that the CFTP is based on: reprogrammable logic and memory. 
A. COTS VS. RADHARD DEVICES 
The fault avoidance methods described in Chapter II are hardware meth-
ods employed to harden a device from the ravages of the space environment.  
RADHARD devices are those designed, manufactured, and packaged using 
these and/or other techniques, to produce a device that is guaranteed to with-
stand higher amounts of radiation than standard commercial devices.  
RADHARD parts, due to the exacting fabrication requirements and the processes 
involved to harden the devices are by their very nature slower, larger, and more 
expensive then their commercial equivalents.  While the radiation tolerance of 
RADHARD parts is consistently superior to commercial parts, RADHARD as a 
component description is not standardized.  For example, in the FPGA industry, 
Actel considers RADHARD devices to have SEL immunity below 80 LET and TID 
tolerant to 300 krad [33], while Xilinx considers its devices RADHARD up to 125 
LET and TID to 100 krad [34]. 
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In an effort to clarify, in this document COTS components refer to the lat-
est developed technology such as the Intel Pentium1 4 3.0 GHz utilizing a 0.13 
micron process or the Sun UltraSPARC III2 1.2 GHz, 14-stage pipelined, 4-way 
superscalar, variable instruction set microprocessor utilizing a 0.15 micron proc-
ess [35, 36].  The focus of COTS technology is understandingly on the booming 
and extremely lucrative consumer market.  By definition then, COTS devices are 
not designed with the features or by the processes required to harden them, and 
are thus susceptible to TID effects and SEEs.  It is sufficient to note that the fea-
tures that allow the COTS devices to perform so well are features that may lead 
to radiation softness.  Thus COTS components, with few exceptions, are gener-
ally not suited to operate reliably for long duration in space.  The exceptions are 
limited those devices that were not specifically designed to be radiation hardened 
but have been extensively tested and found to have radiation tolerance of ac-
ceptable levels [8].   
As discussed earlier, electronic components used in space systems must 
be radiation hardened, very reliable, and available for the long term.  It would 
seem to make sense for these reasons to utilize only RADHARD parts for space 
based applications.  On the other hand, due to the long design-to-orbit time, per-
formance, availability, and cost issues, RADHARD parts may not always be the 
most suitable choice for engineers. 
1. Design-to-Orbit Time and Performance 
The length of time from design (when the parts are selected) to the actual 
launch of a satellite is excruciatingly long as compared to the time to market for a 
commercial system.  This long development time creates a challenge, as the de-
signer must accept technology that will improve in performance as much as two 
or three times, predicted by Moore’s Law [2], before the system is delivered to 
orbit.  For example, the parts selected for the CFTP now will not be on-orbit until 
mid-2006; today’s technology will certainly be outdated by then.  In addition to 
the technology leaps that occur after the parts selection has been made, engi-
                                            
1 Pentium is a registered trademark of Intel Corporation. 
2 UltraSPARC is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
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neers enter the design process already behind current technology, considering 
that the state of the art RADHARD microprocessor is the RAD6000, a 32-bit Re-
duced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) with performance of 35 Megainstructions 
per second (MIPS) running at 33 MHz, utilizing a 0.5 micron process.  Clearly, 
this is hardly comparable to the performance of the Intel and Sun devices men-
tioned above.   
2. Availability 
The early electronics industry had a natural focus on the government and 
military as the primary customers, as the consumer market had yet to develop.  
When this held true, the availability of radiation hardened devices kept pace with 
non-hardened devices [8].  Also contributing was that the technology and fabrica-
tion process gap between RADHARD and commercial components was not as 
significant as it is today.  Now, RADHARD parts require unique fabrication lines, 
at a cost of over $2 Billion each [38].  As commercial demand has increased, in-
dustry has re-invested in the consumer electronics market, leading to a multipli-
cative cycle of improvement and re-investment.  As a consequence, the low vol-
ume, high risk RADHARD market has been left as secondary market at best.  
These factors all contribute to the lack of available RADHARD parts that are now 
made, with a few exceptions, as costly special order parts.     
3. Cost 
Closely related to the availability discussion above, is the issue of cost.  
The cost of commercial components is driven by the demand of the consumer 
market which is far greater that the demand of the RADHARD market.  This de-
mand has led manufacturers to focus on technology progress in order to improve 
sales and increase demand, while endeavoring to reduce cost throughout the en-
tire process.  As a result, state-of-the-art commercial parts are available in large 
volume at relatively low cost.  Meanwhile, the RADHARD market did not develop 
as the commercial market did; as such, it considerably lags in performance and 
cost.  To illustrate this point, Actel retails their commercial A1280 FPGA for $433 
while the RADHARD version RH1280 sells for over $10,000 [39]. 
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4. Which Technology to Choose? 
One of the underlying goals of the CFTP experiment is to utilize COTS 
technology to the greatest extent possible, while ensuring that the design will 
survive in the space environment.  Commercial technology would provide for a 
high performance design, utilizing the state-of-the-art components, at a cost that 
is within the allotted budget.  One of the major problems with commercial proces-
sors, however, is that they quickly become obsolete and, therefore unavailable, 
as new technology is developed [40].  Using conventional wisdom, regardless of 
whether COTS or RADHARD technology is selected, the performance of the de-
sign will be determined and fixed at the time of design.   
At this point it is valuable to recall another of the design goals of the 
CFTP—reconfigurability.  The ability to upgrade, modify, or correct the technol-
ogy of the CFTP while it is on-orbit will allow for state-of-the-art functionality as 
technology improves.  While programmable logic offers a possible solution to the 
quandary of which technology to select, in that the functions that it perform can 
be upgraded by reprogramming, it does not circumvent the problem of out-of-
date technology.  Programmable logic allows design changes to accommodate 
new requirements and to possibly counteract age or SEE related failures in satel-
lites.   
B. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC 
A Programmable Logic Device (PLD), in the most basic context, may refer 
to any number of devices that can be programmed to contain virtually any logic 
network conceivable [8].  This is in contrast to Application Specific Integrated Cir-
cuits (ASIC), which are custom designed, fabricated, and packaged circuits for a 
specific purpose and are not changeable once made.  Included under the general 
umbrella of PLDs are programmable ‘memory’ devices such as Read-Only Mem-
ory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), Erasable PROM (EPROM), and Elec-
trically EPROM (EEPROM), which will be considered types of memory, as op-
posed to programmable logic, for this remainder of the thesis. 
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Prior to the advent of PLDs, logic functions were designed into Integrated 
Circuits (ICs) with varying levels of complexity.  These devices were permanently 
programmed and evolved from basic logic functions, such as AND, OR, NAND, 
and NOR gates, to Arithmetic Logic Units (ALUs) then complex microprocessors.  
Because the logic functions are permanently designed into the device, there is 
little flexibility offered to a system designer to correct errors, or change the func-
tion, without redesigning and re-manufacturing the device.  If an engineer were 
not able to utilize existing, pre-designed logic functions, the only recourse avail-
able is to design a custom circuit.  ASICs, however, can incur a cost of over $1 
million in Nonrecurring-Engineering (NRE) expenses and require considerable 
time to design, troubleshoot, and manufacture [38].  Additionally, if a mistake is 
made or if a change is required, the process must be repeated.  Programmable 
logic offers relief from the inflexibility of preprogrammed logic and the costs as-
sociated with ASICs. 
The heart of the CFTP is the programmable logic SOC core.  The core 
FPGA requires additional logic in order to realize it full potential as a reprogram-
mable system while it is on-orbit.  Throughout the design process, trades were 
made between various types of reprogrammable devices for the various devices 
that make up the CFTP.  This Section presents a brief introduction to customiza-
ble logic solutions for system designer, as they apply to the CFTP.  Programma-
ble Logic Arrays (PLAs) and Programmable Array Logic (PAL3s) are the simplest 
form of the broader category of PLDs.  As technology has improved, the amount 
of logic able to fit within a single IC has increased.  This has led to Sequential (or 
simple) PLDs (SPLDs), which include flip-flops as well as logic gates, providing 
even more flexibility.  Figure 18, below, summarizes the differences between 
these three types of PLDs. 
                                            
3 PAL is a registered trademark of AMD [41]. 
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Figure 18.   (a) PAL (b) PLA (c) SPLD (After Ref. [42].) 
 
1. Complex Programmable Logic Devices 
Complex PLDs (CPLDs) represent the next step in programmable logic 
evolution.  The shrinking of transistor technology exceeded the scalability of 
PLDs, thus making extremely large PLA/PAL architectures unmanageable.  
CPLDs are, in their simplest context, an amalgamation of PLDs on a single chip, 
thus allowing IC manufacturers to reasonably increase the capacity of PLDs.  
The set of PLDs are tied together by a programmable interconnection structure 
allowing each of the unit PLDs to connect to one-another on the chip as a de-
signer would connect them as discrete parts.  While conceptually each CPLD is 
similar, manufacturers utilize slightly different approaches to the CPLD architec-
ture.  These differences are found in the individual PLDs, the programmable in-
terconnect architecture, and the input/output blocks.  Figure 19 illustrates the 
CPLD concept. 
    
Figure 19.   Conceptual CPLD Architecture (After Ref. [41] [42].) 
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2. FPGAS 
FPGAs follow CPLDs in the evolution of programmable logic and are truly 
the current paragon of PLD sophistication.  While not actually PLDs as described 
above, FPGAs are user-programmable devices that perform the functions of 
Large Scale Integration (LSI) circuitry.  In contrast to CPLDs previously dis-
cussed, FPGAs are comprised of many very small logic blocks “in a sea of inter-
connects” [41].  Comparing Figure 19 to Figure 20, this concept becomes clearer. 
 
Figure 20.   Conceptual FPGA Architecture (From Ref. [41].) 
 
The basic architecture of an FPGA is an array of uncommitted circuit ele-
ments, called logic blocks, and interconnect resources [43].  FPGA configuration, 
as mentioned, is performed through programming by the end user.  Because 
FPGAs support very high logic capacity, this technology has been responsible for 
a major shift in the way few-of-a-kind or prototype digital circuits are designed 
[43].  This section will briefly describe two FPGA technologies relevant to the 
CFTP, SRAM based FPGAs and antifuse based FPGAs.  Additional, detailed in-
formation on FPGA architecture can be found in Refs. [8, 32, 33, 38, 41 – 49, 52, 
54 – 57].  
a. SRAM FPGAs 
Devices that utilize programmable SRAM-controlled switches for 
controlling gate nodes of pass-transistor switches and to control the select lines 
of multiplexers that drive logic-block inputs, are called SRAM FPGAs [43].  As a 
generic example, Figure 21 shows the connection of one logic block (represented 
by the AND gate in the upper left corner) to another through two pass-transistor 
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switches, and then a multiplexer, all controlled by SRAM cells.  Whether an 
FPGA uses pass-transistors or multiplexers or both depends entirely on the 
manufacturer and the specific product [43]. 
 
Figure 21.   Generic SRAM-Controlled Switch Architecture (From Ref. [43].) 
 
Xilinx Virtex4 SRAM FPGA products “feature a flexible, regular ar-
chitecture that comprises an array of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) sur-
rounded by programmable Input/Output Blocks (IOBs) all interconnected by a 
rich hierarchy of fast, versatile routing resources” [44].  The Virtex architecture is 
centered on the CLBs providing the building blocks for logic functions, and IOBs 
providing the interface between CLBs and the pins [44].  Figure 22 shows an 
overview of the Virtex architecture.  
 
Figure 22.   Virtex Architecture Overview (From Ref. [44].) 
                                            
4 Virtex is a registered trademark of Xilinx Corporation. 
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(1) IOBs.  IOBs serve a number of purposes and support 
a wide variety of Input/Output (I/O) signaling standards.  From Figure 23 it can be 
seen that the IOBs can be buffered inputs or outputs, or disabled.  The three 
storage elements can be edge-triggered D-type flip-flops or level sensitive 
latches [44].  Each IOB has a clock signal shared by the flip-flops as well as in-
dependent clock enable signals for each [44].  Additionally, the IOBs serve to 
provide electrostatic discharge protection. 
 
Figure 23.   Virtex IOB detail (From Ref. [44].) 
 
(2) CLBs.  CLBs are comprised of Logic Cells (LCs), 
which include a 4-input function generator (implemented as 4-input Look-Up Ta-
bles [LUTs]), carry logic, and a storage element [44].  Each CLB contains four 
LCs, organized into two slice elements, as shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.   Virtex 2-Slice CLB (From Ref. [44].) 
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 (3) Additional Logic and Routing.  The Xilinx FPGAs con-
tain additional logic, including Block SelectRam5 memory, organized in columns, 
four global clock input pins for low-skew clock distribution, and four Delay-Locked 
Loops (DLLs) to further reduce skew as well as double or divide the clock by 1.5, 
2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5, 8, or 16.  As mentioned earlier, the FPGA is logic surrounded by a 
sea of interconnects, which provides for local, global, and I/O routing.  The ver-
saRING6 (refer to Figure 22) provides local routing resources internal to slices, 
among slices, and among the General Routing Matrix (GRM).  Local routing is 
facilitated by CLBs communicating directly to neighboring CLBs.  Adjacent to 
each CLB is the GRM which is a switch matrix providing horizontal and vertical 
routing for general purpose and global connections.  A local routing block is 
shown in Figure 25; note that the GRM interconnects provide for global intercon-
nect access.  The built-in memory, clocks, and robust interconnect architecture 
are the features that truly make the SRAM FPGA so versatile, providing the user 
with countless configuration options. 
 




                                             
5 SelectRAM is a registered trademark of Xilinx Corporation. 
6 VersaRING is a registered trademark of Xilinx Corporation. 
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b. Antifuse FPGAs 
The other type of FPGA technology to be discussed is the antifuse 
programmable switch.  Antifuses start as open-circuits, isolated by an insulator, 
and form a low resistance link only when programmed.  They are suitable for 
FPGAs because they can be built using modified CMOS technology, for example 
Actel’s Programmable Low Impedance Circuit Element (PLICE7) antifuse struc-
ture [32, 43, 45].  Figure 26, below, shows an antifuse (on the right) positioned 
between two interconnect wires (on the left).  The antifuse physically consists of 
three sandwiched layers: the top and bottom layers are conductors, and the mid-
dle layer is an insulator [32, 43].  PLICE uses Poly-Silicon and n+ diffusion as 
conductors and Oxide-Nitride-Oxide (ONO) as an insulator.  Other manufactures 
rely on metal for conductors, with amorphous silicon as the middle layer [43].  
Figure 27 shows a photomicrograph of an antifuse. 
 
Figure 26.   Antifuse Structure (After Refs. [43] [45].) 
 
 
Figure 27.   Antifuse Photomicrograph (From Ref. [46].) 
                                            
7 PLICE is a registered trademark of Actel Corporation. 
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It is important to note that this antifuse technology is not repro-
grammable.  Once the antifuses have been configured, the device remains fixed.  
This is both one of the benefits and one of the drawbacks of this technology.  The 
topic of one-time programmable vs. reprogrammable will be discussed in Chapter 
IV. 
The Actel antifuse FPGAs have three primary modules that serve 
as building blocks for their devices.  These are the I/O module, the logic module, 
and routing module. 
(1) I/O Modules.  As expected, I/O modules provide the 
interface between device pins and the logic array.  Similar to the Xilinx devices, 
I/O modules contain tri-state buffers, input and output latches, and can be con-
figured for input and/or output.  Figure 28 shows an Actel I/O module. 
 
Figure 28.   Actel I/O Module (From Ref. [45].) 
 
(2) Logic Modules.  Actel antifuse FPGAs use Combina-
torial Modules (C-Modules, also called C-Cells), Sequential Modules (S-Modules) 
and Register Cells (R-Cells) as the basic logic building blocks.  C-Cells are used 
in all of their devices, while the use of S-Modules and R-Cells depends on the 
family, generation, size, and complexity of the device.  In any case, either S-
Modules or R-Cells will be used with the C-Cells.  C-Cells provide basic combina-
torial functions and are shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.   Actel C-Cell (From Re. [48].) 
 
S-Modules provide sequential logic functions in the RH1280 
family of devices.  This module implements the same combinatorial logic found in 
the C-Module with an added sequential element at the output.  The sequential 
element can be configured as either a D-type flip-flop, as a transparent latch, or 
simply bypassed [45].  R-Cells are found in the majority of the larger, newer Actel 
antifuse FPGAs and are very similar to S-modules.  R-cells include a flip-flop and 
have programmable clock polarity selectable on a register-by-register basis [48].  
An R-Cell is shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30.   Actel FPGA R-Cell (From Ref. [48].) 
 
(3) Routing.  The majority of Actel antifuse FPGAs cluster 
C-Cells with R-Cells and then form supercluster from those.  Depending on the 
family and generation of Actel device, these superclusters are linked using a 
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combination of hardwired interconnects, programmable paths, and direct cell-to-
cell transfers [47 – 49].  Interconnects for the Actel SX-A Family are shown in 
Figure 31.  Actel RADHARD devices use a slightly different and more direct ap-
proach of horizontal and vertical metal routing tracks to connect logic and I/O 
modules.  These tracks can run the entire length of the device or they can be 
broken into segments.  Figure 32 shows the RH1020/1280 family interconnect 
structure. 
 
Figure 31.   Actel SX-A Interconnect Structure (After Ref. [48].) 
 
 
Figure 32.   Actel RH1020/1280 Interconnect Structure (After Refs. [32] [45].) 
 
C. MEMORY 
There are two types of memory used in digital design, Random-Access 
Memory (RAM) and ROM.  This section will very briefly define those specific 
types of memory that are relevant to the CFTP design process.     
1. ROM 
ROM, as previously stated, is a type of programmable logic.  However, 
this does not mean that it is not, in any of its incarnations, memory.  Quite the 
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contrary, ROM provides for non-volatile storage of data that the system designer 
desires to preserve, which in any context is memory.  Of course, ROM is combi-
natorial logic and, in the strictest sense of the word, is not a memory due to the 
lack of sequential component [41].  Nonetheless, ROM will be treated as memory 
throughout this thesis.   
ROM, by definition, can only be read from, implying that the device is only 
programmed once, which is in fact the case.  Binary information that is stored 
within a PLD is specified in some fashion and then written into hardware [42].  
This is the process of programming a ROM.  The information that is stored in the 
ROM can be read when called on, but not written to or altered.  Similar to the 
evolution of the PLDs discussed earlier, ROM has also evolved through a num-
ber of programmable versions.   
a. PROM 
PROM is similar to ROM, in that it can only be programmed once, 
except the customer may program the PROM using relatively inexpensive 
equipment.  This is as opposed to the extremely costly (in terms of NRE) manu-
facturer’s mask-programming process used to program ROM.  Using a PROM 
programmer the customer can store data of his choosing (program the PROM) 
by vaporizing fuzable links inside of the device, and thus permanently establish-
ing a logic value.  
b. EPROM 
Following PROMs were EPROMs, which use floating-gate Metal-
Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) technology, rather than bipolar ICs.  Because of 
this technology shift, EPROMs can be erased, or reset, to their initial state by ex-
posure to ultraviolet light.  While EPROMS can be extremely difficult to program 
in situ, they nonetheless offer greater flexibility to circuit designers.  
c. EEPROM / FLASH 
EEPROM provides the greatest degree of flexibility for the system 
designer.  EEPROM can be electrically erased, instead of by ultraviolet light, and 
then reprogrammed, all in situ.  EEPROMS, due to their thin insulating layer, can 
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be worn out with repeated erasing and re-writing, thus limiting the number of 
times it can be written.  EEPROMS are typically used for information that needs 
to be saved (stored) when the system has no power, and that does not need to 
be changed frequently, such as for an FPGA configuration memory.  EEPROM, 
because it can be reprogrammed in a ‘flash’ are often called flash memories [41].  
Table 4 summarizes the ROM types discussed. 
 
Type Technology Read Cycle Write Cycle Comments
Mask ROM NMOS/CMOS 10-200 ns 4 weeks Write once; low power 
Mask ROM Bipolar < 100 ns 4 weeks Write once; high power; low density 
PROM Bipolar < 100 ns 10-50 µs/byte Write once; high power; no mask change 
EPROM NMOS/CMOS 25-200 ns 10-50 µs/byte Reusable; low power; no mask change 
EEPROM NMOS 50-200 ns 10-50 µs/byte 10,000-100,000 writes/location limit 
Table 4.   Summary of ROM Types (From Ref. [41].) 
 
2. RAM 
RAM, simply stated, accepts new information, stores it, and presents it for 
use when requested [42].  This is the type of memory that is most often associ-
ated with computers.  RAM, unlike ROM, includes sequential logic and is truly a 
memory and provides for writing, as well as reading the memory.  The term ‘ran-
dom-access’ indicates that the time required to read or write a bit of memory is 
independent of the location (address) in the RAM.  The most common types 
RAM are briefly described here. 
a. Static RAM (SRAM) 
In an SRAM, data stored in a location will remain unchanged as 
long as power is not removed from the device, or that the storage location is 
overwritten.  SRAM uses multiple transistors, typically four to six, and no capaci-
tors for each memory cell which can require large amounts of power.  Because of 
SRAMs simplicity, it offers short read and write cycles and it is easy to control. 
b. Dynamic RAM (DRAM) 
In a DRAM, stored data must be refreshed periodically by reading 
the data then re-writing the data back to the address it came from.  This is be-
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cause DRAM memory cells are a paired transistor and capacitor, which tends to 
‘leak’, thereby forgetting what is stored.  The most significant benefit of DRAM 
over SRAM is that it uses one transistor per cell, therefore much higher density 
memory can be produced.  Also, fewer transistors translates to lower power re-
quired to operate DRAM.  The primary and significant drawback is the additional 
complexity of the memory controller that must control the refreshing, as well as 
timing synchronization for read, right, and refresh cycles.  
c. Synchronous Dynamic RAM (SDRAM) 
SDRAM builds upon the shortcomings of DRAM, by making the 
clocking more sensible.  SDRAM delivers row and column addresses in two 
steps as with DRAM; however SDRAM control and address signals are sampled 
only on the rising edge of the clock, whereas DRAM utilized both rising and fal-
ling edges of the clock.  SDRAM also takes advantage of a burst mode in order 
to improve performance.  In this mode, the SDRAM will stay on the address row 
containing the requested bit and read column data under the assumption that 
data is generally stored sequentially.  The logic required to control SDRAM is on 
par with that of DRAM, although SDRAM is much faster. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter served to provide background information relevant to the de-
sign process of the CFTP.  Fundamental to the design goals for the CFTP are 
the concepts of designing a system that is reconfigurable, maximizing the use of 
COTS technology, while ensuring that the components will not fail due to the per-
ils of the operating environment. 
Chapter IV will explore design considerations and constraints for the de-
velopment of CFTP.  These considerations and constraints include such things 
as interface requirements, power constraints, and PCB layout considerations.  
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IV. HARDWARE DESIGN TRADE SPACE 
The technologies discussed in Chapter III provide contextual background 
for a discussion of the evolution of the CFTP and the associated engineering 
trade space.  The design of a sophisticated electronic system has, in this case, 
been a very convoluted process.  This process has been aggravated by several 
factors including the transient nature of military graduate students, the support 
available from industry, and the educational process itself.  Throughout the evo-
lution of the CFTP, it has been clear the design process has not been linear in 
nature; rather it has been a feedback oriented iterative process.  Each subse-
quent iteration has moved the system closer toward a completed design for 
space applications, while solidifying the objectives for the flight experiment.   
Over the course of the CFTP’s development, the design framework has 
evolved.  Constraints and considerations have grown as the project developed 
from its early beginnings, while the CFTP’s flight design has come to fruition.  In 
order to give the discussion of the actual parts selected and the physical layout of 
the board, the design trade space must be considered.  
A. CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS  
The current version of the CFTP is the result of years of NPS research, 
detailed in References [5 – 10].  As alluded to in Chapter I, the research reported 
in this thesis commenced prior to the NPSAT1 CDR. This section will describe 
the state of the CFTP at the start of this research followed by a brief discussion 
of the design constraints established earlier in the design process. 
1. Entering Arguments 
Considering that this research is essentially the continuation of research 
commenced several years ago, it is reasonable to assume that a certain design 
framework had been established.  It will be shown through the course of this the-
sis that some of these initial conditions were inflexible constraints, and others 
were merely design considerations for convenience. 
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a. Design Framework 
The initial design framework centered on a TMR SOC design utiliz-
ing an FPGA as the centerpiece of the system.  The initial processor to be tripli-
cated for instantiation in the FPGA was developed by Dr. Kenneth Clark, and is 
described in detail in References [9] and [10].  The goal was, and remains, to de-
sign a flexible system that can be reconfigured while on orbit to perform a myriad 
of functions, from general-purpose processing to sophisticated DSP algorithms.  
The hardware concepts for TMR had been explored and developed in Refer-
ences [4 – 7], but not until Lieutenant Peter LaShomb’s thesis [8] did the pros-
pect of using an FPGA become an design alternative.  Thus the concept was de-
fined for the CFTP: a low power, fault tolerant, reconfigurable, TMR SOC, maxi-
mizing the use of COTS technology, in order to reduce design time and cost.  
The initial concept is shown in Figure 33 (a), which simplistically displays the 
concept of instantiating the TMR microprocessors in an FPGA.  Figure 33 (b) 




















































Figure 33.   (a) TMR Instantiation Concept (b) Early System Concept. 
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From Figure 33, it should be clear that the concept of replacing the 
previously researched and developed hardware based TMR design with an 
FPGA based SOC architecture would be a challenge. 
At the time the FPGA concept was taking shape, the CPE was be-
ing designed into NPSAT1.  It was at the CDR, when the NPSAT1 design was to 
be finalized, that the CPE became a new, unique experiment.  While the CPE, 
called CFTP from this point in time forward, was just initiating the re-design proc-
ess based on the FPGA SOC concept, NPSAT1’s design timeline was fully ma-
ture.  Because NPSAT1’s architecture, power budget, interface requirements, 
mass budget and structural requirements were all but finalized, the CFTP, as an 
integrated NPSAT1 experiment, would be held to the design envelope specified 
at the time when the CPE was the planned experiment.   
(1) Size and Mass.  Because the CPE was to be included 
in the C&DH case of NPSAT1, it was to be designed as a single PCB with di-
mensions of 4.7 inches by 6.7 inches, and it would weigh approximately 1 kilo-
gram.  As it has turned out, these requirements changed slightly in order to ac-
commodate the final, constructed version of the C&DH housing.  Figure 34 de-










Figure 34.   CFTP PCB Dimensions 
 
(2) Interface.  NPSAT1 C&DH was designed from the on-
set to be based on the PC/104 standard [50].  While the PC/104 standard de-
scribes bus interface and communications between devices, it also standardizes 
size and shape of PCBs [51].  NPSAT1 designers are utilizing the connector in-
terface and a majority of the signal assignments; however the physical dimen-
sions of the PCB are larger than the PC/104 standard.  As a result, the CFTP is 
constrained to utilize the 16-bit PC/104 bus interface and the signaling bus sig-
nals specified by the NPSAT1 architects, which will be specifically identified in 
Chapter VI.  Figure 35 shows the 16-bit PC/104 interface. 
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Figure 35.   16-bit PC/104 Connector (After Ref. [51].) 
 
(3) Power budget.  When conceived, one of the experi-
mental objectives was to deliver a low power system.  This objective, in conjunc-
tion with the CPE being considered an opportune, small-scale experiment for 
NPSAT1, led to the limited power budget of 4 Watts, nominal.  Additionally, the 
NPSAT1 team planned for a 25 percent duty cycle, expecting the CPE to draw 
an average of 1 Watt [50].  This has become a serious constraint, as the CFTP 
goals include continuous operation in an effort to catalog SEU information, in-
cluding location of satellite at time of fault, type of fault, fault location (within the 
processor), and fault recovery time.  Unfortunately, the nature of FPGAs do not 
provide for convenient power estimation.  This is because each of the nearly infi-
nite configurations has a unique power profile, and thus can not be predicted by 
the manufacturer.  The end result is that the NPSAT1 team had enough flexibility 
in the power budget to allow the CFTP to target 5 Watts for normal operation with 
usage peaks potentially as high as 10 Watts.  Should the CFTP exceed the 
power budgeted, then a duty cycle will be imposed. 
b. Components 
At the commencement of this research, the CFTP design included 
two central devices, while the remainder of the design was a tabula rasa.  The 
legacy components were SRAM and an FPGA.  SRAM provided the CPE’s prin-
ciple memory for the simple reason that it is the memory used in NPSAT1’s 
C&DH.  The most significant advantage of using this memory would be the sav-
ings in design time related to the memory controller and the EDAC or Error Cor-
rection Circuitry (ECC).  Because this hardware had flown on NPS’s Petit Ama-
teur Naval Satellite (PANSAT), the base coding was already complete.  Despite 
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the convenience using of this memory offers, it has since been replaced in the 
CFTP design, is detailed in Chapter V. 
The other component included as a conceptual starting place was a 
Xilinx Virtex FPGA.  The use of an FPGA as the core technology for the SOC has 
been mentioned frequently throughout this thesis.  The reasoning behind the se-
lection of the Virtex device as the centerpiece of the CFTP is explained in detail 
in Reference [8] and will be touched upon in Chapter V of this thesis.  Section B 
of this Chapter will describe the trade space when considering the use of FPGAs. 
2. CFTP Goals 
The goal of the CFTP as a program has remained consistent over the 
years and across graduate researchers.  While specific theses have sought to 
solve unique research questions, the sum of the body of works has remained 
true to the basic goal of designing a reliable, reconfigurable, low-power, low-cost 
flexible system for space applications.  It is critical that the design and develop-
ment of the CFTP, represented by this thesis, remain true to the goal of the pro-
gram as a whole.  As such, the goals of the CFTP project are the most rigorous 
constraints applied on the design process, and are what will ensure its future role 
as an experimental test bed for multiple on orbit projects. 
B. FPGA DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The use of an FPGA as the focus of the CFTP is a forgone conclusion at 
this point.  However, this does not invalidate a further refinement of the actual 
part selected.  The decision to use a particular part from a particular manufac-
turer is based on a multitude of factors.  This section is provided in an effort to 
define the trade space available to a system engineer. 
1. Gate Count 
Gate count is an FPGA industry metric that roughly corresponds to the 
number of logic gates that can be implemented in an FPGA.  This metric, how-
ever, can be misleading. Are the logic blocks two-input AND gates, or four-input 
XOR gates?  Perhaps more useful indicators of usable logic are, for example, the 
number of CLBs and LUTs in Xilinx devices and C-Cells and R-Cells in Actel de-
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vices.  Typical of the technology industry, these more meaningful indicators rep-
resent multiple, uncorrelated standards, which can make a direct comparison dif-
ficult.  As a result, gate count remains the predominant size comparison index.  
Shown in Tables 5 and 6 are examples of proprietary gate count tables from Xil-
inx and Actel, respectively.  Note that the number of programmable assets avail-
able in these FPGAs, while not their top-of-the-line devices, is quite substantial. 
 
Table 5.   Xilinx RADHARD FPGA Gate Counts (From Ref. [34].) 
 
 
Table 6.   Actel RADHARD FPGA Gate Counts (From Ref. [45].) 
 
2. Packages 
Figure 36 shows a sampling of the types of FPGA packages available to 
the system designer.  Due the enormous amount of programmable logic avail-
able in FPGAs, a large number of I/O pins are required to perform today’s de-
manding applications.  For example, the FG1152 package shown in Figure 39 
has 1152 pins!  While this may seem excessive, designers often find that they 
run out of I/O pins and must limit their designs.  The type of package plays an 
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important role in device selection, not only because of the number of I/O pins, but 
for other reasons as well.  Table 7 summarizes Xilinx Virtex family packages, 
showing number of I/O pins and part availability. 
 
Figure 36.   Example FPGA Packages (From Ref. [52].) 
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Table 7.   Xilinx Virtex Package and User I/O Pins (From Ref. [44].) 
 
a. Ball Grid Array (BGA) 
BGAs, such as on the FG1152, provide the highest number and 
density of pins available.  In addition to the high pin count, BGAs offer larger lead 
pitches, occupy less space on the PCB, and dissipate heat better.  BGAs, how-
ever, are not compatible with multiple solder processing methods, and individual 
solder joints cannot be inspected and reworked using conventional methods.  In 
fact, any joint not in the outer rings cannot be inspected.  Additional drawbacks 
are that special techniques are required to affix the device to the PCB and, in or-
der to route the multitude of signals from the pins, a multilayered PCB is re-
quired.  Figure 37 shows several representative BGA profiles. 
 
Figure 37.   BGA Example Configurations (From Ref [53].) 
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b. Flat Pack 
Flat packs are surface-mount packages that provide physical ac-
cess to all of the pins.  Figure 38 shows an example of a 208 lead-Quad Flat 
Pack (QFP).  The benefits of flat packs are the drawbacks of BGAs, and vice 
versa.  For example, it is obvious from Figure 38 that, while each of the leads is 
extremely thin, each can be visually inspected and repaired.  This is a critical 
point for space applications.  Without the ability to inspect the contacts, solder 
joints, and pads before, during, and after qualification testing, there is no way to 
ensure that the device will maintain sufficient contact for operations.  Conse-
quently, QFPs, and not BGAs, are utilized in virtually all space-related applica-
tions. 
 
Figure 38.   208 Lead QFP (From Ref. [54].) 
 
3. Availability 
As with any part, availability is crucial.  Commercial FPGAs command 
over 50% of the programmable market and are making ASICs less and less at-
tractive [38].  The result is that manufactures are producing larger and larger 
quantities of commercial parts.  Unfortunately, most manufactures are following 
the microprocessor rubric discussed in Chapter III and are not developing 
RADHARD parts.  Consequently, there remains a parts availability, as well as 
technology lag, in the Radiation Tolerant markets. 
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In addition to the availability of the devices, there is an additional availabil-
ity issue—what to instantiate in these million-plus gate devices.  Intellectual 
Property (IP) cores, also known as ‘soft-cores,’ are the Hardware Description 
Language (HDL) code which programs the FPGA to act the same as a hardwired 
part such as a microprocessor.  For example, it is possible to instantiate an x86 
soft core microprocessor in an FPGA.  The result is the complete functionality of 
that microprocessor, with the added benefit of being able to reprogram it to be, 
for example, a RISC processor the next day.  Unfortunately, the development of 
IP cores is exceedingly time consuming, not to mention challenging.  The result 
is that state-of-the-art microprocessors are not available in suitable code form for 
implementation into FPGAs. 
4. Radiation Tolerance 
Following the discussion in Chapter III regarding RADHARD components, 
this section will point out only that SRAM-based FPGAs, unless special meas-
ures are taken, are inherently radiation soft.  Antifuse FPGAs in their commercial 
form provide slightly more TID tolerance than their SRAM counterparts.  The 
leading manufactures of both of these technologies do offer RADHARD and Ra-
diation Tolerant devices specifically for the aerospace industry.  The special 
techniques used by these manufactures include a larger (0.8-µm–1.0-µm) proc-
esses, sophisticated masking procedures, and stringent test and verification 
methods in order to guarantee that the devices will withstand a particular TID 
amount.  Additionally, the devices are fabricated on an epi substrate, providing 
additional protection from SELs.  Although RADHARD antifuse devices are 
harder than SRAM devices, the latter are closing the gap rapidly.  While these 
devices slightly lag the most current technology (highest gate counts and fastest 
operating speeds) they do provide requisite protection for space applications. 
5. Reprogrammability 
Reprogrammability must be considered when selecting a particular FPGA 
for use in a system.  Also, the manner in which they are reprogrammed is an ad-
ditional concern.  Consideration must be given to in situ reprogramming methods, 
in addition to load and read capabilities.  As suggested earlier, One-Time Pro-
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grammable (OTP) devices are generally more radiation tolerant than reprogram-
mable devices.  Likewise, reprogrammable CPLDs are generally more radiation 
tolerant but require removal from the system in order to be reprogrammed [8].  
The ability to reconfigure an embedded device, using a simple set of commands, 
certainly has advantages for space based applications.  
a. Configuration 
The specific method of reprogramming a device may also be a fac-
tor in device selection.  When considering Xilinx products, there are four methods 
available to configure the Virtex family: SelectMAP8, Master or Slave serial, and 
JTAG.  The actual process of loading an external configuration is a matter of 
loading the configuration bit stream into the FPGA using the desired mode.  Ta-
ble 8 is a summary of configuration file sizes for Virtex devices.  The external 
process flow is shown in Figure 39 (a).  Figure 39 (b) shows the processing flow 
internal to the FPGA during configuration.   
 
Table 8.   Virtex Bit-Stream lengths (From Ref. [44].) 
 
                                            
8 SelectMAP is a registered trademark of Xilinx Corporation. 
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(a) (b)  
Figure 39.   (a) External Configuration Process Flow (After Ref. [57].)  (b) Inter-
nal Configuration Process Flow (After Ref. [55].) 
 
(1) Master/Slave Serial Mode.  In master/slave mode of 
configuration, one bit of configuration data is loaded at a time.  In the master 
mode, the FPGA being configured drives the configuration clock and in slave 
mode, the FPGA’s clock is driven by an external source.  The master mode was 
designed so that the FPGA could be configured from a serial PROM [55].  The 
62 
slave mode allows the FPGA to be configured from other logic devices, such as 
microprocessors, or in a daisy-chain fashion [55].  The master/slave serial mode 
is depicted in Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40.   Master/Slave Serial Mode Circuit (From Ref. [55].) 
 
(2) SelectMAP.  SelectMAP provides an “8-bit bidirec-
tional data bus interface” [55], or parallel load capability, for Virtex devices.  This 
mode may be used for both configuration and for readback, and provides a 
means for the device to be partially reconfigured while it is operating.  This mode 
requires a controller for the SelectMAP interface, typically a microprocessor or 
CPLD.  In this mode, devices may be connected in a parallel-chain, but not seri-
ally [55].  Figure 41 shows a simple SelectMAP circuit. 
 
Figure 41.   SelectMAP Configuration Circuit (From Ref. [56].) 
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(3) JTAG.  JTAG provides a serial configuration and ver-
ify mechanism as well as provides the for the JTAG protocol’s behavioral testing 
of the internal circuit, allowing for detection of opens and shorts at the device and 
board level [57].  The Boundary Scan mode is always active when the device is 
powered [55], although through careful use of the Virtex mode pins, the JTAG 
mode may be deselected.  It is possible to chain multiple devices using JTAG, as 
shown in Figure 42.  The JTAG mode facilitates test and development of configu-
rations by its design, although it can be used as an in situ readback and recon-
figuration method. 
 
Figure 42.   JTAG-Chained Virtex Devices (From Ref. [59].) 
 
b. Readback and Reconfiguration 
As mentioned above, in addition to being able to be loaded with an 
initial configuration at power up or system reset, Virtex FPGAs provide the ability 
to readback their configuration as well as to reload all or a portion of their con-
figuration while the device is in operation.  This is a tremendous capability, espe-
cially from an error mitigation standpoint because the configuration of the FPGA 
can be verified while it is in operation.  Considering that the configuration of the 
FPGA is defined by programming tiny memory, interconnect, and logic blocks, an 
SEU is as likely to affect the configuration of the FPGA as it is to affect the data 
the FPGA’s configuration is processing. 
In order to readback and reconfigure an operating FPGA, the de-
vice must be set in either JTAG or SelectMAP mode.  The JTAG method of read-
ing back configuration data is appealing for developers due to the probing, test-
ing, and verifying functions specified in the JTAG protocol [57].  This method also 
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provides for partially (or completely) reconfiguring the device while it is operation.  
A potential drawback of using this method is that the JTAG pins on the FPGAs 
are always available.  As such if they are inadvertently driven high or low, the 
possibility for configuration contention exists.  
The SelectMAP mode enables a parallel method of reading back 
and reloading the configuration data.  In this mode the SelectMAP/User IO pins 
must be dedicated to the SelectMAP mode when the function is desired.  Be-
cause this mode is only available when the three mode pins on the device are set 
for SelectMAP, the configuration contention problem does not exist as with the 
JTAG mode.   
In both cases, JTAG and SelectMAP, a controller is required in or-
der to coordinate the readback and reconfiguration.  Depending on the designer’s 
needs, the controller can validate the configuration’s Cyclic Redundancy Code 
(CRC) and reconfigure any frame of data that is in error.  This method is proces-
sor intensive due to the necessary look ups, compares, and frame configuration 
processes, as well as configuration frame fetches from configuration storage.  A 
less processor intensive method is to periodically scrub the current configuration 
by reloading all of it.  This technique requires very little processor time, but lacks 
the rapid detection and repair capability that the comparison method offers.  The 
principle drawback of partial reconfiguration or scrubbing is that is only available 
for CLBs; IOBs and BlockRAM can not be reconfigured during operation without 
running the risk of disabling the IOBs or corrupting data in BlockRAM.   
C. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC VS. DISCRETE LOGIC 
Another trade space that a systems designer must consider is whether to 
use discrete components to perform the miscellaneous functions in the system, 
or to use programmable logic.  These functions, often termed ‘glue logic,’ include 
multiplexers, bus transceivers, buffers, and address decoders, to name a few.  
Discrete components are reliable, proven devices that can be procured at low 
cost and in RADHARD configurations.  For small-scale functions they provide low 
density, low power, simple solutions to designers.  On the other hand, PLDs offer 
65 
scalable solutions in which the designer may be able to incorporate all of the glue 
logic into a single component, thus reducing device density on the PCB, as well 
as possibly reducing cost and power (design dependent).  Programmable logic 
may, however, add a level of complexity to the design of the circuit, as well as to 
the layout and manufacture of the PCB.   
A final thought on maximizing the use of programmable logic relates to 
‘white wires.’  These are the artifacts of overlooked connections, forgotten resis-
tors, and layout errors, and can be damaging to the ego of any engineer.  Utiliz-
ing programmable logic allows the system designer the possibility of program-
ming away errors that might otherwise be repaired by adding, or scratching off, 
interconnects. 
D. PCB DESIGN PROCESS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The design and layout of a PCB is an engineering discipline unto itself.  
The rapid advances in the IC industry have been mirrored in the PCB industry.  
From two-layer PCB technology with millimeter traces less than 30 years ago, to 
17 layer, 25-µm trace-width technology now [58], PCB layout has evolved from 
simple topology management to a sophisticated design process.  The design 
process is multifaceted and requires attention to the implementation of power de-
livery, cooling and I/O systems [59].  Utilizing one or more FPGAs in a design, 
especicially when both will be reprogrammed in situ, makes the task of layout 
even more challenging, as power requirements, I/O routing, and trace imped-
ances will vary significantly between configurations.  A generic PCB Design Flow, 
including FPGA specifics, is presented in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43.   PCB Design Flow with FPGA Specifics (From Ref. [59].) 
 
This section will present a brief discussion of a few of the things that must 
be considered when design a PCB, as well as a few of the basic design rules.  
For detailed information refer to References [58 – 64]. 
1. Software 
Software tools for design and layout of PCBs must be selected carefully.  
This software can be very expensive, is rarely compatible across vendors, and 
must produce a file that the fabrication contractor can use.  Usability, as with any 
software package, should be considered.  Does the software support the tech-
nology and the process of your design?  Are the desired libraries available, if not, 
can they be created?  Are there tools capable of verification of the design?  
Questions such as these should be asked when determining which product to 
select. 
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2.  Layers 
The number of layers in a PCB will depend on routing requirements, but 
should at least have three.  Every board must have continuous ground plane and 
should have a dedicated, continuous Vcc plane, as well as a power plane for any 
other distributed voltage.  An additional consideration for layers is that every 
trace in the stack should be not more than one layer away from a reference plane 
(power or ground) [61, 64].  Figure 44 shows the PCB layering concept. 
 
Figure 44.   Layered PCB with Varying Trace Widths (From Ref. [61].) 
 
3. Traces 
The traces, or wires etched onto PCBs, must have the same impedance 
throughout the length of the run.  Even if the trace should transit multiple layers, 
the trace must be adjusted to maintain constant impedance [61].  Figure 44 illus-
trates this point, by showing different widths of traces to accommodate different 
impedances.  Also, long traces run the risk of transmission line reflection and 
must be analyzed accordingly.  Additionally, closely spaced, long lines need to 
be analyzed for cross talk. 
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4. Capacitors 
Capacitors are required throughout the board in order to stabilize current 
flow and reduce system noise.  Decoupling capacitors need to be included with 1 
cm to 2 cm from each Vcc pin and must be of sufficient value to supply Icc for a 
few nanoseconds [62].  Additional mid-frequency and low-frequency capacitors 
are need for FPGA protection as well as for the board as a whole. 
E. CFTP DESIGN PROCESS AND SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
Having now discussed the initial conditions of the CFTP and the design 
considerations that define the scope of this research, an overview of the CFTP 
system concept will be provided.  The CFTP design process has deviated from 
the typical waterfall approach to system development.  Multiple aspects of the 
design of the total system, including the initial soft core TMR processor and the 
test and evaluation plan have been progressing concurrently with the design of 
the CFTP PCB.  Throughout this non-standard design process, the NPSAT1, 
MidSTAR-1, and STP have added additional design and development require-
ments that have been ongoing in the background of the entire CFTP design pro-
cess.  While this nonlinearity seems unusual, this process has enabled a small 
team to develop a comprehensive program in a very short time. 
The CFTP, in its current version as a reconfigurable space based experi-
ment, began as a simple block diagram as shown in Figure 33 (a).  From that 
concept, given the constraints and considerations discussed earlier, and the mo-
tivation of design documentation for the SERB process, the CFTP quickly 
evolved to become the concept shown in Figure 45, which is the same as Figure 


















































Figure 45.   CFTP Intermediate Conceptual Illustration 
 
The CFTP concept remained in the form shown above while the afore-
mentioned parallel design and development process focused on STP launch ve-
hicle/payload integration.  This aspect of the design process provided an oppor-
tunity for the CFTP technical details to be identified and resolved in order to sat-
isfy satellite launch integration timelines.  
Eventually, it became obvious that the concept was in need of further 
modification.  Through a rapid succession of component level design decisions, 
the CFTP evolved into its final version.  Figure 46 is an illustration representing 
the final conceptual design of the CFTP.  In this figure, two FPGAs are depicted, 
the top left illustrates the Configurable Processor FPGA and the lower left depicts 
the Configuration Controller FPGA with its associaded functions.  On the Right 












































Figure 46.   Final CFTP Concept 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided insight into the background of the CFTP devel-
opment, as well as a discussion of the significant trade spaces that define the 
bounds of this project.  The conceptual progression of the CFTP design, given 
the initial design framework and the hardware design trade space, has remained 
constant in purpose: The development of a reliable, fault tolerant, reconfigurable 
system for space applications.  The process leading to the final CFTP concept, a 
product of numerous trade-offs, will be detailed in the following chapter with a 
discussion of the specific components selected and the reasoning behind those 
choices.  
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V. CFTP COMPONENTS  
Chapter IV presented the hardware design trade space based on the con-
straints and considerations defined for the CFTP.  The intermediate CFTP con-
cept shown in Figure 48 represented the targeted architecture when specific 
parts selection began for the development board.  From this starting point, both 
the parts selection and the conceptual design refinement progressed concur-
rently, each influencing the other.  This mutually reliant relationship between 
component selection and design evolution, serves as an example of the non-
linearity of the CFTP developmental process discussed earlier.  The refinement 
of the design continued through the entire development of the CFTP, with the 
design not becoming truly fixed until the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) was finally 
fabricated. 
Throughout the parts selection/refinement processes there existed pro-
curement considerations, both fiscal and time related.  Because the CFTP is 
manifested on both NPSAT1 and MidSTAR1, at least five boards are needed to 
meet the requirements for the scheduled launch of both satellites in March 2006.  
Five was determined to be the optimal number of boards to achieve the test, 
evaluation, and space qualification goals.  However, budget constraints at vari-
ous junctures of the development cycle, jeopardized the ability to build five 
boards.  Fortunately, careful selection of parts and the generosity of Xilinx and 
SEAKR Engineering allowed for final design costs to be within allocated funding.  
Table 9 summarizes the each board’s purpose and its delivery date. 
 
Board # Purpose Delivery Notes 
1 Test, Eval, Demo 2 QTR CY03 Utilizes developmental hardware.  
2 MidSTAR1 Qual Board 4 QTR CY03 Flight components; for space qualification and ground systems development at NPS 
3 NPSAT1 Qual Board 4 QTR CY03 Flight components; for space qualification and ground systems development at USNA 
4 MidSTAR1 Flight Board 2 QTR CY04 CFTP FLIGHT BOARD 1 
5 NPSAT1 Flight Board 2 QTR CY04 CFTP FLIGHT BOARD 2 
Table 9.   CFTP Board Delivery 
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 A. RECONFIGURABLE CORE 
The heart of the CFTP is the reconfigurable processor.  The device se-
lected for this purpose in Lieutenant Lashomb’s research [8] was the Xilinx 
XCV800 FPGA, primarily because the XCV800 is the largest Xilinx FPGA not 
packaged as a Ball Grid Array (BGA).  Not mentioned in Lieutenant LaShomb’s 
thesis was the TID tolerance of the device, which was assumed early in the 
CFTP development to be 100 krad TID tolerant and SEL immune.  While it is true 
that this is the largest Xilinx device available in a Quad Flat Pack (QFP), it is not 
necessarily valid to assume that these parts are consistently 100 krad TID toler-
ant.  Some are, but it is by luck of the draw only.  In fact, Xilinx offers only a lim-
ited selection of its Virtex family as guaranteed RADHARD to 100 krad—the 
XQVR series.  The XQVR devices are available in the 300, 600, and 1000 sizes 
(refer to Table 5 for associated gate counts), and the XQVR600 is the largest 
available in the QFP package.  While this fact was not discovered until shortly 
before the order was to be placed, it alone would not have affected the decision 
to purchase the commercial XCV800 devices due to cost considerations.  To il-
lustrate this point, the commercial XCV800 can be purchased for less that $1500 
[66] as an industrial class chip in the fastest speed grade, while the XQVR600, a 
smaller device with slower operating speed, costs approximately $7000 [67].  
Considering that each of the five boards needs one of these devices and that a 
goal of the CFTP was to mitigate errors while maximizing the use of COTS tech-
nology (as well as to have a device that was large enough to instantiate state-of-
the-art microprocessors), it seemed reasonable and fiscally prudent to move for-
ward with the purchase of the XCV800.  This was to change. 
 During the course of confirming XCV800’s operating characteristics, Xilinx 
offered to donate to the CFTP design evaluation samples of any RADHARD 
parts desired [68].  The opportunity to use RADHARD components could not be 
passed up, thus the final design of the CFTP is based on the Xilinx XQVR600-




Figure 47.   Example Xilinx RADHARD Device Numbering (From Ref. [34].) 
 
The XCV800-based design used a single XCV800 to contain the memory 
controller, memory EDAC logic, as well as the TMR processors and the neces-
sary voters.  The layout, interconnections, and busses required to support this 
logical arrangement had been completed based on the assumption that the 
XCV800 would be sufficiently large to “hold” these cores, as well as have suffi-
cient capacity to implement larger, more sophisticated TMR microprocessors in 
the future.  Selecting the XQVR600 as the FPGA reduced the available gate 
count by 25%, from 888,439 to 6661,111.  Consequently, the layout was re-
designed to support placing the memory controller and EDAC logic outside of the 
primary FPGA device to provide more gates to implement future IP microproces-
sors.   
B. SYSTEM MEMORY 
The CFTP’s baseline concept at the onset of this thesis research included 
legacy SRAM system memory, implemented with Toshiba TC55V8200FT-12 
chips.  Both the EDAC and the controller coding were essentially complete and, 
because the memory had been fully tested and flown on PANSAT, it was consid-
ered low risk for use in CFTP.  Additionally, this memory was attractive because 
it was easy to implement, inexpensive, and readily available.  However, the 
SRAM had two significant drawbacks, size and power.  For example, to imple-
ment 16 MB of SRAM with 8 bits per word of ECC requires 12 chips (1 by 0.5 
74 
inches each) and uses 3.78 Watts [69].  Having the system memory selection 
made at the start of the program allowed efforts to be focused on other compo-
nents.  This, also, was to change. 
Early in the development of the CFTP, one of the potential IP cores for the 
Configurable Processor (CP), while onboard NPSAT1, was SEAKR Engineer-
ing’s proprietary image compression engine.  As the relationship between NPS 
and SEAKR grew, SEAKR offered to supply a small lot of SDRAM parts that 
were excess from a tested and qualified lot.  Initially, the legacy SRAM was more 
appealing than attempting to integrate the SDRAM into the CFTP design, given 
the uncertainty of the number of chips the CFTP would receive from SEAKR and 
the complexity of employing and controlling SDRAM.  Eventually, SEAKR offered 
to provide their SDRAM Controller IP core written for Virtex devices, in addition to 
a batch of 30 Hitachi (now ELPIDA) HM5225405B-75 256M (16M-word x 4-bit x 
4-bank) SDRAM [70 – 73].  This lot of Hitachi SDRAM performed in testing to 
better than 40 krad TID with an SEL Threshold of 46.5 MeV-cm2/mg [74, 75].  
The space qualified SDRAM and the IP controller core made the offer too good 
to pass up, as a result Hitachi SDRAM is included in the final design of the 
CFTP. 
The 30 SDRAMs were enough to meet the CFTP requirement for five 
boards, providing the existing memory architecture was redesigned.  In order to 
use this memory on all five of the boards, a maximum of six devices per board 
could be used.  This required the memory architecture to be redesigned.  The 
result was a 24-bit wide word memory structure, using 16-bits for data and allow-
ing a maximum of 8-bits of ECC to be stored with each word.  While this structure 
is not the 32-bit optimized architecture that was originally conceived, it certainly 
meets the objectives of the CFTP offering a reliable and flexible solution.  Addi-
tional benefits are that six SDRAM chips (instead of 12), using slightly less power 
(about 3.3 Watts at 50 MHz), provide the CFTP with approximately 1.5 Gbits 
(192 MB) of memory.  
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C. CONFIGURATION MEMORY 
One of the characteristics of an SRAM-based FPGA is that it is an entirely 
volatile device, in so much as it will not retain its configuration or the data that it 
was processing if the power is removed.  Therefore, the configuration must be 
stored in an external, non-volatile storage device.  The early CFTP concepts in-
cluded a combination of RADHARD PROM, EPROM and EEPROM.  The PROM 
was to hold the start-up configuration containing, perhaps, a Built-In Self Test 
(BIST), the necessary settings to enable configuration from the EPROM and/or 
EEPROM, and/or the necessary cores to provide basic communications with the 
PC/104 bus.  The EPROM would contain the TMR microprocessor, with EDAC 
and SDRAM controller, and an EEPROM loading-control core, in addition to nec-
essary command and status registers.  The EEPROM could also hold some 
number of experimental configurations and could be uploaded across the PC/104 
bus whenever desired.  For example, SEAKR’s image compression core could 
be stored, as could a communications routing protocol.  These cores could then 
be loaded on command from the NPS or USNA ground stations for experimental 
use on orbit, in real time.  The reasoning behind employing the various types of 
ROM was based on early reliability assessments.  This also has been changed. 
As various ROM technologies were investigated for suitability, two rea-
sonable alternative EEPROM devices, one from Intel and one from Samsung, 
were considered, based on the testing done by other programs around the coun-
try [70, 74].  While these two flash technologies were being explored, it became 
clear that interfacing the non-volatile storage with the Configurable Processor 
would be challenging.  It was at this point that the Xilinx XC17Vxx and XC18Vxx 
families of configuration PROM became the selection for implementation.  These 
two families of PROM are designed by Xilinx to directly interface and conven-
iently serve up configurations to the Xilinx FPGAs.  The XC17Vxx family of Serial 
PROMs are One-Time Programmable (OTP) devices with RADHARD versions 
(the XQR17Vxx family) [76, 77].  The XC18Vxx family of devices are In-System 
Programmable (ISP) devices (JTAG only) that can parallel load FPGAs in the Se-
lectMAP mode, and are advertised to have a RADHARD version available [76, 
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78, 79].  Using Xiliinx PROMs provided an easy-to-integrate solution to the con-
figuration conundrum.  Yes, this too was to change. 
It became clear during layout that the simple configuration architecture 
utilizing Xilinx PROMs would not suit the needs of the CFTP.  Digging deeper 
into controlling the loading of the PROMs, controlling the FPGA configuration, 
and controlling the readback/partial reconfiguration/background-scrubbing SEU-
mitigation routines, it was found that the PROM devices would only be able to 
work as desired if a sophisticated microcontroller or a microprocessor was used 
as a configuration controller (discussed in the next section).  Additionally, Xilinx 
indicated that the RADHARD XQR18V04 PROM would no longer be available 
due to manufacturing problems and that replacement devices have not yet been 
tested, further complicating the selection process.  As these discoveries were 
made, the Hitachi and Samsung Flash memory were again considered as pri-
mary alternatives.  The Intel TE28F320C3BA 32Mbit flash memory was eventu-
ally chosen to store all of the Configurable Processor FPGA’s configurations be-
cause research indicated that it has better radiation performance than the Sam-
sung alternative [70, 74, 80, 81].  This flash memory is capable of holding as 
many as eight configurations for the FPGA, interfaces easily with the device, and 
has straight-forward control requirements for both reading from and writing to it 
[81]. 
D. CONFIGURATION CONTROLLER 
Configuring the Configurable Processor FPGA, as mentioned in the previ-
ous paragraph requires some form of a controller.  This fact was not identified 
until after the intermediate concept (reference Figure 48), when the issue of con-
figuration memory required reassessment.  However, when the need for a con-
troller became clear, it was determined that the device must be RADHARD due 
to its critical role.  Because the configuration memory devices were to be Xilinx 
PROMs, the first device chosen as a configuration controller was a Xilinx CPLD.  
In short order, Xilinx CPLDs were discounted, because no suitable RADHARD 
devices were available.   
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Actel antifuse FPGAs were the next logical fit given their demonstrated 
RADHARD designs and their impressive flight heritage.  The two primary families 
of radiation tolerant and RADHARD devices (R SX-A and RH 1020/1280 Fami-
lies) offered mixed benefits.  True, they are RADHARD, reliable, devices, with 
affordable design tools and device programming, but they are small (low gate 
count, refer to Table 5), OTP devices, with very high price tags ($3650 for 
RT54SX32S and over $10,000 for RH1280 [82]).  After weighing the options, the 
RT54SX32S was chosen, providing 32,000 gates with a TID tolerance greater 
than 100 krad, total SEL immunity, and SEU immune to greater than 50 LET [54], 
thereby providing solid RADHARD performance at the most reasonably available 
price.  However, this too changed. 
Shortly after the selecting the Actel device as the Configuration Controller 
(CC), Xilinx made the RADHARD offer discussed in Section A, above.  Using the 
Xilinx XQVR600 for the Configuration Controller was immediately appealing for a 
number of reasons, including the cost savings, the form factor, the design tool, 
and the product familiarity.  However using a reprogrammable SRAM based 
FPGA, even the RADHARD XQVR device, increases the susceptibility of the 
Configuration Controller to SEEs.  In order to mitigate these effects and maxi-
mize the ability of this device to meet the desired reliability requirements men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, some control measures were put in place.  
First, the XQVR Configuration Controller would be used in role similar to a CPLD, 
without frequent reconfigurations and the associated EEPROM support that is 
expected of the Configurable Processor FPGA.  Second, a RADHARD Xilinx 
OTP PROM would be used as the configuration storage for the device using the 
dedicated Master Serial configuration mode (which loads the configuration by de-
fault when power is applied or when the system is reset).  The third control 
measure was to utilize background scrubbing of the device while it is operation 
with a refresh frequency optimized for the predicted SEU rates for each orbit.  
This will require the device to serve as its own scrubbing controller and watchdog 
timer, an IP core for which is under development at Xilinx [82].  Fourth, because 
the device is after all reconfigurable, the capability to configure and/or scrub the 
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device using the Reconfigurable Processor FPGA has also been provided for as 
a backup.  Including these control measures, along with TMR instantiation of the 
soft cores, it is expected that the reliability requirement for the Configuration Con-
troller FPGA will be met. 
E. FUNCTIONAL LOGIC 
Several necessary control and reliability functions have been mentioned 
throughout this Chapter, including the use of an SDRAM controller, configuration 
controllers for both FPGAs, readback/partial reconfiguration/scrubbing control-
lers, and EDAC logic.  In addition to these functions, normal operation of the 
CFTP as a system includes interface management, command and status regis-
ters, interrupt handling/control, and system data handling for communications to 
the satellite and ground stations (protocol management).  As functions such as 
these have been identified throughout the design process, they had been col-
lected in a conceptual package referred to as Random Left-Over Stuff (RLOS).  
Until the Configuration Control FPGA took shape, consideration was being given 
to the implementation of RLOS in discrete components.  When the selected Con-
figuration Controller was the Actel device, it was expected that most of the RLOS 
could be instantiated within the 32,000 available gates.  However using the Xilinx 
XQVR600 FPGA with 661,111 gates, it is expected to contain all of the RLOS.  
Table 10 summarizes the functions to be performed by each device in the CFTP. 
F. GLUE LOGIC 
Closely related to the RLOS mentioned above are the essential linking 
and interface functions.  While these are often considered trivial in the large pic-
ture, they are absolutely necessary for the system to operate properly.  Included 
in this category are bus transceivers (buffers), address decoding, an oscillator, 
Direct Current (DC) voltage converters, bypass (or decoupling) capacitors for cir-
cuit/device protection, and pull-up/pull-down resistors.  Initially, all of these func-
tions were to be implemented in discrete logic.  For example, 54HC245 octal bus 
transceiver chips were going to be used between the PC/104 bus and the CFTP 
devices for directional control and buffering.  Because of the size of the FPGA 
chosen as the Configuration Controller, some of this logic, such as the transceiv-
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ers and the address decoding, can be moved to the FPGA which further reduces 
the footprint and power requirements.  Some devices can not be substituted by 
the functionality of the FPGA, these include resistors, capacitors, DC-DC voltage 
regulators/converters, and oscillators.  Discrete component functions are also in-
cluded in Table 10. 
 
Device Primary Function Alternate/Secondary Func-
tions 




Satellite On-Board Systems 
redundancy/Back-up 
DSP 











Future Functions TBD 
SDRAM Configuration Controller Bus Master Functions 
EDAC Controller Communications Control  
JTAG Controller Future Functions TBD 
Readback, Partial reconfigura-
tion, and background  
CFTP Interrupt Handling/Control 
Command and Status registers 











ration Storage for Con-
figuration Controller 






age for Configuration 
Controller 
Up to 8 additional configurations 
including BIST and Status Re-
porting 
Future Configurations TBD 
Intel 28F320C3 
Flash 
Configuration Storage for 
Configurable Processor 
Storage for Operating Sys-
tem/Codes 
 
  Extra application space for mi-
croprocessor 
 
Hitachi SDRAM System Memory User defined storage  
3.3V Regulator 5V to 3.3V Conversion   





Optimized Flight Board Oscillator 
(TBD) 
 
Table 10.   CFTP Device Functions 
 
G. PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD 
PCB layout is a time consuming task requiring a considerable amount of 
design troubleshooting throughout.  Using special software, Accel Technologies’ 
80 
P-CAD9, the selected parts must be created, placed in a schematic editor, and 
pins assigned, from which the net list is generated.  After the devices are input 
into the program, the board itself must be defined, including shape, dimensions, 
obstructions (e.g., bolt holes), design rules, and the number of board layers.  Fi-
nally the physical traces, vias, and interconnects, based on the actual dimen-
sions of the parts and board, are routed.  Throughout this Computer Aided De-
sign (CAD) entry phase, numerous verification and validation steps must be ac-
complished.  It has been through this process that several routing issues, requir-
ing slight conceptual changes, have been brought to light, such as the JTAG de-
vice interconnections.  Multilayer, complex PCB layout, as mentioned in Chapter 
IV, requires a particular skill set.  After the design has passed final verification 
checks and meets the design rules of the manufactures process specifications, it 
is then sent out for fabrication.  For the CFTP, Advanced Circuits10 is the PCB 
manufacturer.  Once back from fabrication, the parts that were not installed by 
Advanced Circuits are soldered on under microscope at NPS, a very exacting 
procedure. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Throughout the CFTP’s design, considerable effort has been spent to 
maximize functionality, within the scope of the projects goals, while minimizing 
costs.  As opportunities were presented, such as Xilinx’s offer of RADHARD de-
vices and SEAKR’s donation of SDRAM, great efforts were taken to analyze al-
ternatives in order to select the one most in accordance with design and func-
tional goals.  This has meant that the CFTP was “redesigned” several times over 
the past two years, but the underlying concept has not changed.  The final CFTP 
design, spawned from this original concept, will be presented in Chapter VI. 
                                            
9 P-CAD is a registered trademark of Accel Technologies, Inc. 
10 Advanced Circuits, 21101 East 32nd Parkway, Aurora, CO 80011 
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VI. THE COMPLETE CFTP  
The goal of designing a reliable, reconfigurable processor for space appli-
cations has been the overarching theme of the CFTP development since its in-
ception.  From the early conceptual stages, characterized by the diagrams shown 
in Figures 36 (a) and (b), the CFTP design process has focused on maximizing 
available resources to deliver the most robust and flexible system possible. 
The component selection and design refinement processes have resulted 
in a system ready for final assembly, leading to test and evaluation.  The final 
component choices provide for a radiation tolerant system with an architecture 
that supports maximum flexibility in application. 
A. COMPONENT INTEGRATION 
Chapter V described a system design process heavily focused on concur-
rent component selection.  As parts were selected, the architecture was changed 
to suit component specific implementations, which led to concept changes, which 
would then require different parts.  This process continued throughout the entire 
process, including the final stages of PCB layout and the physical assignment of 
pins on devices and laying traces on the board.  The end result, however, is the 







Figure 48.   CFTP Final Block Diagram 
   
1. Data paths 
The CFTP architecture was designed with maximum flexibility to support 
future, yet to be determined, IP cores.  This required logic paths to be created 
between the CFTP’s components as well as between the CFTP and the system 
host, for multiple functions, many without specific definition. 
a. Primary Design Architecture 
The CFTP primary design architecture supports the TMR KDLX mi-
croprocessor developed in References [9] and [10], running in the Configurable 
Processor FPGA with the SDRAM controller and EDAC controller cores also in-
stantiated in that FPGA.  The Configuration Controller FPGA would then be re-
sponsible for controlling the background partial reconfiguration of the Processor 
FPGA, providing PC/104 Bus Interface services, provide a Command and Status 
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register, satellite C&DH interrupt handling functions and bus address decoding, 
as well as providing its own background SEU-mitigating scrub routine control.  
This concept is graphically depicted in Figure 49.  Control, data and address sig-
nals across the PC/104 bus trigger the Configuration Controller (CC) to configure 
in its initial state from the PROM, which in turn commands and controls the initial 
configuration of the Configurable Processor (CP) from the flash memory.  During 
normal operations, the CP will utilize the SDRAM for its processor memory while 
the CC controls background configuration scrubbing of the CP using the flash 
memory.  Also, the CC will control its own background scrubbing (self-scrubbing 
mode) using the configuration stored in the PROM.  If the either the CP or the CC 
require bus attention, then it is the CC’s responsibility to negotiate the interrupt 
service and handling routines with the host system. 
 
Figure 49.   Baseline Architecture of the CFTP 
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b. Alternate and Additional Paths 
Considering that the XQVR600 may eventually be too small to con-
tain TMR microprocessor cores and the additional controllers mentioned above, 
multiple direct traces connect the user configurable I/O pins of the two FPGAs.  
This allows for moving various “components” of the architecture to one or the 
other FPGA, depending on the designers constraints.  For example, one of the 
three microprocessors that make up the TMR architecture could be moved from 
the Configurable Processor to the Configuration Controller, allowing for larger 
microprocessor IP cores to be used.  Anticipating “unknown-unknowns,” addi-
tional paths have been designed into the CFTP.  A 45-bit-wide dedicated path 
exists between the two FPGAs, conceptually for the PC/104 to exchange data 
directly with the Configurable Processor, via the bus transceiver logic instantiated 
in the Configuration Controller FPGA.  The 42-bit-wide Flash memory 
data/address/ control busses are paralleled between the FPGAs, providing an 
additional FPGA to FPGA path.  It is worth mentioning that the user I/O FPGA 
pins (all of which these are) can be internally configured for a number of input 
and output functions, including pull-up, pull-down, and high impedance condi-
tions.  Thus, depending on the operating configurations of the two FPGAs, these 
paths can be used between the FPGAs and or between the Flash.  Additionally, 
the pins that are dual use for configuring the devices and as user IO are, for the 
most part, connected in parallel between the devices providing further on-board 
flexibility (more on configuring in the next Section).  Figure 50 highlights the addi-
tional and alternate paths in the CFTP architecture providing for future flexibility 
in architectural designs. 
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Figure 50.   Additional CFTP Connections 
 
2. Configuration Methods and Paths 
Designing suitable configuration capabilities for the CFTP to achieve req-
uisite SEE tolerance has complicated the design process.  The constraints to the 
designer include: the number of available pins on the CB228 packages; the deci-
sion to use, and how best to employ, partial reconfiguration and scrubbing as er-
ror mitigation techniques; and the need to ensure the Configuration Controller 
FPGA is designed to be as RADHARD as possible.  The final CFTP design in-
cludes a wide variety of choices for the programmer.  Thus the design presented 
maximizes flexibility of the FPGAs by including JTAG readback and reconfigura-
tion controller, SelectMAP reconfiguration controller, Master-Slave Serial load, 
and self-scrubbing functions.  Table 11 summarizes the methods available for the 
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CP Flash CC SelMAP Default Osc. X X X CP Default configuration mode 
CP Flash CC Sl. Serial CC CC  X   
CP Flash CP JTAG CC CC   X Self-scrub, CP must Serialize data 
CP PROM CC Sl. Serial CC CC  X   
CP PC/104 CC SelMAP CC Osc. X X  CC serves PC/104 data like Flash 
CP PC/104 CC Sl. Serial CC CC  X   
CP Flash CC Mas. Ser. CC CP  X  CC must appear as a PROM to CP
CP PROM CC Mas. Ser CC CP  X  CC must appear as a PROM to CP
CC PROM CC Mas. Ser Default CC X X  CC Default configuration mode 
CC Flash CP SelMAP CP Osc.  X X  
CC PROM CC JTAG CC CC  X X Self-scrub 
CC PC/104 CC JTAG CC CC   X Self-scrub 
CC Flash CP Mas. Ser CP CP  X  CP must appear as PROM to CC 
CC: Configuration Controller 
CP: Configurable Processor 
Osc: Oscillator 
Sl Serial: Slave Serial mode 
Mas. Ser: Master Serial mode 
Initialize refers to power-off/hard reset 
Reconfigure refers to power-on/soft reset 
Scrubbing refers to any reconfiguration occurring in the background of normal operations 
Table 11.   Configuration Methods for Configurable Processor (CP)                         
and Configuration Controller (CC) FPGAs 
 
 
Table 12.   Configuration Codes for Virtex Devices (From Ref. [44].) 
 
a. Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) / Boundary Scan 
Boundary Scan provides a very useful developmental method of 
loading, reading back and testing configurations, as well as providing a method 
for background configuration scrubbing without interrupting surface processing.  
The JTAG functionality in the CFTP is provided for two principal reasons.  First, it 
is easy to use and it conveniently interfaces with desktop Personal Computers 
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(PCs) supported by useful development software.  Second, the protocol supports 
robust test functions so this will be the preferred method of loading the configur-
able devices on the board during development.  Third, it will be via the JTAG port 
that the Configurable Processor FPGA performs its SEU mitigation background 
scrubbing while on-orbit, a capability also provided for in the Configurable Proc-
essor.  The JTAG daisy chain is shown in Figure 51, and the self-scrubbing 
JTAG path is shown for the Configuration Controller in Figure 52.  The Configur-
able Processor is also designed with this capability, although it is not shown 
here.   
 
Figure 51.   JTAG Daisy Chain 
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Figure 52.   JTAG Self-Scrubbing 
 
b. SelectMAP 
The primary method of loading the Configurable Processor FPGA 
will be through the SelectMAP port.  This method provides for 8-bit-wide parallel 
loading of the device and is the preferred method for performing background con-
figuration readback and partial reconfiguration.  There are two principal draw-
backs when using the mode.  First, although the SelectMAP pins are dual-use, 
they must be dedicated to configuration loading when the readback/recon-
figuration scheme is utilized.  Secondly, this method requires an external control-
ler.  Therefore, the CFTP design allows either FPGA to act as the Select MAP 
controller for the other device.  The block diagram with the Configurable Proces-
sor in SelectMAP is shown in Figure 53. 
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Figure 53.   CFTP SelectMAP Configuration Diagram 
 
c. Master-Slave Serial Mode 
The Master Serial mode is the default method of loading a configu-
ration into a Xilinx Virtex FPGA.  This method was selected to be the fail safe 
mode to load the Configuration Controller FPGA with its initial configuration, as it 
is extremely simple and requires no external clocking.  When the power-on/reset 
command is given to the CFTP, the Configuration Controller will be loaded from 
the RADHARD SPROM via the Master Serial Mode, with no controller required.  
As an additional option, the Processor FPGA can be daisy chained in Slave Se-
rial Mode and loaded from the same SPROM.  Figure 54 depicts the Master-
Slave Serial Mode as used in the CFTP. 
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Figure 54.   CFTP Master-Slave Serial Mode 
 
B. CFTP PCB 
The CFTP PCB was laid out in P-CAD Schematic editor, which provided 
for pin descriptions and net identifications.  (Schematics are provided in Appen-
dix B.)  Using the net list generated from the schematic editor and the exact me-
chanical descriptions of the parts, the physical layout of the traces, vias and in-
terconnects was completed.  Given the number of traces to be run on the board, 
the dimensions of the devices, and the capacitor requirements, an 8-layered PCB 
design was selected.  This provided for a dedicated ground plane, a VCCINT (+2.5 
V) plane, a VCCO (+3.3 V) plane and five planes to run traces in.  The CFTP PCB 
layers are shown in Figure 55.  
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Bottom Signal Trace 2
Bottom Signal Trace 1
VCCO (+3.3 V) Plane
Ground Plane
VCCINT (+2.5 V) Plane
Top Signal Trace 2
Top Signal Trace 1










Figure 55.   CFTP PCB Layers 
 
The final PCB design was verified in the software against design rules 
specified by the manufacturer, such as via proximity, minimum trace width, and 
minimum hole diameters.  Once verified, the design was sent to the manufacturer 
as a “Gerber11” file from which the PCB is fabricated.  The Gerber file provided to 
the PCB manufacturer is not included in this thesis due to its sheer size; however 
it will be maintained in the SSAG [83].  Schematic diagrams and individual PCB 
layer diagrams are also provided in Appendixes B and C, respectively.  Figure 56 
shows the complete CFTP 8-layer PCB layout.  
With the hardware designed and parts selected, the layout has been sent 
to the manufacturer for fabrication.  Soldering the components to the board will 
be the final step required to complete the CFTP development board.  It will be the 
work of future researchers to test and validate the architecture and functionality 
of the system.  
                                            
11 A Gerber File contains all the necessary information for a PCB manufacturer to construct 
the PCB.  This file includes physical dimensions, material specifications, and net-list information. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter brought together the component selection process and the 
functional design of the CFTP illustrating, by example, the fusion of design and 
function.  The CFTP functionality is dependent on the parts selected, which in 
turn were influenced by the functional concept of the CFTP.  Having come full 
circle, the CFTP design is now in hardware and ready for the next phase of the 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH  
This purpose of this thesis was to design, develop, and deliver the CFTP 
flight hardware.  While the final stages of assembly are being conducted at the 
time of publishing, the CFTP flight development board is essentially complete.  In 
concert with the initial objectives of this project, the CFTP has been designed as 
a single PCB multifunction system, in order to demonstrate reliable, reconfigur-
able space-based computing.  The additional goal of achieving COTS perform-
ance while minimizing cost was also achieved. 
A. OVERVIEW 
The CFTP hardware design is another step in a program that will eventu-
ally put multiple devices in various orbits to demonstrate reliable, reconfigurable 
COTS solutions for Electrical and Space Systems Engineers.  From initial con-
cept through hardware delivery, the CFTP design goals have remained the 
same.  Clear goals and a well defined trade space were essential to enable the 
parts selection process.  
Through this selection process, RADHARD FPGAs were selected to per-
form COTS processor functions.  This is an interesting mix of traditional 
RADHARD ASIC or CPLD devices, which lag in technology and speed, and 
state-of-the-art processing capabilities.  In the case of the RADHARD FPGA, the 
devices certainly lag non-RADHARD FPGA technology, but because of the re-
programmable nature of FPGAs, they can achieve COTS-like performance.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The design of a complex system, without knowing what functions it will 
perform in the future, and therefore not truly knowing what the necessary archi-
tecture should be designed to, is a challenging problem.  By simply maximizing 
system flexibility by designing in reconfigurability options, as well as selecting the 
most advanced and reliable parts available, this system offers the necessary ar-
chitecture to meet the unpredictable future needs of CFTP users many years 
from now.  
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The on-orbit reconfiguration concept stands to provide the space industry, 
and particularly the military, the advantage of ensuring that electronic equipment 
on-orbit utilizes the most current algorithms and processors.  Continued CFTP 
research will help contribute to improvements in space based computing sys-
tems, offering system designers reliable flexibility unavailable in the past. 
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
The CFTP is manifested for launch into LEO orbit on two satellites in 
2006; there are many areas for follow on research that must be accomplished for 
this to occur.  First and foremost, the CFTP development board designed for this 
thesis must be tested and evaluated for architectural suitability and that the paths 
designed are satisfactory for future needs.  Assuming that the design architecture 
is valid, the qualification boards must by built and then qualified for space.  This 
verification process will include vibration, thermal, vacuum, and radiation analy-
sis.  Finally, the two flight boards must be built, tested, and then integrated into 
the host satellites.  
The existing soft core microprocessor is the KDLX.  While the TMR con-
figuration has been developed, no programs have been written for it.  Addition-
ally, actual instantiation of the KDLX in an FPGA has not yet occurred. 
Throughout this thesis IP cores, such as configuration controllers, were 
mentioned as being essential components to the instantiated logic in the FPGAs.  
While some of these cores exist, many will have to be developed, and all will 
have to be integrated and married to the appropriate hardwired pins.  
Research into the implementation of state-of the-art soft-core processors 
for future implementation is not required for launch; however it has significant 
value for future applicability of the CFTP.  In addition to soft-core processors, the 
use of other algorithms for DSP and data compression has a great deal of value 
for on-orbit applications. 
Finally, the use of non-RADHARD, BGA FPGAs needs to be evaluated in 
the future.  
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APPENDIX A: STP AND SERB DOCUMENTATION 
Appendix A contains the technical documentation and agreements be-
tween the CFTP and the Space Test Program, including the application to the 
Space Experiments Review Board.  Table 13 lists the document, the page that it 
begins on, and the number of pages in that document.  Note that the documents 
in this Appendix have retained the original formatting due to their official nature 
and the required approval process.  As such, the page numbers in this Appendix 
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SPACE TEST PROGRAM 





1.  EXPERIMENT TITLE 
Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
2.  SHORT TITLE/ACRONYM 
CFTP 
3.  EXPERIMENT NUMBER   NPS-0201 4.  DATE (YYYYMMDD)    2002-08-09 
5.  OBJECTIVE 
To subject CFTP to a variety of radiation fluxes to test suitability of design in numerous space radiation environments.  Evaluate on-orbit, a triple-redundant, fault-tolerant 
computer design to mitigate bit errors in computation by detecting errors and correcting them through voting logic.  Fly a low-cost, COTS, reconfigurable fault tolerant 
processor.    
6.  DESCRIPTION – Please include descriptive website address if applicable 
The CFTP will provide an educational tool for officer students at NPS in Electrical Engineering and Space Systems Engineering and Operations curriculums.  The CFTP 
will use COTS technology in design to investigate a low-cost, flexible alternative to processor hardware architecture, using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) as a 
basis for a system on a chip  
 
WEB SITE:  http://www.nps.navy.mil/CFTP 
7.  RELEVANCE TO SPECIFIC DOD REQUIREMENTS 
-DOD and the National Reconnaissance Office have a need for many space-based missions, such as reconnaissance and communications.  All of these missions require 
reliable computing to perform the necessary attitude control, power management, communication, data handling, and payload management.  Reconfigurability of the 
processor allows adaptation of the satellite to new missions and the use of improved algorithms. 
8.  REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY 
a.  REQUESTED STP SERVICES 
 LAUNCH SERVICES 
 LAUNCH INTEGRATION 
 SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT 
 DATA DISTRIBUTION 
 OPERATIONS 
 SPACECRAFT/EXPERIMENT INTEGRATION 
 OTHER (Specify):      










d.  FLIGHT MODE (1=Preferred, 2=Acceptable, Blank=Unacceptable) e.  POWER (W) 





f.  DIMENSIONS (cm) 
12 X 17.5 X 4 
g.  MASS (kg)  
1 
h.  VOLUME (cc) 
816 
i.  HARDWARE FLIGHT READY DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
 2004-07-01 
j.  STABILIZATION TYPE k.  ORBIT REQUIREMENTS (km) l.  INCLINATION (Degrees) 
       APOGEE 35000 + 2000 - 4000 N/A 
      PERIGEE 500 + 400 - 100 
40 + 15 - 15 
m.  OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
Multiple orbits required: 1. GTO or Molniya, 2. LEO low inclination, 3. LEO mid inclination, 4. LEO high inclination 
9.  PROGRAM SUMMARY 
a.  FUNDING BREAKDOWN ($ Needed/$ Secured) 
SOURCE PRIOR FY FUNDS CURRENT FY FUNDS FUTURE FY FUNDS TOTAL COST 
NRO/LSPO 15000/15000 20000/20000 40000/      75000/35000 
NRO/SSPO      /      51000/51000 100000/      151000/51000 
           /           /           /           /      
           /           /           /           /      
           /           /           /           /      
b.  DESIGN/FABRICATION STATUS 
Design 
c.  CONTRACTOR 
N/A 
10.  DoD DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL 
a.  APPROVING OFFICIAL (Last Name, First, Middle Initial) 
      
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
      
c.  POSITION 
      
d.  MAILING ADDRESS (Street, Apt/Suite No., City, State, ZIP Code) e.  TELEPHONE NUMBER(S) (Include Area Code) 
     COMMERCIAL            DSN                 
f.  SIGNATURE g.  EMAIL 
      
h.  PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR (Last Name, First, Middle Initial) 
Loomis, Hercshel H 
i.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
NAVPGSCOL 
j.  POSITION 
Professor, Department of Elec & Comp Eng 
k.  MAILING ADDRESS (Street, Apt/Suite No., City, State, ZIP Code) l.  TELEPHONE NUMBER(S) (Include Area Code) 
     COMMERCIAL      (831) 656 3214 DSN     756-3214 777 Dyer Rd Code SP 
Monterey, CA 93943 
m.  SIGNATURE 
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FLIGHT REQUEST 
 










PART I - REQUEST FOR SPACEFLIGHT 
 
1.  EXPERIMENT TITLE 
Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
2.  SHORT TITLE/ACRONYM 
CFTP 
3.  EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
 
NPS-0201 
4.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
NPS-0201 
5.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
 
SP 
6.  PROJECT OFFICE 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
7.  MANAGEMENT OFFICE 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
8.  SPONSOR 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
9.  PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR (REQUIRED) 
a.  NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 
Loomis, Herschel H 
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
NAVPGSCOL 
c.  POSITION 
Professor, Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering 
d.  EMAIL 
HLoomis@nps.navy.mil 








g.  DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
 
      
10.  PROJECT OFFICE APPROVAL 
a.  NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 
Loomis, Herschel H 
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
NAVPGSCOL 
c.  POSITION 
Professor, Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering 
d.  EMAIL 
HLoomis@nps.navy.mil 





 g.  DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
      
11.  MANAGEMENT OFFICE APPROVAL 
a.  NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 
Powers, John P. 
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
NAVPGSCOL 
c.  POSITION 
Chairman and Distinguished Professor, 
Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
d.  EMAIL 
jpowers@nps.navy.mil 





 g.  DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
      
12.  SPONSOR APPROVAL (REQUIRED) 
a.  NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 
Powers, John P. 
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
NAVPGSCOL 
c.  POSITION 
Chairman and Distinguished Professor, 
Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
d.  EMAIL 
jpowers@nps.navy.mil 






g.  DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
      
13.  INTERMEDIATE ACTIVITY 
a.  NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 
      
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
      
c.  POSITION 
      
d.  EMAIL 
      
e.  TELEPHONE NUMBER(S) (Include Area Code) f.  SIGNATURE 
COMMERCIAL 
      
DSN 
      
 
g.  DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
      
14.  DoD DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL (REQUIRED) 
a.  NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 
      
b.  OFFICE SYMBOL 
      
c.  POSITION 
      
d.  EMAIL 
      
e.  TELEPHONE NUMBER(S) (Include Area Code) f.  SIGNATURE 
COMMERCIAL 
      
DSN 
      
 
g.  DATE (YYYYMMDD) 
      
 





Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
15.  REQUESTED STP SERVICES 
 OPERATIONS 
 SPACECRAFT/EXPERIMENT INTEGRATION 
 LAUNCH SERVICES (Complete Item 15b) 
 LAUNCH INTEGRATION 
 SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT 
 DATA DISTRIBUTION 
 OTHER (Specify):       
a.  NUMBER OF FLIGHTS REQUESTED/REQUIRED TO MEET OBJECTIVE: 4/1 
b.  DESIRED FLIGHT MODE (1=Preferred, 2=Acceptable, Blank=Unacceptable) 
   SHUTTLE (Complete Section IIIA) 2  ISS (Complete Section IIIA) 1  FREEFLYER (Complete Section IIIB)    OTHER (Specify):        
16.  OBJECTIVE 
1.  To subject CFTP to a variety of radiation fluxes to test suitability of design in numerous space radiation environments. 
2.  Evaluate on-orbit, a triple-redundant, fault-tolerant computer design to mitigate bit errors in computation by detecting errors and correcting them through voting logic. 
3.  Fly a low-cost, COTS, reconfigurable fault tolerant processor.  
4.  To provide a hands-on educational tool for officer students at NPS in the design, development, test, and on-orbit operations of processor architecture.   
5.  To demonstrate commercial, off-the-shelf technology applied to spacecraft architecture as a means of decreasing development time, decreasing costs, and increasing 
reliability in hardware development and implementation. 
6.  Demonstrate applicability of reconfigurable, reliable, fault tolerant processing architectures to space based applications. 
7.  Demonstrate the value of reconfigurable processors as cost effective flexible alternatives to custom integrated circuit architectures across the spectrum of military/DoD 
applications. 
 
17.  RELEVANCE TO SPECIFIC DOD REQUIREMENTS 
-CFTP is a flexible and cost-effective means to address numerous processing requirements, and addresses the requirement of shorter development time for satellites, in 
accordance with the USSPC LRP. 
-CFTP addresses the requirement in Ch 8 of the DTAP of capitalizing on radiation tolerant COTS technology.  
-AFSPC SMP Ch4 requirement #59: Reliable General Purpose Vehicle Fleet.  CFTP can satisfy the general-purpose aspect with its ability to be reconfigured as needed to 
support multi-mission tasking. 
- The CFTP supports the education and training of officer personnel in order to maintain a foundation of high-quality people and innovative leadership within the Naval Space 
Cadre. 
18.  DESCRIPTION – Please include descriptive website address if applicable. 
The CFTP will provide an educational tool for officer students at NPS in Electrical Engineering and Space Systems Engineering and Operations curriculums.  The CFTP will use 
COTS technology in design to investigate a low-cost, flexible alternative to processor hardware architecture, using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) as a basis for a 
system on a chip.  Increasing the flexibility of the processor architecture will serve as a means of decreasing development time while allowing software development and 
component integration to commence at the earliest stages of development, with the expectation that the processor will be configured to support any design constraints.  
Exploiting triple modular redundancy to mitigate single event transients in various radiation environments enables the system on a chip to continue normal functional routine 
without requiring a reset and commensurate loss of data, normally associated with a return to a trusted state.  Additionally, the flexibility of a configurable processor, based on 
COTS FPGA technology, will enable in orbit upgrades, reconfigurations, and modifications to the onboard architecture in order to support dynamic mission requirements. 
  
WEB SITE:  http://www.nps.navy.mil/CFTP 
19.  BACKGROUND 
The Small Satellite Design Studies program at NPS has been ongoing for over a decade.  The objective is to provide hands-on education for officer students in the Electrical 
Engineering and Space Systems Curricula.  This program offers an excellent means of teaching officer students and exposing them to the many technical, managerial, and 
operational challenges in the full life cycle of a space system.  The success can be gauged by the 1998 launch and current operation of the PANSAT small satellite, which 
produced more than 50 Master's theses and continues to provide a rich teaching tool.  PANSAT is a small, tumbling (no attitude control), digital communications satellite. 
COTS FPGA technology provides a mechanism for scalable, configurable processing architectures with low overhead, and rapid development cycles, allowing system 
designers to use more sophisticated and powerful applications and tools in their hardware and software development.  FPGA technology also allows on orbit 
modifications/upgrades to system architecture. 
 





Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
20.  DESCRIPTIVE GRAPHIC 
      
21.  ALTERNATIVES TO SPACEFLIGHT 
The CFTP is largely an electrical engineering experiment.  Spaceflight, particularly in different orbits, offers the long-term environment for evaluation;  actually combining many 
environments, such as launch vibro-acoustic, and space thermal, vacuum, radiation, and solar energy inputs that would not be cost-effective to recreate in a laboratory 
environment.  There is no alternative in the educational process to actually doing that which is trying to be taught.      
 
22.  EXPERIMENT UNIQUENESS – Explain how the proposed experiment differs from and/or is complementary to other similar efforts.  Indicate if a 
competition is pending and when award is expected. 
CFTP demonstrates a combined hardware and software, COTS solution to address software reliability, maintainability, and timeliness. 
 
CFTP will be the first to demonstrate configurability of a processor while on orbit. 
 
CFTP will be the first to utilize COTS available FPGA technology, reliable system on a chip as alternative to radhard processors. 
 
CFTP is unique in that it directly addresses maintaining the caliber of highly-quality people for Navy space needs and its professional cadre. 
23.  FOLLOW-ON PLANS 
CFTP will be the first in a series of FPGA based systems on a chip designed for DoD applications. 
 
The Small Satellite Design Studies program at NPS marries the educational goals with a research program in satellite technology to introduce higher capability and greater 
reliability in small satellites.  Research will continue on the use of configurable processors to support the needs for fault-tolerant processing in space. 
 





Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
PART II - PROGRAM/SECURITY INFORMATION 
24.  HARDWARE STATUS 
 FLIGHT READY  DESIGN 
 UNDER CONSTRUCTION  CONCEPT 
 BREADBOARD 
25.  DESIGN-FREEZE DATE 
2003/01 
26.  DELIVERY DATE 
2003/03 
27.  FUNDING BREAKDOWN ($ Needed / $ Secured) 
a.  SOURCE 
 
b.  PRIOR FY FUNDS 
 
c.  CURRENT FY FUNDS 
 
d.  FUTURE FY FUNDS 
 
e.  TOTAL COST 
 
NRO/LSPO 35,000 /35,000 20,000 /20,000 20,000 /      75,000 /35,000 
NRO/SSPO 51,000 /51,000 50,000 /50,000 50,000 /     151,000 /      
            /            /            /            /      
            /            /            /            /      
            /            /            /            /      
f.  DATA PROCESSING AND DISSEMINATION FULLY FUNDED? (Required per AFI-10-1202(I))  NO  YES 
g.  ON ORBIT OPERATIONS BEYOND FIRST YEAR FULLY FUNDED? (STP only pays for the first year of on orbit operations per AFI 10-1202(I)) 
 NO  YES  NOT APPLICABLE 
h.  REMARKS 







28.  BUDGET/PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION NUMBER 
N/A 
29.  CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY 
N/A 




31.  CONTRACT NO. 
N/A 
32.  PLANNED CONTRACT OBLIGATION DATE 
N/A 
33.  PLAN FOR DATA PROCESSING AND DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS 







34.  SECURITY INFORMATION  (State highest levels) 
a.  EXPERIMENT OBJECTIVES 
U 
b.  TIMELINE 
U 
c.  EXTERNAL VIEW 
U 
d.  FLIGHT HARDWARE 
U 
e.  FLIGHT SOFTWARE 
U 
f.  EXPERIMENT DATA 
U 
g.  RAW DATA 
U 
h.  INTERNAL FEATURES  
U 
i.  IS RAW DATA CLASSIFIED? (ISS/Shuttle cannot provide) j.  ENCRYPTION OF RAW DATA REQUIRED? (ISS/Shuttle cannot provide) 
 NO  YES  NO  YES 







l.  ARE ANY TECHNOLOGIES USED IN THIS EXPERIMENT LISTED IN THE MILITARY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST (MCTL) OR THE US MUNITIONS LISTS?  
 
  NO   YES   
 
    IF YES, ARE THEY CONTROLLED THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATION (ITAR)?   NO   YES   
 
m.  ARE FOREIGN NATIONALS INVOLVED WITH THIS EXPERIMENT?   NO   YES   








PART IIIA – TECHNICAL DETAILS:  SPACE SHUTTLE/ISS 
35.  FLIGHT OPTIONS  
a.  SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPTIONS 
 LOCKER 
 SPARTAN 
 G.A.S. CAN 
 HITCHHIKER 
 CROSS-BAY 
 OTHER (Specify):       
b.  ISS FLIGHT OPTIONS 
 EXPRESS PALLET (UNPRESSURIZED)  
 
 EXPRESS RACK (PRESSURIZED) 
 
 WINDOW OBSERVATION RACK       
FACILITY (PRESSURIZED) 
 OTHER (Specify): See 46g 
36.  STANDARD SUPPORT HARDWARE DESIRED 
 LOCKER 
 PAYLOAD EJECTION SYSTEM/SHUTTLE HITCHHIKER EJECTION LAUNCH SYSTEM 
 EXPRESS PALLET ADAPTER PLATE 
 OTHER (Specify): Bus interface and card mounting 
37.  MASS (kg) 
 
 
40.  EXTENSIONS BEYOND PAYLOAD BAY 
ENVELOPE? 
a.  TOTAL PAYLOAD 
1 
b.  EXPENDABLES 
0 
 
38.  PHYSICAL 
DIMENSIONS (cm) 
12 X 17.5 X 4 
39.  TOTAL VOLUME (cc) 
816 
 NO  YES 
41.  POWER (W) 42.  TYPICAL DUTY CYCLE (% of operation) 
a.  STAND-BY  
.5 (EST) 
b.  NOMINAL  
4 (EST) 
c.  MAX. POWER 
7 (EST) 
a.  STAND-BY 
70 (EST) 
b.  NOMINAL 
25 (EST) 
c.  MAX. POWER 
5 (EST) 
43.  MAXIMUM DUTY CYCLE (% of operation) 44.  MISSION  DURATION (Days) 
a.  STAND-BY 
40 
b.  NOMINAL 
50 
c.  MAX. POWER 
10 
a.  MINIMUM 
100 
b.  NOMINAL 
365 
c.  MAXIMUM 
      
45.  FLIGHT DATE (Quarter, Fiscal Year) 
a.  EARLIEST  
Q4, 2004 
 
b.  PREFERRED  
Q1, 2005 
c.  LATEST 
OPEN 
d.  RATIONALE 
Design and construction timeline of CFTP. 
46.  ORBITAL PARAMETERS 
a.  NOMINAL SHUTTLE PARAMETERS (193 - 604 km, 28.4 - 57°) ACCEPTABLE?  NO   YES 
b.  NOMINAL ISS PARAMETERS (370 – 407 km, 51.6°) ACCEPTABLE?  NO   YES 
c.  DESIRED APOGEE (km) d.  DESIRED PERIGEE (km) e.  DESIRED INCLINATION (Degrees) 
      +      -            +      -            +      -      
f.  ALTERNATE ORBITS (Acceptable, if desired orbit is unavailable) 
      
g.  REMARKS 
Extended duration test on ISS with payload mounted external to pressurized bays would provide meaningful data and satisfy LEO, mid inclination requirement.. 
47.  ORIENTATION REQUIREMENTS (Comment where applicable) 
a.  ISS NOMINAL (+/- 15° roll/yaw, -10 to +20° pitch) ACCEPTABLE?   NO   YES 
b.  X-AXIS 
      
c.  Y-AXIS 
      
d.  Z-AXIS 
      
e.  OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
-Data downlink required. 
-CFTP positioned to receive exposure to sun and radiaiton 
-Minimum shielding 








 WINDOW (NADIR) 
 OTHER (Specify):       
 NOT APPLICABLE 
g.  REMARKS 
      
 









48.  STABILIZATION REQUIREMENTS (Pointing Accuracy (degrees)/pointing knowledge (degrees/axis)) 
a.  ISS NOMINAL (control:  3.5 deg/axis/orbit;  rate: 0.02 deg/sec/axis;  knowledge: 3 deg/axis) ACCEPTABLE?   NO   YES 
b.  LINE-OF-SITE c.  ROLL ABOUT LINE-OF-SITE d.  JITTER OR DRIFT CONTROL 
      /            /            /      
e.  EXPERIMENT PROVIDED POINTER 
N/A 
f.  REMARKS 
N/A 
49.  MAJOR MOVEMENTS 
a.  TRACK 
None. 
b.  SLEW 
None. 
c.  OTHER MOTIONS 
None. 
d.  REMARKS 
      
50.  ASTRONAUT PARTICIPATION 
a.  REQUIRED? b.  FUNCTION c. NON U.S. ASTRONAUT PARTICIPATION ACCEPTABLE? 
 MONITORING  COMMAND AND CONTROL 
 NO  YES 





d.  DESCRIPTION OF ASTRONAUT DUTIES 
      
51.  GROUND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS DURING FLIGHT 
The ability to communicate with the CFTP board during flight, uploading reconfiguration commands and downloading performance data. 
52.  EPHEMERIS REQUIREMENTS 
Only approximate position versus time data required to be able to determine radiation flux. 
 





Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
53.  TELEMETRY AND DATA HANDLING 
a.  DATA STORAGE (Bits per orbit) b.  DATA OUTPUT RATE (bps)  c.  COMMAND REQUIREMENTS 
NOMINAL MAXIMUM N/A 
9,600 100,000  REAL-TIME   NEAR REAL-TIME   NOT REQUIRED 
d.  SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS 
Configuration upload - daily: 1 Mbyte which requires S-Band Single Access Mode with transfer rate of 1Mbps or greater. 
e.  REMARKS 
Data generation rate on average approximately 1,000,000 bytes/week. 
54.  EXPERIMENT COMPLEMENT/PACKAGE DATA 
a.  ITEM b.  DIMENSIONS STOWED (cm) c.  DIMENSIONS DEPLOYED (cm) d.  MASS (kg) e.  EJECTED? f.  RECOVERY? 
CFTP 12 x 17.5 x 4 N/A 1 NO NO 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
g.  OTHER PERTINENT DATA 
TBD 
h.  DESIGN DRAWING SPECIFICATION STATUS 
Design 
55.  CONTAMINATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS? 
 NO  YES (If yes, explain):       
 
56.  SPACE SHUTTLE/ISS SAFETY 
a.  POSSIBLE HAZARDS 
RADIOACTIVE DEVICES  NO  YES (If yes): MATERIAL(S):       STRENGTH (Ci):       
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS  NO  YES (If yes): MATERIAL(S):       
OTHER  NO  YES (If yes, specify):       
b.  DESCRIBE SAFETY COORDINATION ACTIVITIES WITH NASA TO DATE (If any) 
NONE 
c.  OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
N/A 





Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
PART IIIB - TECHNICAL DETAILS:  FREE-FLYER MODE 
57.  EXPERIMENT CLASS  
 EXPERIMENT ONLY  COMPLETE SPACECRAFT  PIGGYBACK PAYLOAD PREFERRED (Specify Host):        
58.  MASS (kg) 59.  PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS (cm) 
a.  TOTAL PAYLOAD 
1 
b.  EXPENDABLES 
0 
c.  SPACECRAFT (If provided) 
0 12 x 17.5 x 4 
60.  TOTAL VOLUME (cc) 61.  POWER (W) 62.  TYPICAL DUTY CYCLE (% of operation) 
816 
a.  STAND-BY  
0.5 (EST) 
b.  NOMINAL 
4 (EST) 
c.  MAX. POWER 
7 (EST) 
a.  STAND-BY  
70 (EST) 
b.  NOMINAL  
25 (EST) 
c.  MAX. POWER 
5 (EST) 
63.  MAXIMUM DUTY CYCLE (% of operation) 64.  MISSION DURATION (Months) 
a.  STAND-BY  
40 (EST) 
b.  NOMINAL 
50 (EST) 
c.  MAX. POWER 
10 (EST) 
a.  MINIMUM  
10 
b.  NOMINAL 
30 
c.  MAXIMUM 
      
65.  FLIGHT DATE (Quarter, Fiscal Year) 
a.  EARLIEST  
Q4, 2004 
b.  PREFERRED 
Q1, 2005 
c.  LATEST 
OPEN 
d.  RATIONALE 
Design and contruction timeline for CFTP. 
66.  ORBITAL PARAMETERS 
a.  APOGEE (km) b.  PERIGEE (km) c.  INCLINATION (Degrees) 
35000 +2000 -4000 500 +400 -100 40 +15 -15 
d.  RATIONALE 
Orbit should expose payload to sufficient radiation to cause SEUs, and should provide a variety of flux. 
e.  ALTERNATE ORBITS (Acceptable, if primary orbit is unavailable) 
Multiple orbits required: 1. GTO or Molniya, 2. LEO low inclination, 3. LEO mid inclination, 4. LEO high inclination 
f.  AXIS/ORBIT PLANE RESTRICTIONS 
      
67.  STABILIZATION REQUIREMENTS (Pointing accuracy (degrees)/pointing knowledge (degrees/axis)) 
a.  STABILIZATION TYPE b.  ROLL c.  PITCH 
 SPIN (If yes): SPIN RATE (rpm):             /            /      
 ANY 
 3-AXIS 
 OTHER (Specify):        
d.  YAW 
      
e.  JITTER OR DRIFT 
      
f.  OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
Require minimum shielding to allow for maximum exposre to radiation. 
g.  REMARKS 
      






Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
68.  MAJOR MOVEMENTS  (Explain and provide rates) 
a.  TRACK 
None 
b.  SLEW 
None 
c.  OTHER MOTIONS 
None 
d.  REMARKS 
      
69.  GROUND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS DURING FLIGHT 
The ability to communicate with the CFTP board during flight. 
70.  EPHEMERIS REQUIREMENTS 
Only approximate position versus time data required to be able to determine radiation flux. 
71.  TELEMETRY & DATA HANDLING 
a.  DATA STORAGE (Bits per day) b.  DATA OUTPUT RATE TO SPACECRAFT   (bps) c.  REAL-TIME DATA REQUIREMENT (bps) 
NOMINAL MAXIMUM  REAL-TIME DATA NOT REQUIRED N/A 
 N/A N/A  REAL-TIME DATA REQUIRED AT RATE:       
d.  SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS 
Data output rate to telemetry - Nominal 9600 bps, total 1 Mbyte/week 
e.  REMARKS 
Configuration upload - daily: 1 Mbyte which requires S-Band Single Access Mode with transfer rate of 1Mbps or greater. 
72.  COMMANDS 
a.  NUMBER OF POWER COMMANDS 
3 
b.  NUMBER  OF SERIAL/DIGITAL COMMANDS 
25 
c.  NUMBER OF DISCRETE COMMANDS 
TBD 
d.  MAGNITUDE COMMAND WORD SIZE (Bits) 
40 
e.  COMMAND STORAGE 
None 
f.   REAL-TIME COMMAND PROGRAMMING REQUIREMENTS (Describe) 
Configuration upload can be accomplished over a period of hours.  Data download at 9600 bps sufficient. 
 





Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
EXPERIMENT NUMBER 
NPS-0201 
73.  POSSIBLE HAZARDS 
RADIOACTIVE DEVICES  NO  YES (If yes):  MATERIAL(S):           STRENGTH (Ci):       
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS  NO  YES (If yes): MATERIAL(S):       
OTHER    NO  YES (If yes, specify):       
74.  CONTAMINATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS? 
 NO  YES (If yes, explain):       
75.  EXPERIMENT COMPLEMENT/PACKAGE DATA 
a.  ITEM 
 
b.  DIMENSIONS STOWED (cm) 
 
c.  DIMENSIONS DEPLOYED (cm) 
 
d.  MASS (kg) 
 
CFTP 12 x 17.5 x 4 12 x 17 x 4 1 
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
e.  OTHER PERTINENT DATA 
TBD 
f.  EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT MOUNTING RESTRICTIONS 
Modified PC104 bus used to connect with satellite bus.  Final pinout design incomplete.  See attached schematic for mounting requirements. 
g.  DESIGN DRAWING SPECIFICATION STATUS 
Design 
76.  OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
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1. SCOPE 
This document contains the specific requirements of the Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
(CFTP).  It provides experiment requirements in the following areas:  physical and functional 
interfaces, spacecraft integration and test, launch systems, and on-orbit flight operations. 
2. EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
2.1. Experiment Description 
The CFTP provides an educational tool for officer students at NPS in Electrical 
Engineering, and Space Systems Engineering and Space Systems curricula.  The CFTP 
uses a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology design to investigate a low-cost, 
flexible alternative to processor hardware architecture, using Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGA) as a basis for a system on a chip.  Increasing the flexibility of the 
processor architecture will decrease development time while allowing software 
development and component integration to commence at the earliest stages of 
development, with the expectation that the processor will be configured to support any 
design constraints.   
 
Exploiting Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) to mitigate single-event transients in 
various radiation environments enables the system on a chip to continue normal operation 
without requiring a reset and commensurate loss of data normally associated with a 
return to a trusted state.  Additionally, the flexibility of a configurable processor, based 
on COTS FPGA technology, will enable on-orbit upgrades, reconfigurations, and 
modifications to the architecture in order to support dynamic mission requirements. 
 
While this document details the experiment requirements for the current design of the 
CFTP, it is important to understand that the CFTP design can be modified to meet many 
of the design parameters of the spacecraft and launch vehicle (eg. electrical interface 
requirements, environmental requirements, etc…).  The intent of this document is to 
provide a foundation upon which begin a dialogue between the spacecraft and launch 
vehicle contractors and the CFTP project team. 
2.2. Experiment Objectives 
1.  To provide a hands-on educational tool for officer students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) in the design, development, testing and on-orbit operations of a 
configurable-processor architecture. 
2.  To subject the CFTP experiment to a variety of radiation fluxes to test suitability of 
design in numerous space radiation environments. 
3.  Evaluate on orbit, a triple-redundant, fault-tolerant, reconfigurable computer design 
which mitigates bit errors in computation by detecting errors and correcting them through 
voting logic. 
4.  To demonstrate COTS technology applied to spacecraft architecture as a means of 
decreasing development time, decreasing costs, and increasing reliability in hardware 
development and implementation. 
5.  To demonstrate applicability of reconfigurable, reliable, fault tolerant processing 
architectures to space based applications. 
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6.  To demonstrate the value of reconfigurable processors as cost effective flexible 
alternatives to custom integrated circuit architectures across the spectrum of 
military/DoD applications. 
2.3. Operational Concept 
The purpose of the space flight portion of this project is to accumulate as much 
operational experience and flight data as possible.   
 
It is desired to operate the CFTP continuously for one year, but the experiment can 
support periodic operation, reduced power or “sleep” modes as well.  Data download 
volume is TBD, but may be on the order of 1M bit per pass.  Minimum data upload 
required for configuration and operating software is 576k bytes but could be as high as 
several Mega-bytes which could be loaded on multiple passes. 
  
Specific interaction with and requirements for the SC are TBD (provide signal to initiate 
self-test, etc…). 
 
The year of operation is broken down into four main phases, which are also directly tied 
to mission success. 
 
Phase I 
With initial softcore configuration loaded and tested on the ground, conduct the 
following on-orbit operations: 
 
 Perform self-tests 
 Establish data transfer path 
 
Phase II 
After initial on-orbit tests (Phase I), upload and reconfigure with the TMR softcore 
through the spacecraft uplink. 
 
Phase III 
With TMR softcore loaded, conduct the following operations: 
 
 Detect and correct for Single Event Upsets (SEU) 
 Perform Benchmark tests 
 Report error frequencies and types and Benchmark results via status 
reports downloaded through the spacecraft downlink. 
 
Phase IV 
Reconfigure the CFTP experiment as an on-orbit resource to process data from other 
experiments or host systems (Note however, that the requirements in this ERD are only 
those for the CFTP as a stand-alone experiment and do not reflect any additional 
interfaces required for this additional concept as no specific additional reconfigurations 
have been identified at this time). 
2.4. Orbit Requirements 
One of the main objectives of the CFTP experiment is to subject it to a variety of 
radiation fluxes.  Because higher orbits provide a much greater exposure to radiation 
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fluxes and therefore an increased probability of SEUs, these orbits would also supply a 
larger collection of data with which to evaluate the suitability of our design.  While many 
of our requirements can be met with LEO orbits, orbits which pass through these high 
radiation environments such as GTO, Molniya, or  MEO orbits are preferred. If multiple 
rides are available, a variety of orbits is desired. 
Order of preference is: 1. GTO or Molniya, 2. MEO, 3. LEO low inclination (<40°), 4. 
LEO mid/high inclination (>40°).  Orbit should expose payload to sufficient radiation to 
cause SEUs, and should provide a variety of flux. 
2.4.1. Standard orbit parameters 
 Altitude at Apogee, (km) 
As detailed in section 2.4, no requirement. 
 Altitude at Perigee, (km) 
As detailed in section 2.4, no requirement. 
 Inclination, (degrees) 
As detailed in section 2.4, no requirement. 
2.4.2. Launch Window 
No Constraints. 
2.4.3. Desired Mission Life 
At least 1 year of operation. 
2.5. Success Criteria 
The following would be considered minimum success of the CFTP experiment. 
 Successful delivery and launch of a low-cost experiment by NPS students 
using COTS products 
 One year of CFTP operation while exposed to radiation fluxes 
 Successful reconfiguration of CFTP after launch 
 Detection and correction of bit errors in an SEU environment  
 
The following would be considered acceptable success of the CFTP experiment. 
 Demonstrate reconfiguration as a resource to process data from other 
experiments or host systems. 
 
Complete success would be defined as completion of the minimum success criteria (with 
adequate data collected to evaluate the TMR design) and continuation of the acceptable 
success criteria by uploading and reconfiguring for additional missions. 
3. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION 
3.1. Engineering Layout 
The CFTP payload consists of a Printed Circuit Board (PCB) with an FPGA and multiple 
Integrated Circuits (ICs) for RAM, ROM, and other supporting logic.  Figures 3-1a and 
3-1b provide two-dimensional views of the board concept along with dimensions, 
coordinate system, connector locations and bolt pattern/bolt size information.  The board 
has a volume of 999 cm3 and mounts to the spacecraft using 14 #4-40 mounting bolts.  
The board can be located anywhere in the spacecraft that allows it to receive exposure to 
radiation with minimum shielding. 



































  3.800 
  




   7.300 
 
Figure 3-1b:  CFTP Board Layout (engineering) 
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3.1.1. Coordinate System 
A notional coordinate system is shown in Figure 3-1b. 
3.1.2. Dimensions 
CFTP board dimensions are nominally 13.5cm x 18.5cm x 4cm (see Figure 3-1b). 
3.1.3. Mechanical Interfaces 
In the current design, the CFTP board will utilize 14 #4-40 bolts to mount to the 
spacecraft.  The spacecraft contractor shall provide a bolt pattern to match the 
CFTP board pattern and the mounting bolts required to tie down the box to the 
spacecraft-mounting plane. 
 
As a single board the CFTP will fasten into a card cage or box, and the mounting 
system can be modified to match the host.   
3.2. Electrical Connections 
Electrical connections required by the CFTP board include: 
 PC104 Bus connections: 
• Ground 
• Power:  ± 28VDC  
 Possible I/O interfaces with the spacecraft’s Command and Data Handler(s) 
• 8, 16, or 32 bit parallel interface 
• synchronous serial interface at 1Mbps 
• asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps 
o RS422 
o Standard 9-Pin “D”-type connector(s) 
3.3. Mass properties 
3.3.1. Weight Summary 
The overall weight of the CFTP board is currently estimated at 1.0 kg.   
3.3.2. Center of Mass 
Center-of-Mass (COM) estimates for the CFTP board are TBD. 
3.3.3. Mass Moment of Inertia 
Mass-Moment-of-Inertia (MOI) estimates for the CFTP board are TBD. 
3.4. Moving parts 
The will be no moving parts on the CFTP. 
3.5. Mounting and alignment 
As the concept of this experiment is to expose the CFTP board to radiation, any 
structures on the spacecraft surrounding the plane of the CFTP should provide minimal 
shielding from radiation.   
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There are no requirements or limitations as to the CFTP board’s alignment to the 
spacecraft axes.  Refer to Figure 3-1b for mounting measurements. 
3.6. Field of View (FOV) Requirements 
There are no FOV requirements for the CFTP board. 
3.7. Experiment Models / Simulators 
At this time there are no mass models or simulators planned for delivery to the spacecraft 
contractor.  A Flight Qualification Unit (FQU) is planned for use in the development of 
the flight board and for algorithm development and test after launch of the flight board.  
It may be possible to use the FQU for electrical and mechanical interface testing prior to 
delivery of the flight unit.  Use of the FQU unit for this purpose would be for limited time 
periods and would require schedule negotiation. 
4. ELECTRICAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 
4.1. Electrical Power Requirements 
4.1.1. Power Supply 
The CFTP power interface to spacecraft is on the CFTP board.  The CFTP 
requires ± 28VDC. 
4.1.2. Power Consumption  
CFTP has a highly variable power consumption depending on experiment tasking.  











CFTP 5 (est.) 11 (est.) 6 (est.) 0.5 (est.) 
 
Table 4.1.2-1  Experiment Power Requirements (estimated) 
4.2. Input/Output Signal Interfaces   
4.2.1. Bi-Directional Interfaces (Command/Telemetry via spacecraft data 
bus) 
Possible I/O interfaces with the spacecraft’s Command and Data Handler(s): 
 8, 16, or 32 bit parallel interface 
 synchronous serial interface at 1Mbps 
 asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps 
4.2.2. Experiment Inputs (Discrete and Analog) 
Possible input interfaces with the spacecraft: 
 8, 16, or 32 bit parallel interface 
 synchronous serial interface at 1Mbps 
 asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps 
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4.2.3. Experiment Outputs (Discrete and Analog) 
Possible output interfaces with the spacecraft: 
 8, 16, or 32 bit parallel interface 
 synchronous serial interface at 1Mbps 
 asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps 
5. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
5.1. Command Interface 
Possible I/O interfaces with the spacecraft’s Command and Data Handler(s): 
 8, 16, or 32 bit parallel interface 
 synchronous serial interface at 1Mbps 
 asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps 
• RS422 
• Standard 9-Pin “D”-type connector(s) 
5.2. Spacecraft Command and Data Handling 
The following is a list of CFTP requirements: 
 Provide a periodic watchdog timer command to the experiment in order to 
provide a maskable capability for asserting experiment reset. 
 The spacecraft shall accept up to several Mega-bytes (TBD) which could 
be loaded on multiple passes, for transfer to the experiment. 
 The spacecraft shall provide for the downlink of approximately 1M bit per 
pass from the experiment. 
 The spacecraft shall be capable of commanding the experiment into 
standby mode. 
5.3. Clock/Time reference requirements 
Time stamps on status reports are desired, with minimum accuracy to the second. 
6. TELEMETRY AND DATA HANDLING 
6.1. Telemetry System 
All telemetry items will be generated as status reports over either a serial or parallel 
interface. 
6.2. Experiment Data Collection & Storage 
CFTP requests that the spacecraft supply a minimum of 500k bytes of memory to act as a 
“store and forward” buffer. 
6.3. Experiment Data Transfer 
6.3.1. Experiment Data Download Requirements 
1M bit per pass. 
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6.3.2. Data Transfer 
Configuration and software uploads and status report downloads will be 
transferred at either the parallel data transfer rate, 1Mbps for synchronous serial, 
or 115kbps for asynchronous serial. 
6.3.3. Data Integrity 
Acceptable bit error rate (BER) for uplink:  2-5 BER 
Acceptable bit error rate for downlink:  2-5 BER 
Acceptable error rate for store and forward buffer: Not to exceed 1 error/day. 
6.4. Spacecraft Data 
Spacecraft real time required on-orbit for error location determination.  Orbital elements 
are required for post-processing on the ground. 
7. ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS 
7.1. Static Load Constraints 
The CFTP board is not designed to support mounting of other experiments. 
7.2. Vibration Constraints 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet the launch environment of the launch vehicle. 
7.3. Shock Constraints 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet the launch environment of the launch vehicle. 
7.4. Radiation Constraints 
There are no radiation constraints, but desire a minimum shielding environment, 
especially on LEO missions. 
 
The CFTP board is designed to operate within a Total Dose Environment of 10 kRads per 
year.   
7.5. Electromagnetic Compatibility 
7.5.1. Radiated Emissions from Experiment 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet typical MIL-STD461/462 requirements 
as modified by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
7.5.2. Conducted Emissions from Experiment 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet typical MIL-STD461/462 requirements 
as modified by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
7.5.3. Magnetic Fields Generated by Experiment 
There are currently no magnetic fields requirements imposed on the CFTP board. 
7.5.4. Sensitivity of Experiment to Radiated Emissions 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet typical MIL-STD461/462 requirements 
as modified by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
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7.5.5. Sensitivity of Experiment to Conducted Emissions 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet typical MIL-STD461/462 requirements 
as modified by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
7.5.6. Sensitivity of Experiment to Magnetic Fields 
The CFTP board will be designed to meet typical MIL-STD461/462 requirements 
as modified by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
7.6. Atmospheric Pressure Constraints 
No requirements. 
7.7. Cleanliness Constraints 
Class 100,000. 
7.8. Humidity Constraints 
No condensation or electrostatic discharge. 
7.9. Thermal Interface Requirements 
7.9.1. Thermal Isolation (watts) 
No requirement. 
7.9.2. Incident Thermal Flux (watts/ft2 ) 
No requirement. 
8. INTEGRATION AND TEST 
8.1. Spacecraft Integration and Test 
8.1.1. Pre-spacecraft-Integration Inspection & Test  
Upon arrival at the spacecraft contractor’s facility, the CFTP board will be 
visually inspected for any shipping damage.  It will then be functionally tested – 
the experiment will be delivered configured with a self-test which will be 
executed upon command from the spacecraft. 
8.1.2. Post-Spacecraft-Integration Test Requirements 
Functional testing of the CFTP board will be done – the experiment will be 
delivered configured with a self-test which will be executed upon command from 
the spacecraft.  This test will be run before and after all spacecraft level 
environmental tests. 
8.1.3. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and Facilities 
The CFTP project team will supply remote GSE to support the CFTP experiment 
during spacecraft level testing.  The ability to upload configurations, receive 
status data and download data remotely is desired.  Facilities required are 
telecommunications and internet access to Ground Control Station. 
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8.1.4. Ground Handling Procedures 
Standard Electro-Static Discharge (ESD) precautions shall be enforced during any 
handling of the CFTP board. 
8.2. Launch Vehicle (LV) Integration and Test 
8.2.1. LV Integration Site Tests 
Functional testing of the CFTP board shall be performed prior to and after 
integration of the spacecraft to the launch vehicle. 
8.2.2. LV Integration Site GSE and Facilities 
The CFTP project team will supply no GSE to support the CFTP experiment 
during LV level testing. 
8.2.3. Launch Pad Tests 
It is desired to perform functional testing of the CFTP payload to ensure proper 
operation of the CFTP board once on the launch pad. 
8.2.4. Launch Pad Environment 
No special environmental conditions are required for the CFTP. 
8.2.5. Experiment Access 
No access is required. 
8.2.6. Launch Go/No-Go Criteria 
Not applicable. 
8.3. Potentially Hazardous Materials & Equipment 
8.3.1. Pressurized Systems (Liquid/Gas) 
Not applicable. 
8.3.2. Ordnance Systems 
Not applicable. 
8.3.3. Radiation Sources 
Not applicable. 
8.3.4. High Voltage Source Locations 
Not applicable. 
8.3.5. Experiment Safety During Integration and Test 
TBD. 
9. ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS 
9.1. Launch Phase Requirements 
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There are no requirements for operation of the CFTP board during launch phase. 
9.2. On-Orbit Operations 
9.2.1. Initialization 
Automatic power-on/initialization sequence will occur. 
9.2.2. Check-Out 
Power-on self test will report status of experiment via PC-104 interchange.   
9.2.3. Experiment Ops 
Refer to section 2.3, Phases 2, 3 and 4. 
9.3. Experiment Turn-On 
Upon application of power, the experiment will execute a power-on/initialization 
sequence. 
9.4. Operations Support 
9.4.1. Pre-Flight Training and Simulation 
Prior to launch, the CFTP project team will provide support for spacecraft 
Integrated Systems Tests (ISTs) and Mission Simulation Tests (MSTs) through 
breadboard and brassboard versions of the CFTP which will be available for 
remote access. 
9.4.2. Data Return, Processing, and Distribution 
Provide remote access to the data stream from the satellite and the ability to 
upload configuration files. 
9.4.3. Meteorological Services 
At this time there is no requirement for meteorological services. 
10. ON-ORBIT ORIENTATION AND STABILIZATION 
10.1. Attitude Control 
At this time there is no requirement for attitude control. 
10.2. Attitude Knowledge 
At this time there is no requirement for attitude knowledge. 
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11. EPHEMERIS DATA 
11.1. Prediction/Real Time Knowledge 
CFTP requires real time satellite clock, but no on-orbit ephemeris data. 
11.2. Post Processed Knowledge 
The CFTP experiment requires ephemeris data for ground processing after receipt of 
experimental data to determine radiation flux during post-processing. 
12. SCHEDULE 
Experiment design and delivery dates are given for information only and are not contractually 
binding dates. 
 
The current CFTP development schedule is shown in Figure 12-1 below. 
 
Tasks and Milestones FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FQU Design                 
DOD SERB Ranking Available     ∆            
FQU Fabrication                 
FQU Testing                 
Flight Design                 
PDR     ∆            
CDR      ∆           
Flight Fabrication                 
Flight Assembly Level Testing                 
Environmental Testing                 
Experiment Delivery         ∆        
Spacecraft I&T                 
Launch (31 March 2006)                 
                 
 
Figure 12-1: CFTP Schedule 
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13. SECURITY 




LIST OF ACRONYMS 
BER  Bit Error Rate 
CDR  Critical Design Review 
CFTP  Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor  
COTS  Commercial Off-The-Shelf  
ESD  Electro-Static Discharge  
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Arrays  
FQU  Flight Qualification Unit  
GTO  Geostationary Transfer Orbit 
I/O  Input/Output 
IC  Integrated Circuits  
IST  Integrated Systems Tests  
LEO  Low Earth Orbit 
MEO  Medium Earth Orbit 
MST  Mission Simulation Tests  
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
PBC  Printed Circuit Board  
PDR  Preliminary Design Review 
SEU  Single Event Upsets 
TBD  To Be Determined  
TMR  Triple Modular Redundancy  
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This Mission Requirements Document (MRD) is the aggregate description and 
requirements document for the Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor (CFTP) experiment 
and the Internet Communications Satellite (ICSat) experiment.  ICSat and CFTP are both 
DoD (Department of Defense) Space Experiment Review Board (SERB)-ranked payloads 
manifested for flight on the MidSTAR-1 spacecraft. 
1.2. Purpose 
The purpose of this document is threefold: 
 1.  It confirms the technical requirements originally established in the Experiment 
Requirements Documents submitted by the payloads, along with arbitrated or imposed 
modifications needed to accommodate the MidSTAR-1 mission. 
 2.  It imposes additional managerial, systems engineering, or additional technical 
requirements intended to amplify or supplement the Memoranda of Agreement that exist 
between the Space Test Program and the experiment agencies. 
 3.  It acts as a reference document for the MidSTAR-1 team, placing the 
experiment requirements in context with descriptions of the experiment hardware, 
software, mission and operations concepts. 
1.3. Terminology, Conventions and Nomenclature 
In general, this document will use terminology that conforms to the definitions given in 
Section 3 of MIL-STD-1540D.  In addition, Space Test Program uses the following 
nomenclature: 
 
Experiment:  In the context of this mission, experiment is equivalent to space experiment. 
 
Payload:  The component(s) of a space experiment hosted on a space vehicle. 
 
Experimenter(s):  The personnel associated with the management, design, build, analysis, 
test, operation, data processing and data interpretation for a space experiment.  Unless 
specified, the term “experimenter” may refer to government or contractor representatives. 
 
Principal Investigator (PI):  The experimenter responsible for setting the scope of an 
experiment and executing the experiment program. 
 
Spacecraft:  The space vehicle without the payloads integrated.  Also referred to as the 





1.4. Applicable Documents  
1.4.1. Compliance Documents 
 
(No Document No.) Secondary Payload Planner’s Guide for Use on the EELV 
Secondary Payload Adapter, Version 1.0 
8 Jun 2001 





Range Safety Requirements  31 Oct 1999 
 
1.4.2. Reference Documents 
 
MIL-STD 1540D Product Verification Requirements for Launch, Upper-
stage, and Space Vehicles 
15 Jan 1999 
MIL-HDBK-340A 
(USAF) 
Application Guidelines for MIL-STD1540; Test 
Requirements for Launch, Upper-stage, and Space 
Vehicles 
1 Apr 1999 
DOD-HDBK-343 
(USAF) 
Design, Construction, and Testing Requirements for One 
of a Kind Space Equipment,  
1 Feb 1986 
MIL-STD-1809 
 
Space Environment for USAF Space Vehicles 15 Feb 1991 
MIL-STD-461E Requirements For The Control Of Electromagnetic 




MIL-STD-462D Measurement of Electromagnetic Interference 
Characteristics 
11 Jan 1993 
FED-STD-209E 
 
Airborne Particulate Cleanliness Classes In Cleanrooms 
and Clean Zones 
11 Sep 1992 
 
ASTM-E-595 Total Mass Loss and Collected Volatile Condensable 






2. PAYLOAD OVERVIEW 
2.1. Payload Description 
2.1.1. Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor (CFTP) 
The CFTP payload consists of three printed circuit boards: the experiment board, the 
interface board, and the power supply board.  The CFTP experiment is a Printed Circuit 
Board (PCB) with an FPGA and multiple Integrated Circuits (ICs) for RAM, ROM, and 
other supporting logic.  Figure 2-1 provides a two-dimensional view of the board concept.  
CFTP accepts data from the SC processor, processes it according to the configuration of 
the FPGA, and returns the data to the SC processor.  The interface board and the power 
supply board form the interface with the spacecraft. 
 
 
Figure 2-1:  Layout of CFTP Board 
2.1.2. Internet Communications Satellite (ICSat)  
ICSat consists of four components.  These are the Hosted Software, the Communications 
Block, the Amplifier Card, and the ICSat Antenna. 
 
Hosted Software:  The Hosted Software is a Linux-based application that resides on the 




files using BZIP-2 protocol, accepts files that are placed in an Earth-bound data stream, 
formats the stream into TCP/IP, and provides a serial output to the Communications 
Block.  The Hosted Software also receives uplinked TCP/IP-formatted serial data streams 
via the Communications Block and converts them into the host vehicle format. 
 
Communications Block:  The Communications Block performs modulation, 
demodulation, transmission, and reception functions.  It accepts a TCP/IP data stream 
from the Hosted Software, modulates the data stream onto the downlink frequency, and 
outputs the RF stream to the amplifier.  It also receives the boosted uplink signal from the 
amplifier and demodulates it, outputting the TCP/IP formatted data stream to the Hosted 
Software 
 
Amplifier Card:  The amplifier receives the uplink RF signal from the antenna, boosts the 
signal, and forwards it to the Communications Block. 
 
ICSat Antenna:  The antenna is a quadrifilar helix configuration, providing near-
hemispherical coverage around its boresight. 
2.2. Operational Concept 
All payloads will be unpowered during launch.  Following the Launch and Early Orbit 
(L/EO) phase and completion of SC checkout, the payloads will be powered and checked 
out.  Once checkout is completed, nominal operations will begin. 
 
The CFTP experimenter desires to operate CFTP continuously for one year (but can 
support periodic operation, reduced power or “sleep” modes as well).  The year of 
operation is broken down into four main phases, which are directly tied to mission 
success. 
 
Phase I: CFTP will be loaded with a tested, initial softcore configuration.  Once on-orbit, 
the experimenter commands CFTP, with this initial configuration loaded, to execute self-
tests.  The experimenter examines returned CFTP data to verify the operation of CFTP 
and the data transfer paths. 
 
Phase II:  After Phase I, the experimenter uplinks a reconfiguration file to MidSTAR-1, 
and executes a reconfiguration sequence.  The reconfiguration files will load the FPGA 
with the TMR softcore.  The experimenter evaluates downlink data to verify that the 
reconfiguration executed correctly. 
 
Phase III 
With TMR softcore loaded, conduct operations to detect and correct for single event 
upsets (SEU) by repeatedly performing benchmark tests.  Data outputs to MidSTAR-1 
consist of status messages that report errors and benchmark results.  MidSTAR-1 
downlinks the status messages to the ground station on a TBD schedule. 
 





ICSat will operate only during passes over Annapolis Satellite Ground Station (SGS).  
ICSat may be activated on every pass in a single day.  MidSTAR-1 will be commanded 
via its TT&C link to execute the ICSat Hosted Software.  The Hosted Software will 
access data files aboard the spacecraft, package them in TCP/IP formats and submit them 
to the Communications Block.  The ground station will transmit data files to MidSTAR-1 
via ICSat for later action.  (For example, the ground station may transmit command files 
for execution by the command/control system).  The ground station will terminate TCP/IP 
file transfer prior to the end of the pass, and close the Hosted Software application.  
Standard command and control will not be disabled during ICSat operations. 
2.3. Orbit Requirements 
2.3.1. Orbit Parameters 
CFTP requires a low earth orbit above 40 degrees inclination. 
 
ICSat requires the orbital perigee and apogee altitudes to be within the range of 300 km to 
700 km, and inclination greater than 35 degrees.  The orbit shall provide at least 30 
minutes in view of the SGS per day above an elevation angle of 5 degrees. 
 
The mission orbit is currently under study to accommodate, as well as possible, all 
payloads manifested on the MLV-05 mission.  Tentatively, the expected operational orbit 
for MidSTAR-1 is 600 km altitude circular at 46° inclination. 
2.3.2. Launch Window 
There are no experiment-driven seasonal or time-of-day requirements for the launch. 
2.3.3. Desired Mission Life 
The desired mission life for CFTP is 1 year. 
 





3. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION 
3.1. Engineering Layout 
3.1.1. CFTP 
The CFTP payload consists of three printed circuit boards:  the experiment board, the 
interface board, and the power supply board.  These boards are enclosed in an aluminum 
housing.  Electrical interface to MidSTAR-1 is via 2 connectors, one providing 28 VDC, 
and the other providing RS-422 serial port data connection to the MidSTAR-1 spacecraft 
processor   The CFTP team will provide the housing, all components internal to it, and 
the connectors on the housing.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide the harness and its 
connectors.   
3.1.2. ICSat 
The Communications Block and Amplifier Card will be integrated into a single housing 
(referred to collectively as the ICSat Transceiver Assembly, or ITA) by the ICSat 
experimenter.  The location of boltholes and power and signal connectors is to be 
determined.  The ICSat team shall procure all experiment-side connector sets, and shall 
provide the MidSTAR-1 team with the harness portion of the connector halves.  The 
MidSTAR-1 team will provide the harness between the ITA and the MidSTAR-1 
Processor.  The MidSTAR-1 team will also provide the fastening devices for securing the 
ITA to the MidSTAR-1 structure. 
 
The ICSat Antenna is a quadrifilar helix antenna.  It will be mounted on the exterior of 
the spacecraft IAW requirements given elsewhere in this document. 
3.2. Dimensions 
CFTP box dimensions are nominally 16 cm x 20 cm x 8 cm (see Figure 3-1b). 
 
ICSat Transceiver Assembly:  Communications block and amplifier to be housed in one 
unit not to exceed 25cm x 25cm x10 cm. 
 
ICSat Antenna:  Not to exceed 12cm x 12cm x 15cm 
3.3. Mass Allocations 
 
Table 3-1:  Mass Allocations for MidSTAR-1 Payloads 







CFTP    
   Board 1.0 .3 1.3 




ICSat    
   Amplifier 0.75 0.25 1.00 
   Comm Block 4.0 1.0 5 
   ICSat Antenna 0.5 0.1 0.6 
   ITA Chassis 1.0 0.5 1.5 
   Harness 0.25 0.1 0.35 
3.4. Center of Mass 
The center of mass for the CFTP box is TBD. 
 
The center of mass for each ICSat component is at geometric center of each component.  
The location uncertainty in each axis is of 10% of the component dimension in that axis. 
3.5. Mechanical Interfaces and Integration 
The CFTP box will mount to the pattern shown in figure TBS, with TBD bolts 
 
The ICSat components all present a four-bolt pattern for fastening.  This includes the 
amplifier card, the communications block, and the antenna. 
3.6. Moving Parts and Deployment Mechanisms 
Neither CFTP nor ICSat have any moving parts. 
3.7. Mounting and Alignment 
 
CFTP has no requirements for alignment or orientation with respect to the spacecraft 
axes.  CFTP shall be mounted so that the shielding from radiation provided by other SV 
structures and/or components is minimized.  
 
The ICSat antenna shall be mounted on a flat surface; minor deviations in flatness may be 
negotiated with the ICSat team.  The antenna boresight shall be aligned within 5° of 
perpendicular to that surface. 
3.8. Field-of-View Requirements 
The CFTP board has no FOV requirements. 
 
The ICSat antenna shall be mounted so that no obstructions penetrate a cone of 70° half-
angle centered on the antenna boresight, and obstructions into the hemisphere centered on 




4. ELECTRICAL INTERFACE AND POWER REQUIREMENTS 
4.1. Harness and Connectors 
The experimenters shall provide both halves of each connector on the experiment end of a 
harness.  The experimenters shall also provide at least one set of flight spares, and a set of 
connector savers.  In cases where this requirement has an ambiguous application, the 
experimenter shall negotiate an agreement with the MidSTAR-1 team and STP. 
 
The CFTP team shall negotiate connector specifications with the MidSTAR-1 team. 
 
The ICSat ITA requires two separate power connectors, one each for the Communications 
block and the amplifier; one serial port for command signals; one serial port for data 
input; two coax ports, one for output to the transmit antenna and one for input from the 
receive antenna. ICSat will provide both sides of all non-coax connections. 
4.2. Power Supply 
The experiment payloads require power supply lines as given in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1:  Power Supply Line Requirements for MidSTAR-1 Payloads 












CFTP   1 SC controlled switch on SC 
line 
ICSat     
     Amplifier  1  SC controlled switch on SC 
line 
     Comm Block 1   SC controlled switch on SC 
line 
4.3. Payload Power Requirements  
4.3.1. Power Consumption  
The experiments will draw power across each power line as given in Table 4-2 below.  
The power figures given here are unmargined current best estimates. 
 
Table 4-2:  Power Draw Requirements for MidSTAR-1 Payloads 




 Survival Standby Operating Peak 
CFTP 0.0 0.5 5.0 11.0 
ICSat     
    Comm Block 0.0 0.0 4  4.0 
    Amplifier 0.0 0.0  10.0  10.0 
 
Survival power is the power that must be provided to the payload during nominal 
operations when the payload is not in standby or operating.  Standby power is defined as 
the average power consumption of an instrument in a condition where it is not collecting 
data but could start doing so instantaneously without warm up.  Operational power is 
defined as the average power consumption of a component during the period it is 
operating.  Peak power is the maximum instantaneous power that a component will draw; 
this does not include power surges of less than 1.0 milliseconds. 
4.3.2. Power Profiles 
Payload power consumption for typical operations modes and duty cycles, assuming a 96-
minute orbit duration, are shown in Table 4-3 below. 
 
Table 4-3:  Power Profiles of MidSTAR-1 Payloads 
Experiment Ops Mode Power Draw, W Fraction of Orbit, 





5 100% Continuous 
CFTP Configuration 
Change 
TBD TBD Once per week 
CFTP Standby 
 
0.5 TBD Only as needed 
ICSat Data Transmission  14.0 11 min Each pass over 
SGS 
ICSat Standby  4.0 85 min Out of view of 
SGS 
4.4. Grounding 





5. COMMAND AND CONTROL, TELEMETRY, AND DATA 
HANDLING 
5.1. Bi-Directional Interfaces 
CFTP requires one RS-422 asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps. 
 
The ICSat payload requires one synchronous serial interface with the SC for 
commanding.  The ICSat team will negotiate data bus specifications and data transfer 
protocols with the MidSTAR-1 team. 
5.2. Spacecraft Inputs and Commands 
5.2.1. Discrete Analog Inputs to Payloads 
Neither CFTP nor ICSat use any discrete analog inputs. 
5.2.2. Discrete Digital Inputs to Payloads  
Neither CFTP nor ICSat use any discrete digital inputs. 
5.2.3. Spacecraft Commanding 
CFTP requires the SC to provide the following commands: 
1.  A periodic watchdog timer command to the experiment in order to provide a 
maskable capability for asserting experiment reset 
2.  A command to place the experiment into standby mode 
3.  A command to place the experiment into active mode 
 
ICSat requires the SC Flight Software to execute the ICSat Hosted Software application 
upon command.  The ICSat team shall negotiate the Hosted Software interfaces, 
protocols, permissions, and resource management with the MidSTAR-1 team. 
 
Futhermore, ICSat requires the SC to provide for commands to switch the power lines to 
ICSat experiment hardware.  The ICSat team shall negotiate additional ICSat commands 
with the MidSTAR-1 team. 
5.2.4. Software and Data Uploads 
CFTP requires occasional uploads of new FPGA configuration files. Configuration file 
uploads will be a minimum of 576 kbytes.  CFTP may also require uploads of test data 
sets on the order of several Mbytes.  The CFTP team shall negotiate the final data upload 
volume with the MidSTAR-1 team. 
 
ICSat has no requirements for software or data uploads. 
5.2.5. Clock or Time Reference Input Requirements 




5.3. Spacecraft Telemetry Interface and Payload Outputs 
5.3.1. Discrete Analog Outputs from Payloads 
Neither CFTP nor ICSat use any discrete analog inputs. 
5.3.2. Discrete Digital Outputs from Payloads 
Neither CFTP nor ICSat use any discrete digital inputs. 
5.3.3. Payload Data 
CFTP requires a minimum of 800 kbytes of SC memory storage to act as a “store and 
forward” buffer.  The CFTP experimenter shall negotiate additional requirements with the 
MidSTAR-1 team. 
 
ICSat requires 30 Mbytes of storage space for stored data files to be transported over the 
experimental communications link.    This storage requirement does not include 
requirements driven by the Hosted Software.  ICSat requires the experiment data to be 
maintained until deleted by ground command.  The ICSat experimenter shall negotiate 
additional requirements with the MidSTAR-1 team. 
5.3.3.1. Payload Data Collection and Download Requirements 
CFTP requires a maximum of 1 Mbit of data to be downloaded for each viable ground 
contact. 
 
The ICSat team shall negotiate a maximum data volume and data rate for downlink 
through the SC communications system and through the ICSat communications path. 
5.3.3.2. Data Transfer 
CFTP configuration and software uploads and status report downloads will be transferred 
at the RS-422 data transfer rate. 
 
The ICSat payload requires data transfers of up to 1 Mbit/s to and from the 
Communications Block.  In cases where the ICSat experiment uses the spacecraft 
communications link, the ICSat experiment shall conform to spacecraft capabilities. 
5.3.3.3. Data Integrity 
CFTP data resident on SC systems shall not experience more than 1 uncorrected bit error 
per day.  CFTP data transmitted (uplink and downlink) over the MidSTAR-1 SC-to-SGS 
system (from data bus interface with the payload to placement on data distribution server) 
shall experience bit-errors at a rate no greater than 2 in 105 averaged over the total 
volume of data transferred. 
 
ICSat data transmitted (uplink or downlink) over the MidSTAR-1 SC-to-SGS system 
(from data bus interface with the payload to placement on data distribution server) shall 
experience bit-errors at a rate no greater than 1 in 105 averaged over the total volume of 




5.3.3.4. Spacecraft Data Storage 
CFTP requires the SC to time stamp each status report it receives from the CFTP payload.  
The time stamp shall be accurate to within 1 second of UTC. 
5.3.3.5. Data Latency 
The SC data identified in Section 5.4 shall be available (on a data distribution server) to 
the PIs within 3 days of receipt at the SGS. 
5.4. Spacecraft Data 
The CFTP and ICSat experimenters require time-tagged command history logs from the 
spacecraft.  The experimenters require command history logs be available (on a data 
distribution server) to the PIs within 3 days of receipt at the SGS. 
 
The experimenters require that the SC monitor and report payload temperatures and 
power supply line voltages and currents. 
 
  This information shall be provided to the PIs in accordance with the latency 
requirements specified in Section 5.3.3.5 to assist in payload data analysis.  The SC shall 
monitor with enough resolution to detect when the payloads are on. 
5.5. ICSat Hosted Software 
The ICSat Hosted Software requires a PC-104 or equivalent platform with Linux 




6. ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS 
6.1. Static Load Constraints 
CFTP and ICSat hardware components shall be compatible with the static loads provided 
by the MidSTAR-1 team. 
6.2. Vibration Constraints 
CFTP and ICSat hardware components shall be compatible with the vibration loads 
provided by the MidSTAR-1 team. 
6.3. Shock Constraints 
CFTP and ICSat hardware components shall be compatible with the vibration loads 
provided by the MidSTAR-1 team. 
6.4. Atmospheric Pressure Constraints 
CFTP and ICSat hardware components shall be compatible with the depressurization 
profile given in the Delta IV Payload Planner’s Guide. 
6.5. Radiation Constraints 
CFTP and ICSat hardware components shall accept the radiation environment of the 
mission orbit specified in 2.3.1 above. 
6.6. Electromagnetic Compatibility 
The payloads shall be electromagnetically compatible with each other and with the SC. 
6.6.1. Radiated Emissions from the Payloads 
The CFTP shall to meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for radiated emissions, as 
tailored MidSTAR-1 team and the IC. 
 
When not conducting communications experiments, the ICSat payload shall comply with 
MIL-STD-461 requirements for radiated emissions, as tailored by the MidSTAR-1 team 
and the IC.  In addition, during communications events, ICSat will transmit in a 
frequency band of  2 MHz bandwidth, centered on frequency 2.4 GHz. 
6.6.2. Conducted Emissions from the Payloads 
The CFTP will be designed to meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for conducted 
emissions, as tailored MidSTAR-1 team and the IC. 
 
The ICSat payload shall comply with MIL-STD-461 requirements for conducted 
emissions, as tailored by the MidSTAR-1 team and the IC. 
6.6.3. Magnetic Fields Generated by the Payloads 





6.6.4. Radiated Susceptibility of the Payloads 
The CFTP board shall meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for radiated susceptibility, as 
tailored by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors.  CFTP shall tolerate the fields 
generated by ICSat during ICSat communications events. 
 
ICSat shall meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for radiated susceptibility, as tailored by 
the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
6.6.5. Conducted Susceptibility of the Payloads 
The CFTP board and ICSat shall meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for radiated 
susceptibility, as tailored by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
 
6.6.6. Magnetic Field Susceptibility of the Payloads 
The CFTP and ICSat payloads shall meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for magnetic 
field susceptibility, as tailored by the spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors. 
6.6.7. Sensitivity of the Payloads to SC Charging 
No requirement. 
6.7. Cleanliness Constraints 
The CFTP and ICSat payloads shall be tolerant of Class 100,000 cleanliness 
environments or better.  The CFTP and the ICSat payloads shall comply with the MLV-
05 Contamination Control Plan, as implemented by the MidSTAR-1 team. 
 
All CFTP and ICSat payload hardware, and GSE that will accompany the hardware in any 
thermal chamber, shall be low-outgassing.  Low-outgassing is defined as materials that 
have less than 1% Total Material Loss (TML) and less than 0.10% Collected Volatile 
Condensable Materials (CVCM) when tested in accordance with ASTM-E-595.  If 
compliance with low-outgassing criteria cannot be confirmed, the payload and GSE 
hardware shall be subjected to a thermal vacuum bake, with exit criteria TBD.  STP shall 
approve all exceptions to these requirements. 
6.8. Humidity Constraints 
The CFTP and ICSat payloads shall be maintained in a humidity range in which 
condensation is avoided and the potential for inadvertent electrostatic discharge is low. 
 
 
6.9. Thermal Interface Requirements 
6.9.1. Thermal Isolation (watts) 




6.9.2. Incident Thermal Flux (watts/ft2 ) 
Neither CFTP nor ICSat have incident thermal flux requirements. 
6.9.3. Temperature Limits 
The CFTP and ICSat payload elements shall be maintained within the temperature ranges 
given in Table 6-1. 
 









Notes Payload Component 
Low High Low High  
CFTP      
ICSat      
     Amplifier -40 90 -25 80  
     Communications Block -40 90 -25 80  





7. INTEGRATION AND TEST 
7.1. General Integration and Test Requirements 
The CFTP and ICSat experimenters shall provide the following integration and test 
documentation: 
 Payload integration procedures 
 Payload operating procedures and constraints 
 Payload abbreviated and extended functional test procedures, annotated with 
  expected payload responses or response ranges. 
 Compliance Data Package at payload delivery, including 
  ICD compliance verification matrix 
  Environment test procedures, annotated with results 
  Final pre-delivery functional test with results 
  Other compliance certifications as need (e.g., materials lists) 
 
The experimenters shall inform STP and the MidSTAR-1 team of test schedules as far in 
advance as possible.  Experimenters shall permit STP, the MidSTAR-1 team, or 
designated representatives to observe tests as they are performed. 
 
Once the payloads are integrated into the spacecraft, the experimenters shall support SV 
test efforts.  Where needed, the experimenters shall provide all necessary ground support 
equipment (GSE) needed to properly test, calibrate or evaluate the payload.  For each test, 
the experimenters shall either provide support for the conduct of the tests, or shall provide 
sufficient operating instructions to permit the MidSTAR-1 team to conduct testing 
without the experimenters present.  The experimenters shall review all payload test 
results for signs of degradation or damage within three days of each payload test. 
7.2. Pre-Delivery Payload Integration and Test 
The CFTP and ICSat payloads shall be subjected to a tailored protoqualification test 
regimen following the guidelines of MIL-HDBK-340A and DOD-HDBK-343 for a Class 
D spacecraft (or equivalent standards) and using test levels provided by the MidSTAR-1 
team or by STP.  Following the protoqualification tests, the payloads shall successfully 
complete an extensive functional test prior to delivery to the spacecraft integration 
facility. 
7.3. Payload-to-SC Integration and Test 
7.3.1. Post Delivery Inspection & Test 
Upon arrival at the spacecraft integration facility, the CFTP and ICSat experimenters 
shall ensure the payloads survived shipping without harm, including at a minimum a 
repeat of the extensive function test performed prior to shipment.  Each payload shall 
successfully complete the functional test before custody of the payload is transferred to 





7.3.2. Post-Integration Test 
The experimenters shall support all payload functional tests conducted after the payload is 
integrated with the SC. 
7.3.3. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and Facilities 
The CFTP and ICSat experimenters shall supply all experiment unique GSE during 
spacecraft level testing.  The MidSTAR-1 team will supply workspace, standard 110V 
AC power, telephones, and Internet access. 
7.3.4. Ground Handling Procedures 
All personnel handling the payloads shall use standard electrostatic discharge precautions.  
All personnel working near the ICSat antenna shall observe a keep-out/no-hands zone 
around the antenna. 
7.4. SV Test Phase 
7.4.1. Payload Access 
The experimenters will be given access to their payloads through the SC interfaces as 
needed.  However, the experimenters shall eschew access to the payload hardware that 
requires de-integration from the SV, unless required to repair damage or degradation. 
7.4.2. Environmental Requirements 
The experiments will be maintained within the environmental constraints established in 
XXX.  Exceptions will be identified to and coordinated with STP and the experimenters. 
7.4.3. Ground Support Equipment 
The CFTP and ICSat experimenters shall supply all experiment unique GSE during 
spacecraft level testing.  The MidSTAR-1 team will supply workspace, standard 110V 
AC power, telephones, and Internet access. 
7.4.4. Integrated Functional Testing 
The experimenters shall support all payload functional tests conducted during SV 
environmental and functional tests. 
7.5. Launch Vehicle Integration and Test 
7.5.1. LV Integration Site Tests 
The experimenters shall support all SV functional tests performed at the launch site, 
including at a minimum the post shipment verification and the post-integration 
verification. 





7.5.3. Launch Pad Tests 
No requirement. 
7.5.4. Launch Pad Environment 
No requirement. 
7.5.5. Experiment Access 
No requirement. 
7.5.6. Launch Go/No-Go Criteria 
CFTP will not have go/no-go criteria beyond its final functional test prior to payload 
encapsulation in the LV fairing.  ICSat go/no-go criteria will be determined solely on the 
detection of visible damage to the external elements of ICSat. 
7.6. Potentially Hazardous Materials & Equipment 
7.6.1. Acoustic Hazards 
Not applicable. 
7.6.2. Non-Ionizing Radiation Sources 
7.6.2.1. Radio Frequency Emitters 
CFTP has no RF transmitters.  The ICSat has a transmitter that will radiate through the 
ICSat antenna.  For both payloads, unintentional emissions will be kept within or shielded 
to MIL-STD-461. 
7.6.2.2. Laser Systems 
Not applicable. 
7.6.3. Radioactive (Ionizing Radiation) Sources 
Not applicable. 
7.6.4. Hazardous Materials 
Not applicable. 
7.6.5. Ground Support Pressure Systems (Liquid/Gas) 
Not applicable. 
7.6.6. Flight Hardware Pressure Systems (Liquid/Gas) 
Not applicable. 





7.6.8. High Voltage Source Locations 
Not applicable. 





8. ON-ORBIT PAYLOAD OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS  
8.1. Launch Phase Requirements 
The payloads shall be powered off from liftoff to SV separation from the LV. 
8.2. On-Orbit Payload Operations 
8.2.1. Spacecraft Initialization and Checkout 
After SV separation from the LV and boot-up of the SC processor, the SC will maintain 
CFTP and ICSat at survival temperatures until SC checkout is complete.  
8.2.2. Payload Initialization and Checkout 
The CFTP payload will perform a self-test upon application of power.  CFTP will 
generate status reports via the RS-422 data bus for downlink to the SGS. 
8.2.3. Normal Operations 
The CFTP payload will perform a self-test upon application of power.  CFTP will 
generate status reports via the RS-422 data bus for downlink to the SGS. 
8.3. Operations Support 
8.3.1. Pre-Flight Training and Simulation 
The experimenters shall support pre-flight training for the SV operators as requested by 
the MidSTAR-1 team. 
8.3.2. Data Return, Processing, and Distribution 
The experimenters shall retrieve data files regularly from the data distribution server, 
shall review it immediately, and shall request retransmissions within 24 hours of retrieval.  
The experimenters shall provide command uploads (or the equivalent as appropriate to 
the final operations concept) and data uploads onto the data distribution server no less 
than 24 hours prior to the first need time for the data. 





9. ON-ORBIT ORIENTATION AND STABILIZATION 
9.1. Attitude Control 
CFTP has no attitude control requirement.  ICSat requires the boresight of the ICSat 
antenna to be pointed within 90 degrees of the SV instantaneous local nadir axis. 





10. EPHEMERIS DATA 
10.1. Prediction/Real Time Knowledge 
CFTP has no predictive or real-time ephemeris knowledge requirement.  ICSat requires 
orbit elements or ephemeris to permit predictions of SV passes over the SGS ground 
station.  ICSat requires accuracy of the orbital elements or ephemeris to be sufficient to 
predict pass times with predicted rise time accurate to within ±5 minutes of the actual rise 
for up to five days from the epoch of the element set or ephemeredes. 
10.2. Post Pass Knowledge 
CFTP requires orbit elements and/or ephemeris to correlate experiment processor faults 
to orbit location.  CFTP requires the accuracy of orbit elements and/or ephemeris to be 
sufficient to locate each event with an accuracy of less than or equal to 50 km.  ICSat has 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose 
The purpose of this MidSTAR-1 Technical Requirements Document (TRD) is to communicate 
the technical requirements and constraints necessary to successfully build, test, launch and 
operate the MidSTAR-1 space mission. 
1.2. Scope 
MidSTAR-1 is the name given to the spacecraft (SC) that hosts the Configurable Fault Tolerant 
Processor (CFTP) payload and the Internet Communications Satellite (ICSat) payload.  This 
document includes requirements for the SC design and fabrication, payload integration, space 
vehicle (SV) testing, launch vehicle (LV) integration, launch site testing, ascent and early orbit 
operations support (SV checkout and initialization), and mission operations support for the space 
vehicle.  All requirements herein are mandatory requirements. 
1.3. Nomenclature and Conventions 
In general, this document will use terminology that conforms to the definitions given in Section 3 
of MIL-STD-1540D.  In addition, Space Test Program (STP) uses the following nomenclature: 
 
Experiment:  In the context of this mission, experiment is equivalent to space experiment. 
 
Payload:  The component(s) of a space experiment hosted on a space vehicle. 
 
Experimenter(s):  The personnel associated with the management, design, build, analysis, test, 
operation, data processing and data interpretation for a space experiment.  Unless specified, the 
term “experimenter” may refer to government or contractor representatives. 
 
Principal Investigator (PI):  The experimenter responsible for setting the scope of an experiment 
and executing the experiment program. 
 
Spacecraft (SC):  The space vehicle without the payloads integrated.  Also referred to as the bus. 
 
Statements contained within brackets [] are intended to amplify or explain requirements, but 
need not be tracked as requirements. 
1.4. Applicable Documents 
1.4.1. Compliance Documents 
 Secondary Payload Planner’s Guide for Use on the 
EELV Secondary Payload Adapter, Version 1.0 
8 Jun 2001 
 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Standard Interface 
Specification, Version 6.0 
5 Sep 2000 
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EWR 127-1 
 
Range Safety Requirements  31 Oct 1999 





Space Support 14 Sep 2000 
DoDD 4650.1 
 
Management and Use of the Radio Frequency Spectrum 24 Jun 1987 
DoDI 3100.12 
 
Space Support 14 Sep 2000 
1.4.2. Reference Documents 
 
 
MidSTAR-1 Mission Requirements Document TBD 
MIL-STD 1540D Product Verification Requirements for Launch, Upper-
stage, and Space Vehicles 
15 Jan 1999 
MIL-HDBK-340A 
(USAF) 
Application Guidelines for MIL-STD1540; Test 
Requirements for Launch, Upper-stage, and Space 
Vehicles,  
1 Apr 1999 
DOD-HDBK-343 
(USAF) 
Design, Construction, and Testing Requirements for 
One of a Kind Space Equipment,  
1 Feb 1986 
MIL-STD-1809 
 
Space Environment for USAF Space Vehicles 15 Feb 1991 
FED-STD-209E 
 
Airborne Particulate Cleanliness Classes In Cleanrooms 
and Clean Zones 
11 Sep 1992 
 
ASTM-E-595 Total Mass Loss and Collected Volatile Condensable 
Material From Outgassing in A Vacuum Environment 
1999 
MIL-STD-461E Requirements For The Control Of Electromagnetic 
Interference Characteristics of Subsystems And 
Equipment 
20 Aug 1999 
MIL-STD-462D Measurement of Electromagnetic Interference 
Characteristics 
11 Jan 1993 
MIL-STD-1541E 
 
Electromagnetic Compatibility of Space Systems 30 Dec 1987 
 Systems Engineering Fundamentals (Defense 
Acquisition University Press) 
Jan 2001 
1.5. Document Evolution 
The requirements in this document are high-level requirements that should remain reasonably 
static over the course of the MidSTAR-1 mission.  Changes to these requirements will be 
recorded in updates to this TRD. 
 
Details concerning the implementation of these requirements will be captured in other TBD 
documents, such as interface control drawings and documents, test plans and procedures, and 
operations checklists. 
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2. Mission Overview 
2.1. Mission Description 
The MidSTAR-1 mission will support two experiment payloads that have been ranked by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Space Experiment Review Board (SERB).  The CFTP experiment 
is an experiment sponsored and built by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to evaluate and 
characterize the operation of a configurable space-borne processor and a fault-tolerant processor 
design.  ICSat is a United States Naval Academy (USNA)-sponsored and -built experiment 
designed to demonstrate the use of internet communications protocol for satellite 
communications up to 1 Mbit /sec.  Both experiments are of equal importance for the MidStar 
Mission. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SV is currently planned for launch on the STP Launch Mission 1 (STP-1).  The 
STP-1 mission will be conducted with a Delta IV LV from Cape Canaveral Air Force Base, 
Florida, and will feature the first use of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 
Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA).  The primary SV will be the Orbital Express satellite; 
MidSTAR-1 will be a secondary.  Other secondary SVs tentatively include Space Test Program 
Satellite Mission 1 (STPSat-1, STP); Naval Postgraduate School Satellite 1 (NPSAT1, NPS); and 
FalconSat-3 (Air Force Academy)  
 
Once on orbit, MidSTAR-1 will be operated from the USNA’s Satellite Ground Station (SGS) in 
Annapolis, MD.  USNA personnel will conduct all mission planning and execution, and will 
parse, format and transmit payload data to the respective experimenters. 
2.2. Organizations and Responsibilities 
2.2.1. Space Test Program 
STP exercises overall responsibility and authority for the MidSTAR-1 mission, including the 
accommodation of two SERB-ranked experiments and access to space via the STP-1 launch 
mission.  Within STP, two groups will be involved directly with the MidSTAR-1 mission.  The 
MidSTAR-1 System Program Office (SPO) will monitor the design, construction, test, and data 
return for the MidSTAR-1 SV.  The STP-1 SPO is responsible for the execution of the entire 
STP-1 launch mission, and will set requirements, constraints and conditions for integrating 
MidSTAR-1 onto the STP-1 Integrated Payload Stack (IPS). 
2.2.2. United States Naval Academy 
USNA provides two mission elements for the MidSTAR-1 mission.  The USNA MidSTAR-1 
Team will design, build and test a SC to accommodate the CFTP and ICSat experiment payloads; 
integrate the payloads to form the MidSTAR-1 SV; test and deliver the SV for launch on the 
STP-1 mission; and operate the SV on-orbit and distribute experiment data to the appropriate 
organizations.  The USNA ICSat Team will provide the ICSat experiment payload, will provide 
experiment plans and upload data to the MidSTAR-1 Team, and will evaluate the returned 
experiment data. 
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2.2.3. Naval Postgraduate School 
NPS will provide the CFTP experiment payload; will provide experiment plans and upload data 
to the MidSTAR-1 Team, and will evaluate the returned experiment data. 
2.2.4. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System Program Office 
The EELV SPO executes the Delta IV LV contract, and manages all LV services. 
2.2.5. Integrating Contractor 
Boeing Homeland Security and Services Company is the STP-1 Integration Contractor (IC).  The 
IC is STP’s agent for consolidating all STP-1 payload requirements, designing and implementing 
the IPS interfaces, and presenting the IPS as a single payload interface to the EELV SPO. 
2.3. Project Interfaces 
2.3.1. SV-to-LV Interface 
MidSTAR-1 will launch as a secondary payload on the EELV Boeing Delta IV-Medium (with 
4m fairing) using the ESPA.  The ESPA is a cylindrical aluminum structure that duplicates the 
EELV Standard Interface Plane (SIP) for the primary payload, and provides six 15-inch diameter 
flanges around its circumference as stations for secondary payloads.  The exterior surface of a 
secondary flange defines the Secondary Standard Interface Plane (SSIP). 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SV will use a 15-inch Lightband separation system provided by STP.  The 
Lightband will provide one 15-pin connector for pass through from the ESPA harness.  In 
addition, the Lightband provides three redundant separation switches for separation sensing.  The 
separation force will be dictated by the delta-v requirements established by STP. 
2.3.2. SC-to-Payload Interfaces 
The MidSTAR-1 SC will interface with two SERB-ranked experiment payloads, CFTP and 
ICSat.  The interface requirements, as currently envisioned, are documented in this TRD; further 
context and amplification may be found in the MidSTAR-1 Mission Requirements Document 
(MRD).  The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate and document the final interface design details 
with each experiment prior to the Space Vehicle Critical Design Review. 
2.3.3. SV-to-SGS Interfaces 
The MidSTAR-1 SC will receive commands and data uploads from and send telemetry and 
mission data to the USNA’s SGS.  USNA will manage this interface. 
2.3.4. SGS-to-Experimenter Interfaces 
The MidSTAR-1 SGS will be the conduit for experimenters to send commands and data uploads 
to and receive telemetry and experiment data from the experiment payloads.  The MidSTAR-1 
team will negotiate and document the final interface design and protocol details with each 
experiment prior to the Space Vehicle Critical Design Review. 
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2.4. Payload Description 
2.4.1. Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor 
 
The CFTP payload consists three printed circuit boards (the experiment board, the interface 
board, and the power supply board) housed in an aluminum box.  The experiment board is a 
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) with a field programmable gate array (FPGA) and multiple 
Integrated Circuits (ICs) for random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), and 
other supporting logic.  Figure 2-1 provides a two-dimensional view of the experiment board 
concept.  The interface and the power supply board form the interface with the spacecraft.   
CFTP accepts data from the SC processor, processes it according to the configuration of the 
FPGA, and returns the data to the SC processor. 
 
 
Figure 2-1:  Layout of CFTP Board 
2.4.2. Internet Communications Satellite 
ICSat consists of four components.  These are the Hosted Software, the Communications Block, 
the Amplifier Card, and the ICSat Antenna. 
 
Hosted Software:  The Hosted Software is a Linux-based application that resides on the host 
vehicle processor (PC-104 or equivalent).  The Hosted Software compresses data files using 
BZIP-2 protocol, accepts files that are placed in an Earth-bound data stream, formats the stream 
into Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), and provides a serial output to 
the Communications Block.  The Hosted Software also receives uplinked TCP/IP-formatted 
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serial data streams via the Communications Block and converts them into the host vehicle 
format. 
 
Communications Block:  The Communications Block performs modulation, demodulation, 
transmission, and reception functions.  It accepts a TCP/IP data stream from the Hosted 
Software, modulates the data stream onto the downlink frequency, and outputs the RF stream to 
the amplifier.  It also receives the boosted uplink signal from the amplifier and demodulates it, 
outputting the TCP/IP formatted data stream to the Hosted Software. 
 
Amplifier Card:  The amplifier receives the uplink RF signal from the antenna, boosts the signal, 
and forwards it to the Communications Block. 
 
ICSat Antenna:  The antenna is a quadrifilar helix configuration, providing near-hemispherical 
coverage around its boresight. 
2.5. Operations Concept 
All payloads will be unpowered during launch.  Following the Launch and Early Orbit (L/EO) 
phase and completion of SC checkout, the payloads will be powered and checked out.  Once 
checkout is completed, nominal operations will begin. 
 
The CFTP experimenter desires to operate CFTP continuously for one year (but can support 
periodic operation, reduced power or “sleep” modes as well).  The year of operation is broken 
down into four main phases, which are directly tied to mission success. 
 
Phase I: CFTP will be loaded with a tested, initial softcore configuration.  Once on-orbit, the 
experimenter commands CFTP, with this initial configuration loaded, to execute self-tests.  The 
experimenter examines returned CFTP data to verify the operation of CFTP and the data transfer 
paths. 
 
Phase II:  After Phase I, the experimenter uplinks a reconfiguration file to MidSTAR-1, and 
executes a reconfiguration sequence.  The reconfiguration files will load the FPGA with the 
Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) softcore.  The experimenter evaluates downlink data to 
verify that the reconfiguration executed correctly. 
 
Phase III 
With TMR softcore loaded, conduct operations to detect and correct for single event upsets 
(SEU) by repeatedly performing benchmark tests.  Data outputs to MidSTAR-1 consist of status 
messages that report errors and benchmark results.  MidSTAR-1 downlinks the status messages 
to the ground station on a TBD schedule. 
 
Phase IV:  Reconfigure the CFTP experiment to evaluate alternate softcore architectures. 
 
ICSat will operate only during passes over the Annapolis SGS.  ICSat may be activated on every 
pass in a single day.  MidSTAR-1 will be commanded via its TT&C link to execute the ICSat 
Hosted Software.  The Hosted Software will access data files aboard the SC (which may include 
ICSat data from previous uploads, other payload data, or SC telemetry), package them in TCP/IP 
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formats and submit them to the Communications Block.  The SGS will transmit data files to 
MidSTAR-1 via ICSat for later action.  (For example, the SGS may transmit command files for 
execution by the command/control system).  The SGS will terminate TCP/IP file transfer prior to 
the end of the pass, and close the Hosted Software application.  Standard command and control 
will not be disabled during ICSat operations. 
3. Mission Objectives and Success Criteria 
3.1. MidSTAR-1 Objectives 
No. Importance Objective 
1 Primary Educate First Class Midshipmen in the Astronautics curriculum 
of the Aerospace Engineering major in spacecraft design, systems 
engineering, program management techniques, cost, scheduling, 
flight certification, safety procedures, and spacecraft testing. 
- Minimum Success:  Construction of MidSTAR-1 SV 
completed. 
- Nominal Success:  Completed MidSTAR-1 SV is delivered to 
Cape Canaveral launch base for integration with STP-1. 
2 Primary Integrate, test, launch and operate a space vehicle to support two 
SERB-rated space experiments on-orbit. 
- Minimum Success:  SV provides on-orbit support sufficient for 
at least one experiment to satisfy minimum success criteria.  
Should both payloads terminally malfunction (not induced by a 
SC fault or misoperation) prior to either satisfying minimum 
success, the mission will be declared a minimum success. 
- Nominal Success:  SV provides on-orbit support sufficient for at 
least one experiment to satisfy nominal success criteria.  Should 
both payloads terminally malfunction (not induced by a SC fault 
or misoperation) prior to either satisfying nominal success, but 
after at least one experiment has achieved minimum success, the 
mission will be declared a nominal success. 
- Complete success:  SV provides on-orbit support sufficient for 
at least one experiment to satisfy complete success criteria.  
Should both payloads terminally malfunction (not induced by a 
SC fault or misoperation) prior to either satisfying complete 
success, but after at least one experiment has achieved nominal 
success, the mission will be declared a complete success. 
3.2. CFTP Objectives 
No. Importance Objective 
1 Primary Provide a hands-on educational tool for officer students at the 
NPS in the design, development, testing, and on-orbit operations 
of processor architecture. 
Minimum success:  Complete on-orbit check-out of the CFTP 
experiment with no mission terminal anomalies. 
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Nominal Success:  Successfully reconfigure the CFTP processor 
one time while on-orbit.  
2 Primary Expose the CFTP experiment to the radiation fluxes in the 
MidSTAR-1 mission orbit and contribute data to characterize the 
design response in numerous space radiation environments. 
Minimum success:  Operate intermittently (powered on less than 
85% of the time) in the orbital environment for one year. 
Nominal Success: Operate continuously (powered on greater than 
or equal to 85% of the time) in the MidSTAR-1 orbit for at least 
one year 
3 Secondary Evaluate the on-orbit performance of a triple-redundant, fault-
tolerant computer design to mitigate bit errors in computation. 
Minimum success:  Detect and correct at least one bit error 
resulting from an SEU. 
4 Secondary Demonstrate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology as 
applied to spacecraft architecture to decrease development time 
and costs, and increase reliability in hardware development and 
implementation. 
5 Secondary Contribute data and experience to the overall evaluation of 
reconfigurable processors as cost-effective, flexible alternatives 
to custom-designed integrated circuit architectures across the 
spectrum of military applications. 
Minimum success:  Successfully reconfigure CFTP once after 
launch. 
Complete success would be defined as completion of the 
minimum success criteria (with adequate data collected to 
evaluate the TMR design) and continuation of the acceptable 
success criteria by uploading and reconfiguring for additional 
missions. 
6 Secondary To demonstrate the value of reconfigurable processors as cost 
effective flexible alternatives to custom integrated circuit 
architectures across the spectrum of military/DoD applications. 
Nominal Success:  Demonstrate reconfiguration as a resource to 
process data from other experiments or host systems. 
3.3. ICSat Objectives 
No. Importance Objective 
1 Primary Educate First Class Midshipmen in the Astronautics curriculum 
of the Aerospace Engineering major in spacecraft design, systems 
engineering, program management techniques, cost, scheduling, 
flight certification, safety procedures, and spacecraft testing. 
- Minimum Success:  Delivery of flight-ready midshipman-
designed and constructed experiment package to the SC 
integrator. 
- Nominal Success:  Achieve minimum success for ICSat 
Objective 2 
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2 Secondary Demonstrate the use of TCP/IP communications protocol for 
space-to-ground data transmission. 
Minimum success:  Successful transfer of data and/or command 
files with TCP/IP using satellite’s communication link 
Nominal Success:  Successful transfer of data/command files at 
1Mbps with TCP/IP using experimental Communications Block 
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4. System Program Office Requirements 
4.1. Mission Design Requirements 
4.1.1. Mission Orbit 
The SC shall be compatible with the mission orbit assigned by the STP-1 Program Office.  
Pending the results of feasibility studies, the mission orbit for MidSTAR-1 is 600 km altitude 
circular at 46° inclination. 
4.1.2. Debris Mitigation 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall ensure the SC design and operations minimize the generation of on-
orbit debris in accordance with Section 6.3 of Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 
3100.12. 
4.1.3. Mission Life and Reliability 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall design and test the SC to maximize the probability that the SV will 
successfully separate from the launch system.  Furthermore, the MidSTAR-1 team should 
optimize the probability that the SV will achieve nominal success. 
4.1.4. End-of-Life 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall plan for the disposal of the MidSTAR-1 SV at its end-of-life in 
accordance with Section 6.4 of DODI 3100.12.  The disposal plan for the SV shall incorporate 
debris mitigation measures in accordance with Section 6.3 of DODI 3100.12.  The MidSTAR-1 
SV design shall permit ground personnel to disable all SV transmitters upon reaching end-of-life. 
4.2. Project Management 
4.2.1. Formal Reviews 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct the design reviews listed in the following subparagraphs at 
the appropriate stages of spacecraft development.  The MidSTAR-1 team and STP will establish 
entrance and exit criteria prior to each design review.  
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall participate in payload instrument design reviews.  The MidSTAR-1 
team shall report to STP any potential problems posed by a payload that may affect the 
performance or reliability of the SV. 
4.2.1.1. Preliminary Design Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct a PDR and provide an overview of the mission concept, SC 
design, launch services, preliminary integration & test plans, a detailed schedule, instruments’ 
status, mission operations concept, and presentation of draft interface documents.  Payload loads 
and environment test levels shall be specifically addressed within this review.  Concept must 
have significant depth and detailed analysis to permit STP evaluation and understanding of the 
design implementation and requirements compliance.  All mechanical and electrical interfaces to 
the STP-1 LV shall be finalized to the greatest extent possible by PDR.  [According to Systems 
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Engineering Fundamentals, “~15% of production drawings are released by PDR.  This rule is 
anecdotal and only guidance relating to an “average” defense hardware program.”] 
4.2.1.2. Critical Design Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct a CDR and present a detailed presentation of the mission, 
including final SC design, mission operations concept, software review, I&T plans, updated cost 
and schedule performance, updated metrics, and presentation of final interface documents.  CDR 
will include a presentation of the payloads status and schedules.  [According to Systems 
Engineering Fundamentals, “At CDR the design should be at least 85% complete.  Many 
programs use drawing release as a metric for measuring design completion.  This rule is 
anecdotal and only guidance relating to an “average” defense hardware program.”] 
4.2.1.3. Payload Integration Readiness Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct a Payload Integration Readiness Review (PIRR) to 
demonstrate that the SC is ready for payload delivery. The MidSTAR-1 team shall present a 
summary of the fabrication, assembly, and testing of the SC, provide proof of compliance to 
established Interface Control Documents (ICDs), present a summary of major discrepancies and 
their corrective actions.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall present final, detailed integration and test 
(I&T) procedures and updated cost, schedule, and program metrics. 
4.2.1.4. Space Vehicle Test Readiness Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct a Test Readiness Review (TRR) to demonstrate that the SV 
is ready for environmental testing, compatibility, and final functional testing.  The MidSTAR-1 
team shall present resolution of all prior anomalies and problems; final functional and 
environmental test procedures; anomaly resolution procedures; Government participation 
requirements (including STP and PIs’); and success criteria. 
4.2.1.5. SV Pre-Shipment Review/Mission Readiness Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct a Pre-Shipment Review (PSR) and obtain STP approval to 
ship the SV to the launch site.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall support an STP-directed Mission 
Readiness Review (MRR), the purpose of which is to review and approve the SV and LV system 
test data.  At this meeting, the MidSTAR-1 team shall demonstrate that the SV is ready for 
delivery to the launch site, personnel are ready to support LV I&T, and that launch site 
procedures will not damage the SV. 
4.2.1.6. Flight Readiness Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall demonstrate at the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) that the SV is 
ready for launch.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall review anomalies, their resolution, and all 
deviations. 
4.2.1.7. Launch Readiness Review 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall support the Launch Readiness Review (LRR). 
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4.3. Systems Engineering 
4.3.1. Technical Budgets and Margins 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall develop technical budgets, reserves and/or margins for all 
performance metrics (e.g., mass, power, pointing control authority and knowledge, 
telecommunication link performance).  The MidSTAR-1 team shall develop reserve and/or 
margin allocation schedules linked to major milestones or design progress.  The MidSTAR-1 
team shall allocate margin to all unmargined payload requirements and/or properties in 
accordance with margin allocation criteria they select or devise. 
4.3.2. Payload Support Verification 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide telemetry of SC systems sufficient to verify that the SC is 
properly accommodating the experiment requirements.  Examples of such telemetry points 
include, but are not limited to, voltages and currents in power supplies provided to the 
experiment payloads, temperatures of payload reference points, deployment sensors, attitude 
measurements, etc. 
4.3.3. Engineering Analyses 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide static and dynamic structures models, thermal, mass 
properties, attitude control stability, power, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), 
communications links, and reliability analyses for review by STP and designated representatives, 
the experimenters, and the integration contractor as appropriate. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall deliver the following drawings to the IC in accordance with the IC 
Integrated Master Schedule: 
 Contamination Control Requirements 
 Payload Thermal Analysis 
 
[In the titles of these documents, “Payload” actually refers to the SV.] 
4.3.4. Technical Documentation 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall deliver the following technical documents to the IC in accordance 
with the IC Integrated Master Schedule: 
 Spacecraft Questionnaires (Draft and Final) 
 Spacecraft Launch Operations Plan 
 Spacecraft Integration Procedures 
 Interface Requirements Document 
 Spacecraft Critical Design Review package 
 Spacecraft Test Documents 
 Payload Program Requirements 
 Payload Facility Requirements 
 Mission Operations and Support Requirements 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide technical input to the following documents to be delivered 
by the IC in accordance with the IC Integrated Master Schedule: 
 Interface Control Document 
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 Missile System Pre-launch Safety Plan 
 Vehicle Information Memorandum 
 
[In the titles of these documents, “Spacecraft” and “Payload” actually refer to the SV.] 
4.3.5. Detailed Design Drawings 
Drawings shall include assembly drawings, complete SC electrical schematics, wiring drawings 
and lists, mechanical and electrical layouts, materials list, approved parts list, and coatings.  The 
MidSTAR-1 team shall make these available to STP in a central repository.  Selected items shall 
be delivered to STP upon request. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall deliver the following drawings to the IC in accordance with the IC 
Integrated Master Schedule: 
 Spacecraft Computer Aided Design (CAD) models 
 Spacecraft Mass Properties 
 Spacecraft Drawings 
 Spacecraft Dynamic Models 
 
[In the titles of these documents, “Spacecraft” and “Payload” actually refer to the SV.] 
4.4. Testing Requirements 
4.4.1. General Test Program Requirements 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall plan and execute the verification effort.  The verification program 
shall use the appropriate inspection, demonstration, test, and analysis techniques to verify all 
requirements. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall plan and execute a tailored test program, with STP concurrence, as 
part of an overall verification of the SV and ground system compliance to mission requirements.  
Testing and tailoring should be accomplished in accordance with the guidance in 
MIL-HDBK-340A and DOD-HDBK-343 for a Class D SC (or equivalent standards) except as 
specified otherwise.  The requirements in this TRD assume a proto-qualification test strategy for 
a single flight unit; the MidSTAR-1 team may propose an alternate test strategy with 
justification. 
 
Levels chosen for environmental tests shall include or envelop all possible anticipated shipping, 
handling, integration, launch, and flight conditions. STP will provide information on the launch 
environment to the MidSTAR-1 team. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall derive the appropriate component environmental test levels and 
provide these to the experiment PIs and to STP.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall also provide 
measured or calculated loads (static, vibration and/or shock) at the payload mounting locations.  
The MidSTAR-1 team shall validate any models used to calculate loads. 
 
All SC-level testing and beyond shall be conducted using configuration-controlled versions of 
flight software.  Deficiencies found in ground testing shall be corrected before the last end-to-
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end test.  Deficiencies found during initialization and checkout should be corrected before first 
year operations begin. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall allow STP personnel, the experiment PIs, or their designated 
representatives to observe testing. 
4.4.2. Test Planning 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall produce and submit a System Integration and Test Plan.  The 
System Integration and Test Plan shall include an overview of the test program, plus test specific 
plans.  The overview should show the integration and test flow, including the integration points 
for major items (payloads, mass models, Lightband, SC components, etc.), configuration 
changes, transportation, and other logistical considerations.  It should also address retesting for 
failures that result from part malfunctions or inadequate design. 
 
Each test-specific plan shall include the objectives for each test referenced to primary and/or 
derived requirements, a description of test facility for each test, the configuration of the space 
vehicle, test entrance criteria, test exit criteria, test success criteria, and a detailed description of 
for all I&T activities.  The System Integration and Test Plan shall include unit-level 
environmental testing; spacecraft level functional tests; experiment payload environmental 
testing; hardware bake-outs; experiment payload pre- and post-shipment functional tests; 
experiment payload integration; space vehicle environmental, EMC, and functional tests; system 
end-to-end testing; LV integration; and on-orbit test and check-out. 
 
At least 30 days prior to each test, the MidSTAR-1 team shall provide STP and the involved 
experimenters with written test procedures that include step-by-step checklists, acceptable 
system response (or range of responses) to each step, a designated space to record the actual 
response, and initials for the test conductor and any quality control personnel. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall document the test configuration for all environmental tests by 
photography or videography. 
4.4.3. Spacecraft Simulator 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide a spacecraft simulator for use by the experimenters.  At a 
minimum, the simulator shall permit the experimenters to verify connectors, pin-outs, and 
communication protocols.  [Other suggested functions for the spacecraft simulator include 
providing a command interface for the experimenters, supporting software and data uploads, and 
demonstrating telemetry collection and file handling.] 
4.4.4. Payload Integration 
Prior to integration of the experiment payloads onto the SC, the experiment payloads and the 
spacecraft components shall have successfully completed environmental and functional testing.  
Furthermore, the MidSTAR-1 team, the experimenters, and STP shall verify all SC and payload 
interfaces and review all test data to ensure all hardware and software is clear to be mated. 
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4.4.5. Space Vehicle Qualification and Acceptance 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall perform at least one separation test using the flight Lightband 
system. 
 
SV thermal vacuum testing shall include a minimum of eight (8) cycles with full functional tests 
conducted at the high and low extremes of the first and last cycles.  The last three cycles shall be 
anomaly free.  Simulated operations representative of the mission activities and scenarios, 
including typical commanding, tracking, and telemetry contacts, should be conducted during the 
thermal vacuum testing. 
4.4.6. End-to-End Test 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct at least one end-to-end test using the SV, the SGS (or a 
reasonable facsimile), and communication links to the experimenter agencies representative of 
the ones to be used during on-orbit operations.  These tests shall exercise typical data flow 
including commanding to payloads and SC subsystems, payload data collection, spacecraft 
processing, and data downlink operations. 
 
The flight software, ground station software, command databases and telemetry databases that 
are used in the final end-to-end test shall be the final configurations released prior to launch. 
4.4.7. 24-Hour Mission Simulation Test 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conduct at least one 24-hour Mission Simulation test (a.k.a. “Day-
in-the-Life” test).  The Mission Simulation test shall, to the greatest extent possible, exercise the 
SV systems and payloads in a manner similar to its operations on orbit.  For this test, the 
MidSTAR-1 team shall document the test procedures and the results for presentation at later 
readiness reviews.   (The purpose of this test is to gain confidence that the spacecraft will support 
the operations concept.  Sometimes, certain design failure modes that become manifest in long-
duration operations, such as memory fragmentation, input/output overload, etc., only become 
apparent at a system level). 
4.5. Mission Support Requirements 
4.5.1. Security 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall identify and conform to all security regulations that apply to their 
facilities. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 Team shall ensure that foreign nationals assigned to the MidSTAR-1 project or 
to the associated experimenters are not given access to data concerning the Delta-IV launch 
vehicle or the activities associated with the design, integration, test and deployment of the IPS. 
4.5.2. Health and Safety 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall identify and conform to all health and safety requirements that apply 
to facilities used in the design, construction and test of the MidSTAR-1 SV. 
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4.5.3. Environmental Assessment 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall support STP’s environmental assessment activities by providing 
data on materials, failure modes and probabilities, or other data as required. 
4.5.4. Frequency Allocation 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall obtain frequency allocations for the SC and the ICSat experiment. 
4.5.5. Encryption 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall comply with the encryption requirements of National Security 
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) No. 12.  [The 
MidSTAR-1 team may pursue a waiver for uplink and downlink encryption IAW NSTISSP 
No. 12.  However, if a waiver is denied, the MidSTAR-1 team must encrypt communications 
IAW National Security Agency (NSA) and United States Navy (USN) guidelines.] 
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5. Experiment Requirements 
5.1. Payload Coordinate Systems 
No requirement. 
5.2. Interface Allocations 
The MidSTAR-1 Team shall provide all fastening devices for securing the CFTP payload.  The 
MidSTAR-1 team shall provide the harness and its connectors.  The CFTP team will provide the 
connectors on the housing. 
 
The ICSat team will procure all experiment-side connector sets, and will provide the 
MidSTAR-1 team with the SC side of the connector halves.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide 
the harness between the ICSat assembly and the MidSTAR-1 Processor.  The MidSTAR-1 team 
shall also provide the fastening devices for securing the ICSat assembly to the MidSTAR-1 
structure. 
5.3. Physical Interfaces 
5.3.1. Physical Properties 
5.3.1.1. Dimensions 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall accommodate the payload dimensions as negotiated with the 
experimenters and STP. 
 
[Current dimensions for the experiments are as follows: 
CFTP box dimensions are 16 cm x 20 cm x 8cm. 
ICSat Transceiver Assembly:  25 cm x 25 cm x 10 cm 
ICSat Antenna:  Not to exceed 12cm x 12cm x 15cm] 
 
5.3.1.2. Mass Properties 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall accommodate the payload mass properties as negotiated with the 
experimenters. 
 
[Current estimate of the total mass is TBD kg for the CFTP payload, and 8.45 kg for ICSat.  
Centers of gravity for each payload component are currently estimated to be the geometric 
centers of gravity.] 
5.3.1.3. Surface Properties 
No requirement. 
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5.3.2. Mechanical Interfaces 
5.3.2.1. Fastening and Contact 
[The CFTP board will bolts to mount to the SC; type and mounting pattern TBS.  The ICSat 
components all present a four-bolt pattern for fastening.  This includes the amplifier card, the 
communications block, and the antenna.] 
5.3.2.2. Alignment and Orientation 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall mount the CFTP payload so that the radiation shielding provided by 
other SV structures and/or components is minimized.  [CFTP has no requirements for alignment 
or orientation with respect to the SC axes.] 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall mount the ICSat Antenna on a flat surface.  [The MidSTAR-1 team 
may negotiate minor protrusions or deviations in flatness of the antenna surface with the ICSat 
experimenter.]  The MidSTAR-1 team shall align the antenna boresight within 5° of 
perpendicular to the antenna-mounting surface. 
5.3.2.3. Fields-of-View 
The CFTP board has no field-of-view (FOV) requirements. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall mount the ICSat Antenna so that no obstructions penetrate a cone of 
70° half-angle centered on the antenna boresight, and obstructions into the hemisphere centered 
on the antenna boresight are minimized. 
5.3.2.4. Load Paths 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall not mount SV hardware to any payload hardware in a manner that 
transmits loads through the payload hardware. 
5.3.3. Moving Parts and Deployable Mechanisms 
No requirement.  [Neither CFTP nor ICSat have any moving parts or deployable mechanisms.] 
5.3.4. Electrical Connectors and Harnesses 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate the specifications for connectors and harnesses with the 
experimenters. 
 
[Each experimenter will provide both halves of each connector on the experiment end of a 
harness.  Each experimenter will also provide at least one set of flight spares, and a set of 
connector savers. 
 
The ICSat ITA requires: 
 Power connector for the communications block 
 Power connector for the amplifier 
 One serial port for command signals 
 One serial port for data input 
 One coax port for output to the transmit antenna 
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 One coax port for input from the receive antenna 
] 
5.4. Electrical Power 
5.4.1. Voltage and Current 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide one switched 28 VDC +8/-4 VDC power line to the CFTP 
payload. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide one switched 12 VDC ± TBD VDC power line to the CFTP 
payload. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide two switched 5 VDC ± 1 VDC power lines to the ICSat 
payload. 





The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate grounding interfaces with each experimenter. 
5.4.5. Power Draw Profiles 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide experiments with power across each power line as negotiated 
with each experimenter. 
 
[Current estimates for power draw for each power line are given in Table 5-1below.  The values 
given here are unmargined.] 
 
Table 5-1:  Power Draw of MidSTAR-1 Payloads 
Power States, W Component 
Survival Standby Operating Peak 
CFTP 0.0 0.5 5.0 11.0 
ICSat     
    Comm Block 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 
    Amplifier 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 
 
[Survival power is the power that must be provided to the payload during nominal operations 
when the payload is not in standby or operating.  Standby power is defined as the average power 
consumption of an instrument in a condition where it is not collecting data but could start doing 
so instantaneously without warm up.  Operational power is defined as the average power 
consumption of a component during the period it is operating.  Peak power is the maximum 
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instantaneous power that a component will draw; this does not include power surges of less than 
1.0 milliseconds. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide sufficient power to the payloads to operate all experiment 
modes.  [Payload power consumption for typical operations modes and duty cycles, assuming a 
96-minute orbit duration, are shown in Table 5-2 below.] 
 
Table 5-2:  Power Profiles of the MidSTAR-1 Payloads 
Experiment Ops Mode Power Draw, W Fraction of Orbit, 





5 100% Continuous 
CFTP Configuration 
Change 
TBD TBD Once per week 
CFTP Standby 
 
0.5 TBD Only as needed 
ICSat Data Transmission 14.0 11 min Each pass over 
SGS 
ICSat Standby 4.0 85 min Out of view of 
SGS 
 
5.5. Electrical Signals (Inputs and Outputs) 
5.5.1. Discrete Analog Signals 
No requirement. 
5.5.2. Discrete Bi-Level Signals 
No requirement. 
5.5.3. Digital Signals 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide one RS-422 asynchronous serial interface at 115kbps. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide one synchronous serial data channel with the ICSat payload.  
The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate data bus specifications and data transfer protocols with the 
ICSat experimenter. 
5.6. Software Interfaces 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide a computer system to execute the ICSat Hosted Software.  
The host computer system shall be a PC-104 or equivalent platform with Linux operating 
system.  The host computer system shall provide at least 1 Mbyte of storage space for the Hosted 
Software.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate the Hosted Software interfaces, protocols, 
permissions, and resource management with the ICSat experimenter. 
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5.7. Command and Data Requirements 
5.7.1. Time/Clock Reference Requirements 
No requirement. 
5.7.2. Command Requirements 
5.7.2.1. Command Scheme 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide the capability for experimenters to execute real-time 
commands (forwarded to the payload immediately upon receipt) and stored commands 
(forwarded to the payload according to a time indicator within the command or a header. 
5.7.2.2. Command Loading 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide the following commands to CFTP: 
1.  A periodic watchdog timer command to the experiment in order to provide a maskable 
capability for asserting experiment reset 
2.  A command to place the experiment into standby mode 
3.  A command to place the experiment into active mode 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall be able to execute the ICSat Hosted Software application upon 
command.  The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide commands to switch the power lines to ICSat 
experiment hardware.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate additional ICSat commands and 
command formats with the ICSat experimenter. 
5.7.3. Telemetry Requirements 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall monitor and report payload temperatures and power supply line 
voltages and currents.  This data shall be provided to the experimenters to assist in  payload data 
analysis.  The SC shall monitor these points with enough resolution to discern when the payloads 
are on. 
5.7.4. Data Management Requirements 
5.7.4.1. Data Volume 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall accept a maximum of 1 Mbytes (unmargined) of CFTP data per day 
from the payload.  The MidSTAR-1 team shall negotiate additional requirements with the CFTP 
experimenter.  The MidSTAR-1 SC shall accept a maximum of 1 Mbytes (unmargined) of CFTP 
data per day from the SGS for transfer to the CFTP payload.  The MidSTAR-1 SC shall provide 
a minimum of 2 Mbyte (unmargined) of data storage for the exclusive use of the CFTP payload. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall accept a maximum of 30 Mbytes (unmargined) of ICSat stored data 
files to be transported over the experimental communications link.  [This storage requirement 
does not include requirements driven by the Hosted Software.]  The MidSTAR-1 SC shall 
provide a minimum of 30 Mbytes of mass memory for the exclusive use of the ICSat payload. 
 
FINAL 
Page 22 of 30 
[All experiment data requirements include experiment overhead, but do not include SC-added 
overhead.] 
5.7.4.2. Data Latency 
The MidSTAR-1 SC/SGS system shall retrieve payload downlink data within 24 hours of when 
the data was generated. 
5.7.4.3. Data Quality 
The SC shall ensure that CFTP data resident on SC systems do not experience more than 1 
uncorrected bit error per day.  The MidSTAR-1 SC-to-SGS (from data bus interface with the 
payload to placement on data distribution server) system shall introduce bit-errors into CFTP at a 
rate no greater than 2 in 105, averaged over the total volume of data transferred.   
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC-to-SGS (from data bus interface with the payload to placement on data 
distribution server) system shall introduce bit-errors into ICSat date at a rate no greater than 1 in 
105, averaged over the total volume of data transferred. 
5.7.4.4. Payload Data Management Functions 
The SC shall accept data from the payloads as they are generated.  The SC shall provide 
buffering and routing of uploaded data to the payloads.  The SC shall provide the sole on-orbit 
payload data storage for both experiments. 
 
The SC shall conduct all data management activities for payload data that is in storage, 
including, but not limited to: memory checks, memory purges, identify data blocks, perform 
error detection and correction, and enforce experiment data separation. 
 
The SC shall conduct all data bus management between the payloads and the SC subsystems, 
including, but not limited to: enforcing allowable latency from “message ready” to “message 
handled”, avoidance of data overwrite, preventing early data fetch, and arbitrating data access 
contention. 
 
The SC shall be able to route uplinked commands to the SC.  The SC shall be able to route SC 
telemetry to the ICSat payload for transmission to the ground station.  The SC shall be able to 
forward data from the ICSat payload to the CFTP payload, and from the CFTP payload to the 
ICSat payload. 
5.8. Environmental Constraints 
5.8.1. Static and Quasi-Static Loads 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and/or SC shall not expose the experiment payloads to static or 
quasi-static loads greater than those the MidSTAR-1 team derives for the experimenters. 
5.8.2. Random Vibration 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and/or SC shall not expose the experiment payloads to random 
vibration loads greater than those the MidSTAR-1 team derives for the experimenters. 
FINAL 
Page 23 of 30 
5.8.3. Acoustics 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and/or SC shall not expose the experiment payloads to acoustic loads 
greater than those the MidSTAR-1 team derives for the experimenters. 
5.8.4. Shock 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and/or SC shall not expose the experiment payloads to shock loads 
greater than those the MidSTAR-1 team derives for the experimenters. 
5.8.5. Depressurization 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and/or SC shall not expose the experiment payloads to 
depressurization at rates greater than 4.14 kPa/sec. 
5.8.6. Humidity 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and/or SC maintain the CFTP and ICSat payload in a humidity range 




5.8.8.1. Temperature Limits 
The MidSTAR-1 processes and /or SC shall maintain CFTP and ICSat payload elements within 
the temperature ranges given in Table 5-3. 
 









Notes Payload Component 
Low High Low High  
CFTP      
ICSat      
     Amplifier -40 90 -25 80  
     Communications Block -40 90 -25 80  
     Antenna -40 90 N/A N/A  
 
5.8.8.2. Thermal Flux Limits 
No requirement. 
5.8.9. Contamination 
From receipt of the experiment payloads to the transfer of the SV to the IC, the MidSTAR-1 
team shall maintain the experiment payloads in a cleanliness environment of Class 100,000 or 
better.  Exceptions to this condition shall be coordinated with STP. 
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5.8.10. Electromagnetic Compatibility 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall ensure that the SV operates without anomaly, as defined in Section 
3.1 of MIL-STD-1541A.  Ground Support Equipment (GSE)-generated electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) shall not degrade the MidSTAR-1 team’s ability to test and operate the SV in 
normal test environments. 
 
[The CFTP shall to meet MIL-STD461/462 requirements for radiated emissions, as tailored 
MidSTAR-1 team and the IC. 
 
When not conducting communications experiments, the ICSat payload shall comply with MIL-
STD-461 requirements for radiated emissions, as tailored by the MidSTAR-1 team and the IC.  
In addition, during communications events, ICSat will transmit in a frequency band of 2 MHz 
bandwidth, centered on frequency 2.4 GHz. 
5.9. Positioning and Orientation Requirements 
5.9.1. Orbit Maintenance 
No requirement. 
5.9.2. Attitude Control and Knowledge 
No attitude knowledge or control requirement for CFTP. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall point the boresight of the ICSat antenna within 90 degrees of the SV 
instantaneous local nadir axis. 
5.10. Integration and Test Support Requirements 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide sufficient workspace and supplies for the experimenters 
throughout the integration and test period, as negotiated with the experimenters.  “Workspace 
and supplies” shall include work areas, furnishings, office supplies, other minor supplies (e.g. 
cleanroom suits), access to standard wall electrical outlets, access to telephone lines, and access 
to an internet server. 
 
All personnel handling the payloads shall use standard electrostatic discharge precautions.  All 
personnel working near the ICSat antenna shall observe a keep-out/no-hands zone around the 
antenna. 
5.11. Operations Support Requirements 
5.11.1. Facility Requirements 
No requirement. 
5.11.2. Personnel Training Requirements 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall establish training requirements for the experimenters.  The 
MidSTAR-1 shall train the experimenters in accordance with their requirements as needed. 
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5.11.3. Payload Operations Requirements 
[Upon application of power, the CFTP payload will perform a self-test and generate status 
reports.]  The MidSTAR-1 SC shall be able to accept data from the CFPT payload at any time 
while CFTP is powered on. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall time-stamp all data packets from CFTP.  The time-stamps shall be 
correlated to Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) within ±1 second. 
 
The SC shall maintain ICSat experiment data until deleted by ground command. 
5.11.4. Mission Planning Requirements 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide an operations plan that outlines SC on-orbit check-out, 
experiment payload check-out, normal operations, contingency operations, and mission end-of-
life.  The operations plan shall demonstrate that the MidSTAR-1 mission will satisfy all mission 
requirements.  The normal operations plan should ideally describe the progression of activities 
that lead to increasing levels of mission success. 
5.11.4.1. Ephemeris Requirements 
CFTP has no predictive or real-time ephemeris knowledge requirement.  ICSat requires orbit 
elements or ephemeris to permit predictions of SV passes over the SGS ground station.  ICSat 
requires accuracy of the orbital elements or ephemeris to be sufficient to predict pass times with 
predicted rise time accurate to within ±1 minutes of the actual rise for up to five days from the 
epoch of the element set or ephemeredes. 
5.11.4.2. Meteorological Services 
No requirement. 
5.11.4.3. Space Weather Services 
No requirement. 
5.11.5. Data Distribution and Analysis Requirements 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall provide orbit elements and/or ephemeris to CFTP to correlate 
experiment processor faults to orbit location.  The accuracy of orbit elements and/or ephemeris 
shall be sufficient to locate each event with an accuracy of less than or equal to 50 km. 
 
ICSat has no requirements for post-pass orbit elements or ephemeris. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall make all downloaded experiment data files available to the 
experimenters within 24 hours of receiving the download. 
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6. Launch Service Requirements 
6.1. LV Coordinate System 
For each secondary interface on the ESPA, a local right-handed coordinate system is defined 
with the origin in the SSIP and centered in the flange.  The positive X-axis is defined 
perpendicular to the SSIP and directed toward the fairing.  The positive Y-axis lies in the SSIP, 
is parallel with the LV longitudinal axis, and is directed toward the primary payload station.  The 
positive Z-axis is orthogonal to the X- and Y-axes, with its direction dictated by the right-hand 
rule.  All MidSTAR-1 data submitted to the IC shall reference this coordinate system. 
6.2. Interface Allocations 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall count the Lightband separation system as part of the space vehicle 
for all purposes. 
6.3. Physical Interfaces 
6.3.1. Physical Properties 
6.3.1.1. Dimensions 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall fit within a 60.9 cm x 60.9 cm x 96.5cm static envelope; small 
excursions beyond the envelope may be coordinated with the STP-1 SPO.  The Lightband 
separation system and all payload components shall be contained within the volume envelope. 
6.3.1.2. Mass Properties 
The SV mass shall not exceed 150 kg.  For purposes of mass calculation, the SV shall account 
for the entire Lightband system in its mass budget. 
 
The SV center of mass shall be less than or equal to 48 centimeters from the secondary standard 
interface plane with ESPA (along the positive x-axis as defined in the Secondary Payload 
Planner’s Guide.)  The center of gravity excursion from the SV centerline shall be chosen to 
maintain SV controllability with the resultant tip-off rate, and ensure satisfactory deployment 
clearance. 
6.3.1.3. Surface Properties 
This section not used. 
6.3.2. Mounting, Alignment and Clocking 
The SV design shall permit reasonable access to the Lightband bolts and electrical connectors 
during SV-to-ESPA integration.  The SV design shall permit reasonable access to test ports 
and/or arming plugs after integration to the ESPA and during post-encapsulation processing, as 
appropriate. 
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6.3.3. Moving Parts and Deployable Mechanisms 
Any moving part or deployable mechanism shall be inhibited to ensure it does not move or 
deploy prematurely. 
6.3.4. Electrical Connectors and Harnesses 
The MidSTAR-1 SC electrical connections to the LV and the launch umbilical shall be routed 
through the Lightband 15-pin connector. 
6.4. Electrical Power 
6.4.1. Umbilical Power 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall require no more than two pairs of electrical power lines through the 
umbilical harness while mated to the ESPA. 
6.4.2. LV Power 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall not require LV-provided power at any time. 
6.4.3. SC Power 
If the MidSTAR-1 team decides to forego trickle charge service through the umbilical, the 
MidSTAR-1 SV electrical power function shall remain viable for ninety contiguous days without 
maintenance or reconditioning. 
6.5. Electrical Signals (Inputs and Outputs) 
6.5.1. Umbilical Signals 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall require no more than two pairs of digital telemetry lines through the 
umbilical harness while mated to the ESPA.  
6.5.2. LV Signals 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall provide a loopback for one pair of wires from the LV to serve as a 
separation indicator. 
6.6. Command and Data Requirements 
[The launch vehicle shall supply the redundant signal for Lightband initiation.] 
6.7. LV Environments 
The STP-1 SPO will provide the MidSTAR-1 team with predicted launch loads (quasi-static, 
random vibration and shock) when available.  Until the predicted loads are available, the 
MidSTAR-1 team shall apply the loads given in Sections 6.7.1 and 6.7.2 below for design.  All 
other environments are as specified in the Delta IV Payload Planners Guide.  The MidSTAR-1 
team shall satisfy any additional requirements imposed by the STP-1 SPO. 
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6.7.1. Static and Quasi-Static Loads 
Until predicted loads are available, the MidSTAR-1 team shall use design load factors of 10.6 g 
in the LV axial (MidSTAR-1 + Y-axis) and 10.6 g’s LV lateral (MidSTAR-1 + Z-axis), applied 
concurrently and at the SV center of gravity. 
6.7.2. Fundamental Frequency 
The SV shall be designed with a minimum first fundamental frequency of 35 Hz in both the LV 
axial (MidSTAR-1 + Y-axis) and LV lateral (MidSTAR-1 + Z-axis) directions. 
6.7.3. Random Vibration 
[To be supplied] 
6.7.4. Acoustics 
[To be supplied] 
6.7.5. Shock 
[To be supplied] 
6.7.6. Depressurization 
The MidSTAR-1 SC shall tolerate depressurization at rates up to 4.14 kPa/sec. 
6.7.7. Humidity 
[To be supplied] 
6.7.8. Contamination 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall comply with the STP-1 contamination plan, when available.  The 
following requirements apply until superceded by the requirements in the contamination plan. 
 
All flight hardware, and all GSE that will accompany flight hardware into thermal and/or thermal 
vacuum chambers, shall contain only low-outgassing materials (total mass loss < 1.0% and 
collected volatile condensable materials < 0.10%); else, the SV and the accompanying GSE shall 
be subjected to a thermal vacuum bake-out to achieve equivalent low-outgassing properties.  
Additionally, the MidSTAR-1 team shall be prepared to provide a list of materials to the STP-1 
SPO upon request. 
 
From payload integration on, all flight hardware and accompanying GSE shall be maintained in 
Class 100,000 environments at all times (some brief violations may be tolerated with approval 
from STP).  Prior to shipping to the launch site, the exterior of the SV and accompanying GSE 
shall be verified to be visibly clean.  At the launch site, the MidSTAR-1 team shall comply with 
all cleanliness procedures imposed by the IC. 
6.7.9. Thermal 
[To be supplied] 
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6.7.10. Electromagnetic Compatibility 
The MidSTAR-1 SV, GSE, and procedures shall comply with the requirements provided in the 
STP-1 Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis, when available.  This analysis will determine the 
EMI concerns for all SVs on the STP-1 mission. 
 
The MidSTAR-1 communications subsystem and the ICSat experiment shall not radiate through 
RF antennas while in the launch base integration facility or while the SV is mated to the ESPA.  
If post LV-integration (especially post-encapsulation) tests are required, communications 
between the SV and the GSE shall be conducted over cables. 
6.8. Integration and Test Support Requirements 
Prior to integration to the ESPA, the MidSTAR-1 SV shall be cleaned to VC 7 Cleanliness level, 
as defined in the Delta IV Payload Planners’ Guide, Table 4-4.   
6.9. Launch Operations Requirements 
6.9.1. Countdown 
No requirement. 
6.9.2. Launch and Ascent 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall be powered off during ascent. 
6.9.3. Separation 
The MidSTAR-1 SV shall not contact any other SV on the IPS during separation. 
6.10. Launch Base Requirements 
6.10.1. Security 
The MidSTAR-1 team shall conform to the security requirements in place at the launch site. 
6.10.2. Range Safety 
All launch site operations shall be compliant with the requirements of Eastern and Western 
Range (EWR) 127-1 as applicable to the launch site. 
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7. Operations Service Requirements 
7.1. Ground System Interface Requirements 
This section not used. 
7.2. Personnel Training Requirements 
This section not used. 
7.3. Space Vehicle Management Requirements 
This section not used. 
7.4. Mission Planning Requirements 
This section not used. 
7.5. Data Distribution and Analysis Requirements 
This section not used 
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APPENDIX B: CFTP SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMS 
Appendix B contains the schematic diagrams depicting the pin-outs of 
each of the CFTP’s devices.  Figure 57 is shows the PC/104 interface, Intel flash 
memory, Xilinx PROM, voltage regulators, and oscillator.  Figure 58 shows the 
pin-out for the Configuration Controller FPGA, and Figure 59 shows the pin-out 





Figure 57.   CFTP Schematic Sheet 1 
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Figure 58.   CFTP Schematic Sheet 2 
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Figure 59.   CFTP Schematic Sheet 3 
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APPENDIX C: CFTP PCB LAYER SCHEMATICS 
Appendix C contains the layer detail of the CFTP PCB.  Figure 61 is the 
top layer, including silk screen.  Figure 62 is the top layer mask.  Figure 63 is the 
first mid-layer.  Figures 64 through 66 are the VCCINT (+2.5V), Ground, and VCCO 
(+3.3V) planes, respectively.  Figures 67 and 68 are mid-layers two and three.  
Figure 69 is the bottom layer mask.  Figure 70 shows the bottom layer, including 




Figure 61.   CFTP PCB Top Layer, Including Silk Screen 
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Figure 63.   CFTP PCB First Mid-Layer  
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Figure 64.   CFTP PCB VCCINT (+2.5V) Plane 
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Figure 65.   CFTP PCB Ground Plane 
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Figure 66.   CFTP PCB VCCO (+3.3V) Plane 
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Figure 67.   CFTP PCB Mid-Layer Two 
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Figure 68.   CFTP PCB Mid-Layer Three 
212
 
Figure 69.   CFTP PCB Bottom Layer Mask 
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Figure 70.   CFTP PCB Bottom Layer, Including Silk Screen 
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Figure 71.   CFTP PCB Dimensions. 
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APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY 
ALU Arithmetic Logic Unit 
AMD Advanced Micro Devices 
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
BGA Ball Grid Array 
CAD Computer Aided Design 
CC Configuration Controller 
C&DH Command and Data Handler 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CFTP Configurable Fault-Tolerant Processor 
CLB Configurable Logic Block 
C-Module Combinatorial Module 
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor 
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf  
CP Configurable Processor 
CPE Configurable Processor Experiment 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check  
DC Direct Current 
DD Displacement Damage 
DLL Delay Lock Loop 
DOD Department of Defense 
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory 
DSP Digital Signal Processing 
ECC Error Correction Code 
EDAC Error Detection And Correction 
epi epitaxial layer 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
GCR Galactic Cosmic Rays 
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit 
GeV Giga-electron Volt 
GRM General Routing Matrix 
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GTO Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit  
HDL Hardware Description Language 
IC Integrated Circuit 
I/O Input/Output 
IOB Input/Output Block 
ISP In-System Programmable 
JTAG Joint Test Action Group 
KeV Kilo-electron Volt 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LET Linear Energy Transfer 
MEO Medium Earth Orbit 
MeV Mega-electron Volt 
MidSTAR-1 Midshipmen Science and Technology Application Re-
search Mission 1  
MIPS  Million Instructions Per Second  
MISR Multi-angle Imaging SpectroRaiodmeter 
MOS Metal Oxide Semiconductor  
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NPSAT1 Naval Postgraduate School Satellite 1 
NRE Non-Recurring Engineering 
ONO Oxide-Nitride-Oxide  
OTP One-Time Programmable 
PAL Programmable Array Logic 
PANSAT Petit Amateur Navy Satellite 
PC Personal Computer 
PCB Printed Circuit Board 
PLA Programmable Logic Unit 
PLD Programmable Logic Device 
PLICE Programmable Low Impedance Circuit Element 
QFP Quad Flat Pack 
RADHARD Radiation Hardened 
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rads Radiation Absorbed Dose 
RAM Random Access Memory 
R-Cell Register Cell 
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Architecture 
RLOS Random Left-Over Stuff 
ROM Read Only Memory 
SAA South Atlantic Anomaly 
SCR Silicon Controller Rectifier 
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory 
SEE Single Event Effect 
SEL Single Event Latchup 
SERB Space Experiments Review Board 
SET Single Event Transient 
SEU Single Event Upset 
S-Module Sequential Module 
SOC System-On-A-Chip 
SOI Silicon on Insulator 
SPLD Serial (or Sequential) Programmable Logic Device 
SRAM Static Random Access Memory 
SSAG Space Systems Academic Group 
STP Space Test Program 
TID Total Ionizing Dose 
TMR Triple Modular Redundant 
USAFA United States Air Force Academy 
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